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ABSTRACT 
After a review of the two approaches' to study in community power structure 
(eliticists and pluralists), this study tried to employ an exchange network model in the 
study of local political community structure. 
Following the exchange network approach developed by Richard M. Emerson, 
this study had applied the quantitative network analysis method in studying the 
development of a selected community-based District Board in Hong Kong, namely the 
Kwai Tsing District Board from 1981 to 1993. Relational data was collected through 
multiple methods, including (a) informant interviews of past and present District 
Board members and prominent community activists; (b) content analysis of minutes 
of District Board meetings and Annual Reports of the District Board; and (d) 
retrospective recall of the author's life story during these years (as he was a member 
of the district Board in 1988-1991). 
In this study, the application of network analysis was mainly limited to the 
study of overt and expressed political behaviour on District Board meetings. Patterns 
of the exercise of exchange relations among the District Board members behind the 
scene (Backdoor manipulations) were addressed mainly through informant interviews 
and the review of life story of the author. 
During this period, the development and changes of the power structure within 
the District Board were analysed with respect to four "generations": (a) before 1985; 
(b) 1985-1988; (c) 1988-1991; and (d) 1991-1993. These four "generations" were 
classified according to the election events which reflected significant changes in the 
power structures within the District Board after each election. 
It was argued that although ideological difference was an important factor in 
the demarcation of different groupings within the District Board, the formation, 
alignment, and disintegration of the factions and coalitions were based mainly on 
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political exchange relations among the actors. These basically dyadic relations had 
developed into political exchange networks (of the District Board) and partial 
networks (of the factions). These exchange networks had been found as structural 
constraints to the political behaviours of the District Board members, which explained 





I would like to thank Dr. Stephen Tang, my thesis supervisor, in giving me 
valuable stimulations during the formulation of research strategies. I would also like 
to thank Dr. Lai On Kwok and Mr. Chan Kin Man, on their patience in reading the 
first draft of my thesis with thoughtful comments. Last but not the least, I would like 
to record my gratitude here to Mr. Lee Wing Tat, who had given valuable 
information to me without which this study could not be finished. 
Kwok Ngai Kuen 
i 
\ 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Chapter I: INTRODUCTION 二 
1. Study of Community Power Structure 1 
2. Network Analysis 3 
3. Objective of this Study 6 
4. Methodology ^ 
5. Structure of the Thesis 15 
Chapter II: AN UNEXPLORED POLITICAL MARKET 
1. Introduction 18 
2. Brief History of the Community 18 
3. Demographic Characteristics 20 
4. Political Development of the Community 23 
5. Evolution of Political Market 24 
6. Political Network Before 1985 28 
7. Conclusion 43 
Chapter III: MARKET TEST OF THE LIBERALS 
1. Introduction 45 
2. Changes in Political Scenario 46 
After the 1985 Election 
3. Emerge of the New Generation 49 
4. Structure of the Political Network 55 
(a) Structural Characteristics of 58 
the Total Network 
(b) Supportive Network of the District 64 
Board 
(c) Partial Network of the Liberals 71 
(d) Partial Network of the Conservatives 78 
5. Conclusion 82 
Chapter IV: EMANCIPATION BY THE LIBERALS 
1. Introduction 84 
2. Market Penetration by the Liberals 84 
3. Domination over the District Board 90 
by the Liberals 
4. Structure of the Political Network 99 
of the Conservatives 
5. Political Network of the Liberals 103 
6. Conclusion 114 
t 
\ 
Chapter V: GREAT DIVIDE OF THE LIBERALS 
1. Introduction 117 
2. Continual Domination by the Liberals 117 
3. Political Structure of the District Board 119 
4. Supportive Network of the District Board 125 
5. Split of the Liberal Camp : 127 
6. Aftermath of the Conflict 131 
Chapter VI: CONCLUSION 
1. Impact of Exchange Relations to 145 
Structure of Political Network 
2. Impact of the Context: Application 147 
of Political Market Concept 
3. Methodological Implications 149 





1. Study of Community Power Structure 二 
The study of community power usually concerns the structure and patterns in 
exercising influence or domination over community policies. 
The structural approach to community power takes the positions or roles 
occupied by social actors and the relations or connections among these positions as 
the basic units of political systems. In general, five types of community power 
structures are identified- by various political sociologists (Lynd and Lynd，1934; 
Hunter, 1963; Dahl, 1964; Sayre and Kaufman, 1960; Banfield, 1961): 
(a) simple pyramid: 
- consists of an individual, or a small number of individuals, who 
exercise all the power in community; 
(b) multiple pyramid (vertically integrated): 
- with a few individuals at the top of the structure but their power over 
the the mass is exercised through mediating instruments or 
organizations that are rather hierarchically organized; 
(c) multiple pyramids (horizontally integrated): 
- a number of power groups (multiple centres) of which the integration 
is through the co-existence of another centre possessing approximately 
the same amount of power; 
(d) multiple pyramids (no integration): 
-- there are still multiple centres but without point of control or 
integration of those centres; 
(e) amorphous: 




Hunter (1963) used the reputational method to identify the men of 
power and the relevant networks in Atlanta. He concluded that the power structure 
of Atlanta had exhibited an elitist pattern, with the policy-makers and the 
policy executors as the top power segments. Moreover, there are strong ties and 
shared perceptions of influence that unite-the men of power. In addition, he 
discovered that wealth and business leadership represent the main resources for power 
in the community. His study also revealed that the process of making policy and 
arriving at decisions on major issues facing the community is rarely open to the 
public. 
On the other hand, Dahl (1964) presented a theory of pluralism. By 
using an Issue-oriented approach, he found that in New Heaven, there was 
only a small number of individuals exercise direct influence over the making of major 
policies. Moreover, different issue areas tend to unite different sets of individuals 
who are interested in the substance of the issue under discussion. In contrast with the 
findings of Hunter, he found that the social and economic notables of the community 
rarely play a part in the decision-making process. 
However, these two approaches had received much criticisms. In fact, the 
method they used have to a large extent decided the findings. That is, if one uses the 
reputational method, one will likely to identify the elitist pattern; whereas if one uses 
the issue-oriented method, one will likely identify the pluralist pattern. 
The analysis of community power structure by using the exchange network 
analysis may be a more promising alternative of these two approaches. 
There are two significant assumptions about social behaviour under social 
network analysis. The first one is that any actor will participate in a social system 
including many other actors, who are significant reference points in others' decisions. 
But the focal actor's perceptions, beliefs, and actions may be influenced by the nature 
of these relationships between him and the others. The second characteristic is that, 




positions within a system, in which structure consists of regularities in the patterns 
of relations among concrete entities. Thus, the most important step in social network 
analysis is to delineate a concrete population of social objects and one or more types 
of relationships among them. 
2. Network Analysis 
A network is generally defined as a specific type of relation linking a defined 
set of persons, objects, or events (i.e. actors or nodes). The configuration of present 
and absent ties among the network actors reveals a specific network structure. 
Relationships have both form and content, which are basic concepts in network 
analysis because their variations are expected to explain observed behaviours of 
individual actors and the entire social system. Relational form refers to the properties 
of connections among dyads, apart from their substantive meanings. Two basic forms 
are intensity (the strength or frequency of interaction) and the degree of joint 
involvement in activities, whereas relational contents are the substantive meanings of 
network connections. 
By analysing the density (ratio of number of observed relations to 
maximum possible relations), path distance (minimum number of links to 
connect a dyad), reachability (whether a direct or indirect path 
connecting a dyad) , prominence (the extent to which an actor is visible 
within a system through direct and indirect ties to other actors), cliques, and 
structural equivalent positions, community political networks could 
be detected and studied. 
Following the exchange theory put forward by George Homans from the 
social psychological perspective focusing on the exchange relations between the two 
parties of a dyad, Richard Emerson had realized the potential for blending exchange 
theory with network analysis. In collaboration with Karen Cook, he developed the 
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exchange network theory and basic exchange propositions to explain exchange 
relations and power-dependence conceptualization (Emerson and Cook, 1978), 
He criticised that the exchange theory has the merit of bringing power and equity 
together in a single analytical framework, but it just focused on basically dyadic 
relations, while power is a phenomena of the social structure. On the other hand, 
exchange networks can be used to extend power analysis to n-person social structures. 
Power can be conceptualized as an attribute of network position revealed in behaviour 
even of persons who do not know their position or level of power. 
Moreover, exchange theory and social network analysis both view social 
structure as a configuration of social relations among actors and positions. These two 
approaches have similar conceptions of actor. However, they differ in their view of 
the links between positions. Exchange theory stress the exchange aspect of all ties 
and contends that the appropriate network in any analysis is one that contains all 
relevant exchange relations. On the other hand, network analysis focus more on the 
nature of the links between the actors. Nevertheless, the convergence of exchange 
theory and network analysis as stimulated by Emerson can give more explanatory 
power than either approach alone (Cook and Whitemeyer, 1992). In addition, the 
exchange network theory can also be used in analyses of merging of actors and the 
formation of coalitions, which based on power and position in the 
network. An exchange network can be defined as a set of two 
or more connected exchange relations. Any two relations 
are said to be connected if the frequency or magnitude of 
exchange in one relation is a function of exchange in the 
other relation (Emerson, 1969:396). Market structures can also be 
analysed by using the exchange network approach by taking it as a particular case of 
such network patterns (Cook, 1977). 
Emerson had put forward his conception of power-dependence 
relations which became the starting point of the exchange network theory later 
receiving fast development. The attempt was made in an effort to resolve some of 
the ambiguities surrounding "power", "authority", "legitimacy", and power 
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,"structure", through bringing them together in a coherent scheme. He linked up 
power and dependency by proposing that ''power resides implicitly 
in the other's dependency'' (Emerson, 1962:32). He then made a more 
concrete proposition on this point: 
"Dependence (Dab) • The dependence of actor A 
upon actor B is (1) directly proportional to A's 
motivational investment in goals mediated by 
B and (2) inversely proportional to the 
availability of these goals to A outside of the A-B 
relation." 
(Emerson, 1962:32) 
And thus, ”...power of actor A over actor B is the amount of resistance on the 
part of B which can be potentially overcome by A" (Emerson, 1962:32). 
Emerson had later conducted two experiements to test three hypotheses, that 
submission to group influence varies directly with (1) motivation 
toward participation in the group, (2) intensity of group expectations, and (3) 
status insecurity. He then identified exactly four balancing 
operations in the power-dependence relation (Emerson, 1964): 
(1) Withdrawal. Decreased motivational investment on the part 
of the weaker member. 
(2) Network Extension. Increased availability of goals for the 
weaker member outside the relation (extension 
of the "power network" through formation of 
new relations).‘ 
(3) Status Giving. Increased motivational investment on the part 
of the stronger member. 
(4) Coalition Formation. Decreased availability of goals outside of 
the relation for the stronger member ("coalition 
formation", or collapsing a power network). 
Thus, it could be seen that the exchange network approach had promised 





power-dependence relations between dyads, and the extension of the analysis to 
macro-sociology concerning social structure. Changes of group structure and 
coalition formation process could also be understood by this approach. 
3. Objective of this study 
It is the aim of this study to analyze the community power structure using the 
conception of exchange network. It is hoped that by using this alternative approach 
to the reputational and issue-oriented approaches, the study of community power 
structure will be possible to originate from the political exchange relations of dyads, 
and then to the formation of the whole exchange network. It is in fact the goal of 
Emerson to link up the micro-level analysis with macro-level analysis. Thus, it is the 
objective of this study to examine the exchaange network theory in community power 
study, and through the application of social network analysis to see the potential of 
extending its application on longitudinal analysis of process and change 
concerning community power structure. 
Basically, there are two different types of approaches to longitudinal analysis. 
The first one is the Deterministic Approaches. The notion that a system 
proceeds through time in ways determined by whether levels of certain variables 
reach or exceed the values of certain other "control" variables has had a long history 
in biostatistics and has been received well in sociology. These "structural control" 
models had been applied to study the social interaction processes. Examples are 
temporal regression-based analyses and time-series. 
Another type of approaches is the Probabilistic Approaches, 
Stochastic models, such as diffusion models are examples. In these models, 
theoretically expected contacts at time t or at infinity are based first upon values such 




elaborated by controlling for biases or constraints. Markov analysis was another 
example of this type (Runger & Wasserman, 1979). 
In this study, a deterministic approach will be employed. The configuration 
of the political network is taken as the independent variable, and the exchange 
relations among the actors within the network was the dependent variable influencing 
by the structure of the political network. An intervening variable, the political market 
development, will then be introduced to see the impact of the environemntal changes. 
However, this is not a linear chain of order of causes. The relations might in fact be 
a cyclical one. The exchange relations among the actors are in turn influencing the 
configuration of the political network. Thus, an interactional approach might be more 
appropriate in this study, taking into the consideration of the contextual factor, the 
development of local political scenario and the national political scenario. 
In the past ten years, Hong Kong has undergone very rapid social change and 
drastic political changes. From the early '80s, the "97 issue" had to a great extent 
conscientized most Hong kong people. Development of Representative Government 
and District Administration Scheme have added weight to the politicization of Hong 
Kong people at large. 
Following the past four District Board elections and the first direct election 
of the Legislative Council in 1991, vast number of researches and studies have been 
conducted in this area. Some of them concentrate on the study of political culture of 
Hong Kong people in general (e.g. Jermain Lam & Jane Lee's study on political 
culture of voters of the Legislative Council election, finding that they are of the 
subject — participant type), or on the attitudes towards political leaders or 
political parties (e.g. studies by Prof. S.K. LAU), on the voting behaviours (e.g. 
W.K. TSANG), on content analysis of campaign themes (e.g. M.K. LEE, Jane LEE), 
and on elite-mass relationship (e.g. W.T. CHUI). 
In fact, due to the election system, the past and the future political 
development of Hong Kong will be based on community-level politics as building 
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blocks (e.g. single-seat constituencies or multiple-seats-single-choice constituencies). 
Accoding to the exchange theory, there is a reciprocal influence of the network 
actors' preferences, attitudes, and behaviours, and the actors' impact on the structure 
in turn. Due to this heuristic purpose, it is significant to study the process of 
formation and change of community political network in the past ten years in order 
to understand the political changes of Hong Kong. 
From 1990 and onwards, numerous political parties have been formed in Hong 
Kong, some of them are actually reformed from the political or pressure groups in 
the past. Though the party effect is not being recognized to be a major 
influential factor in elections in Hong Kong, it will gain weight in the future 
elections. Hence, it will be of heuristic significance and also theoretical significance 
to relate the micro-level analysis of community politics and to the macro-level 
analysis of national political structures. It is the aim of this study to illustrate the 
power of explanation of the exchange network analysis not only in studying the 
micro-level dyadic relations, but could also be a viable approach to deal with the 
macro-level of exchange relations between collective actors or groups, and thus the 
formation of exchange networks among these collective actors. It followed that 
macro-level social phenomenon can then be stidues by this approach。 
4. Methodology 
This study takes a single case design method. As the objective of this study 
is not to generalize the findings to all other situations, but to identify variables and 
to get a better understanding on how the variables are related, and to examine the 
exchange network theory, survey designs or experiemental designs will not be 
appropriate. 
A mix of research methods have been used in this study. These include 
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informant interviews, archival research and participant observations. Totally fifteen 
informants had been interviewed. They are either past or incumbent Kwai Tsing 
District Board members, or core members of significant local pressure groups. 
However, due to problems of Informant accuracy in retrospective data as 
a threat to the data recalled (Bernard, K毋worth, Kronenfeld, & Sailer，1984)， 
minutes of District Board meetings, annual reports of the Kwai Tsing District Board, 
Kwai Chung and Tsing Yi District Board, and Tsuen Wan District Board, newspaper 
cuttings, and relevant election campaign materials have been analyzed. 
In addition, participant observations on board meetings and campaigns have 
also been conducted, so as to ensure the convergent validity of the data. It is so 
unique in this case that the researcher is himself one of the District Board members 
during the term 1988-91. Thus, the researcher has many exposures that are unique 
to himself but not shared by others (e.g. lobbying processes, dynamics among the 
board members behind the 
scene, and backdoor manipulations). Such a condition enables the researcher to have 
a more comprehensive understanding of the process. Such a source of information 
has the combined advantages provided by the methods of participant observation and 
autobiography (Szavai, 1984; Sjoberg and Kuhn, 1989; Sheridan, 1993). The method 
used here is in fact a retrospective mix of the method of participant 
observation, autobiography, and life story approach (Angrosino, 1976; Bertaux and 
Kohli, 1984; Simeoni, 1988). It helps to understand the underlying dynamics of the 
committee politics unable to be provided by other methods alone. Moreover, the 
researcher was a total participant during the term 1988-91, but had not acted as a 
researcher at that time. Thus, the participation was an unobtrusive observation 
which was a common limitation of the method of participant observation (Abbs, 1974; 
Harrison and Lyon, 1993). The information was retrieved by a retrospective recall 
of the researcher. 
However, such a method did not made it free of the limitations mentioned by 
Kemsley (Kemsley, 1979): 
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(a) load of reporting on respondents; 
(b) failure to recall events as they recede into the past; 
(c) events remembered, but dates incorrect; 
(d) events remembered, but descriptive details incorrect; 
(e) effect of topics on reported data; 
(f) interviewer effects; 
(g) effect of regular or continuous reporting; 
(h) behavioral change; and 
(i) bias from different response. 
Thus, by using the research mix of informant interview, content analysis of 
minutes of District Board meetings, participant observation, and narrative 
autobiography, such threats to validity will be overcomed. Moreover, in using such 
a research mix, this study tries to integrate the reputational approach and the issue-
oriented approach in community power structure study. By defining the boundary 
of the political exchange network to be the District Board, 
it can avoid the limitations of the reputational method which will turn out an elitist 
pattern. Though it may be querried that other political groups in the community (e.g. 
concern groups and Mutiial-Aid-Committees of housing blocks, MACs) should be 
included so that a more comprehensive power structure can be identified, it is 
doubtful whether MACs should be classified into "political" groupings. In fact, it is 
generally accepted that MACs do not have an influential role in community politics. 
According to a survey on 643 MAC Office-bearers by the City and New 
Territories Administration in 1992 (CNTA, 1992), the most important function of 
MAC as perceived by the office-bearers is t o promote general building 
management and environmental hygiene in the 
estate/building. However, most of the MACs (68%) had not 
participated in any district-wide or territory-wide social 
actions . Although they had also tried to act as a referral agent for the residents' 
complaints, they normally referred the complaints through the District Office (60%), 
Area Committees/District Boards/OMELCO (43%), or direct to government 




problem solving is also reflected from the official view (CNTA, 1992:6): 
At present, MACs, Area Committees (AGs) and District 
Boards (DBs) form three separate and yet inter-related 
tiers of building-based, area-based and district-based 
organizations. There is no formal link between them, 
but they are related through some common membership. 
Most AGs are made up largely of office-bearers of 
MACs and Owners' Corporations in their respective 
areas. It has also been a common practice for MACs 
to refer unresolved issues to AGs for discussion, and 
likewise ACs often ask DBs for help in channelling 
their requests to the Government. From time to time, 
DBs also invite ACs for views before deciding on what 
advice to give to Government on localised issues. In 
most districts, DBs regularly allocate funds to MACs 
for the organization of community building activities. 
Some DBs also make periodic visits to MACs to 
strengthen ties with them, to receive complaints 
from them and to solicit their views on various matters. 
From the above quotation, it is obvious that although there are no formal links 
between DBs and MACs, and between DBs and ACs, the government has bear in 
their mind that there in fact exists a three-tiers l i n k among the t h r e e , 
with a hierarchical order� of DB-AC-MAC. 
In addition, the most frequent activities organized by 
the MACS are the functions in support of activities organized by the 
Area Committees or District Boards. Other frequently organized activities are picnics 
(49%), and fund-raising activities on behalf of charitable organizations (41%). 
Thus, it is not surprising that the MACs perceived themselves (and reflected 
accordingly in their actual functioning) as concerning more on block management 
activities and on neighbourhood building functions. They would rather leave 
community problem solving activities to the District Boards. Hence，the MACs have 
chosen an apolitical role and do not perceive the necessity to fulfill the political 
demands of the residents. 
1 1 
Besides the above "apolitical" role of the MACs, office-bearers also performed 
very poor in District Board elections. 
Year No. of No. of Successful 
Candidates Candidates Elected Rate 
1 9 8 5 2 1 5 2 3 , 8 1 % 
1 9 8 8 9 1 1 . 11% 
1 9 9 1 5 1 * 2 0 . 0 0 % 
Table 1.1"""Performance of MAC-af f 11 iated 
Candidates in DB elections 
Source: News reports of Ming Pao 
*(It should be noted that this only MAC member was one of 
the "Kwai Tsing Sevens") 
From Table 1.1，it is obvious that in addition to the apolitical orientation of 
the MACs, the office-bearers of these MACs did not perform well in the elections 
even when they decided to run for a public office in the district. As the District 
Board elections had to certain extent reflected the choice of the voters, in choosing 
a representative to fulfill their political demands, the poor performance of these MAC 
office-bearers implied that they were not chosen by the voters to act as their political 
representatives. Thus, it is not surprising that MACs, and office-bearers of MACs, 
did not occupy a significant position in the community political power structure. 
On the other hand, there are always overlaps between District Board members 
and community concern groups. For many cases, especially for the elected members, 
the concern groups are formed by the board members, or the board member is 
representing the group in turn. By considering these concern groups also, the 
political behaviours of the concerned board members will be over-emphasized, giving 
bias to the whole political network structure. Moreover, District Board is the only 
legitimate channel that the general public can participate in community politics (other 
than the Area Committees and MACs) through universal franchise or run for the 
offices. Though it is actually the government officials (through the departments and 
the District Management Committee) who make decisions on community issues, it is 
the District Board which provides the opportunities for the participation of community 
politics and thus political dynamics can be observed. Thus, by identifying the 
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political notables of the community through this boundary had avoided the limitations 
faced by the reputational approach. Moreover, the content analysis on the issues 
discussed and decided within the District Board can also shed light on the political 
decision-making process of the community, which, in addition to the above mentioned 
reputational method, can turn out a more cornprehensive consideration of the power 
structure. 
Through the above means, the structure of the political networks are analyzed 
by quantitative method. Relational data is collected, and two relational 
matrices are constructed for each of the four 'generations' of the District Board. One 
of them is an incidence matrix, the case-by-affiliation matrix, recording 
the affiliations and background of each of the District Board members. Another one 
is an adjacency matrix, the mutual-supportive matrix, reflecting the 
mutual-supports among the board members during District Board meetings. Using 
these matrices as data, the computer algorithm programme UCINET IV student 
Version is used to make analysis. It is a computer program to analyze the social 
networks by applying the graph theory (Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman, 1992). 
Freeman had made a clear analysis of the merits and limitations of different computer 
programs in social network analysis such as SONET, GRADAP, SONIS，UCINET, 
N E G O P Y , STRUCTURE, and AL (Freeman, 1988). 
Conventional sociometric techniques commonly used by anthropologists 
in analyzing dyadic relationships are inadequate, in dealing with substantively 
important complex relationships, such as the patterns of membership in groups 
(Wilson, 1982). Thus, by applying graph theory in sociology, central and prestigious 
actors in a social network can be identified (Barnes & Harary, 1983). A variety of 
centrality and prestige measures, such as degree, closeness, information centrality, 
proximity, and status prestige, can then be used to highlight the differences between 
important and nonimportant actors (Faust & Wassennan, 1992). With an 
advancement of the application of graph theory and smallest space analysis on the 
examination of consensus-cleavage structure of the community influence system, 
significant community issues can be identified and the impact by them on the 
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formation of opposing factions and conditions in the District Board can then be made 
(Laumann and Pappi, 1973). 
The time frame of this study is from 1981 to 1993, The reason for choosing 
this time frame is that it has covered f o u r 二〃 gen era tioiis：'' of the Kwai Tsing 
District Board, so that the changes of the power structure can be studied in this 
longitudinal sense. It is through this time frame that the variables contributing to the 
formation, alignment, and disintegration of the political network of the District Board 
can be analyzed, and the implications to the national political network be possible. 
Four aspects of the affiliation networks and supportive networks (Knoke and 
Kuklinski, 1982) at each of the four "generations" will be analysed: 
(a) structure of the network: 
i) density:- proportion of the the number of all ties observed divided by the 
number of all possible ties; 
ii) degree:- the number of other actors with which a given actor has direct 
contact; 
iii) reachability:- minimum number of path distance linking a dyad; 
iv) connectedness:- indicating how the dyad may be linked by directed 
lines. 
(b) indices for actors and networks: 
i) cohesion:- number of mutual choices in a binary matrix of directed ties by 
the maximum possible number of such choices; 
ii) centrality:- ratio of aggregate relations involving the actor over all 
relations in the network; 
iii) prestige of actor:- degree of receiving linkages; 
iv) influence domain:- total number of actors that directly or indirectly 





(c) clique detection: 
A clique is a highly cohesive subset of actors within the network. The 
criterion to detect a clique includes (i) Maximal complete subgraph (a set of 
completely linked points not contained in a larger, completely linked set); or (ii) 
maximal strong component (a network subgraph in which each actor can at least reach 
every other actor directly or indirectly and no further actors can be added without 
losing this mutual reachability (n-cliques, k-plex cliques, or social circles). 
(d) structural equivalence: 
A pair of actors is structurally equivalent if they have exactly identical patterns 
of relations with the N-2 other actors in the network in order to be placed together 
in the same network position. This aspect of analysis is used to partition network 
actors into subgraphs and as an alternative to clique detection method. Two methods 
can be used: (i) cluster analysis (drawing boundaries around objects in 
multidimensional space that result in maximal homogeneity within each cluster; or (ii) 
blockmodel method (using discrete distance algorithms to group actors into 
structurally equivalent positions or blocks). 
5. Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis will be organized into six chapters. According to the time of 
development, the ten years will be divided into four periods, in accordance with the 
four，generations, of the board as a result of the timing of the elections. 
Chapter 2 will present the political scenario before 1985. In these years the 
now Kwai Tsing district was in the boundary of Tsuen Wan District. Before the 
launching of District Administration Scheme and the setting up of territory-wide 
District Boards in 1982, the government has set up the Tsuen Wan Advisory 
Committee. By appointing the notables in the community, the advisory committees 
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have played the role of 'antecedents' of District Boards. After the 'success' of these 
pilot projects in Kwun Tong and Tsuen Wan, 18 District Boards have been set up in 
1982, The first Tsuen Wan District Board has been set up after the election in 1982. 
Though the voter turn out rate was 37%，the actual number of registered voters is 
still small. Not only being neglected by the g^ublic, the election attracted only mainly 
the MAC members to run for the office. It was the first generation of the board. 
Chapter 3 will present the changes in the local political scene during the 
second generation of the District Board. Actually it is the first term of the Kwai 
Chung and Tsing Yi District Board, which had been separated from the Tsuen Wan 
District Board to be the 19th District Board in Hong Kong. It is classified as the 
'second' generation because most of the board members are those incumbent Tsuen 
Wan District Board members (except some of the elected members). With the 
participation of the liberals in the election and who won the offices, the dynamics of 
the board had changed. 'The Kwai Tsing Sevens' have began to align together, and 
have made challenges to the other Board members. Although the seven are only the 
minority of the board, they have successfully attracted the attention of the media, and 
the confrontation between these liberals and the other conservatives have began to 
take place and being realized. 、 
Chapter 4 will present the political scenario of the Kwai Tsing District Board 
from 1988 to 1991. Out of the 16 elected board members, 15 have been won by the 
7s mentioned above and their comrades. These 'Kwai Tsing 15s' have became the 
majority of the board, and thus the board has been dominated by these liberals, and 
is the only one out of the 19 District Boards in Hong Kong at that time. Thus, the 
chairman of the Board was one of the liberals, which is of significance because he 
was the first liberal chairman and it means an end to the domination of the 
conservatives in the past two 'generations'. Throughout this third generation, the 15s 
not only participate actively in urging motions and works to be done in the Board, but 
also organized residents' actions outside the board. It seemed that the alignment first 
formed during .1985-88 has been consolidated, with an integration of committee 
politics and pressure group politics. 
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Chapter 5 will describe and analyze the changes in the District Board from 
1991 to 1993. The new term of the board is from 1991 to 1994. Of the 18 elected 
offices, the liberals have won all the seats. Not astonshing, the chairman comes from 
the liberal camp, and they continue to dominate the District Board. Thus, it is 
generally assumed that the power of the liberals in the Kwai Tsing District Board will 
be further strengthened on the basis of the 15s in 1988-91. However, during and 
after the first time direct election to Legilative Council in 1991, these 17s have 
splitted among themselves. Conflicts are observed between two groupings among 
themselves. What is more unexpected is that one of the groups has in turn making 
re-alignment with the conservatives (the appointed members). Hence this new 
alignment becomes the new dominating force in the District Board. These years are 
classified as the fourth generation also because the candidates in the 1991 elections 
began to run the campaign under the umbrellas of political parties. It is the first time 
party politics have formally being introduced in the elections, no matter the influence 
of such party effect. Analysis will be made on how and why did the liberals split 
among themselves, and why did a faction of them to realign with the conservatives 
by using the exchange network theory. 
In the concluding chapter, implications and stimulations will be drawn on the 
applicability of the exchange network theory in the study of community politics. In 
addtion, the concept of political market will also be tried to integrate into the analysis 
of exchange network, to see if the explanatory power on changes of community 
politics will be enhanced. Such an integrated approach will be examined, and 
suggestions will be made on the viability of applying this approach to the study of 
macro-level political developments such as social movements and the changes in the 






AN UNEXPLORED POLITICAL MARKET 
1. Introduction 
With the introduction of the District Administrative Scheme by the government 
in the early 1980s, District Boards were set up throughout Hong Kong as a formal 
channel for the political participation of the residents, though these boards were only 
playing a consultative role in government decision-making process. Tsuen Wan 
District Board was one of the earliest one having been set up. In this chapter, the 
historical development of the Tsuen Wan District Board would be traced. By 
analysing the process of formation of structure of the relations among the members 
in the board, the roots for the later patterns of development of the subsequent Kwai 
Tsing District Board and the configuration of power structure within it would be 
identified. This was of significance because in the later chapters, it would be shown 
that such prior configurations of power would to a great extent casting constraints for 
the political behaviours of the District Board members in board affairs, and in the 
formation and split of coalitions. Geographical and demographic characteristics of 
the district would be analyzed, so that a background understanding on the community 
problems would be possible. Such an understanding would help the explanation of 
the later failure of the first "generation" of the board members. 
2. Brief History of the Community 
When the Hakka people arrived in the Kwai Chung area in the 17th Century, 
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there were already local inhabitants. Most of these new migrants came from the 
north eastern part of Guangdong Province of Mainland China. 
The oldest known clan is the LO clan who came and built their village at 
Sheung Kwai Chung in 1709, followed by the-FU in 1716 at Chung Kwai Chung, the 
TSANG in 1737 at Kau Wah Keng and the SIN clan in 1830 at Ha Kwai Chung. 
Before 1950, most of the habitants were farmers who worked mainly paddy, 
pineapple, sweat potatoes and vegetable fields. However, a few people in Tsing Yi 
were fishermen. 
The new town d e v e l o p m e n t began to take shape in the I950's and since then 
paddy fields were gradually converted to commercial and industrial lots as well as 
private buildings and public housing estates. 
The Kwai Chung and Tsing Yi district was formed in 1985, and later changed 
to the name of Kwai Tsing district in 1988. Before 1985, the present Kwai Tsing 
district was stil within the boundary of Tsuen Wan district, which was one of the 
earliest new town developed in Hong Kong. 
As indicated by the name, Kwai Tsing district consists of the Kwai Chung 
region and the Tsing Yi Island. The well known clans inhabiting the island include 
the LAM, FAN,TANG, CHAN, and CHEUNG. They lived mainly in the villages 
Chung Mei, Lo Uk, Ta Wong Ha, and Yim Tin. Farming was the major life activity 
on the island. As early as the，20s，industry began to develop. Later, in the ’50s 
small factories and oil storage tanks began to be operated on the island. 
As it is an island, the major mode of transportation of the inhabitants is the 
ferry to Tsuen Wan. They can go to Tsuen Wan on road only after the building of 
a bridge crossing connecting this island to Tsuen Wan. From early '80s, the 
government had planned to develop the island into an important industrial centre. 
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3. Demographic Characteristics 
From the census data in 1981, there were totally 450,000 residents in the Kwai 
Tsing district, with 434,707 in Kwai Chung, and 42,471 in Tsing Yi. The overall 
population density of Kwai Chung is 30,3^ per hectare, and 4,973 per hectare at 
Tsing Yi. The most densely populated regions are listed in Table 2.1. 
Population/hectare 
Tsuen Wan Town Centre 62,801 
Tai Wo Hau * 96,395 
Sheung Kwai Chung * 44,510 
Ha Kwai Chung * 39,861 
Shek Lei * 31,668 
Table 2.1 
Population density of the district as at 1981 
represents those later 
included in the Kwai 
Chung and Tsing Yi 
District) 
As at 1981, those under 15 years old occupied a great proportion of the 
population (30.5% at Kwai Chung, and 35.6% at Tsing Yi). The median age of the 
residents at Kwai.-Chung is 23.3, whereas that of Tsing Yi is 22.0, which represented 
a younger population than the overall population of Hong Kong (the median age is 
26.0，and the proportion of those under 15 years old is 24.8%) and Tsuen Wan as a 
whole (median age 26.0, and only 22.8% is under 15 years old). 
However, the educational attainment of residents in Kwai Tsing district is 
relatively lower than Tsuen Wan and Hong Kong as a whole, perhaps due to its 
younger population (Table 2.2). 
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Kwai Chung Tsing Yi Hong Kong 
< Primary 21.9% 25.3% 22.1% 
Primary 42.7% 45.4% 36.7% 
Secondary 33.2% i 27.5% 36.2% 
College/U 2.2% 1.8% 5.0% 
Table 2.2 
Education level of Kwai Tsing District as at 1981 
Referring to Table 2,2, the residents of Kwai Tsing district are mainly 
manufacturing workers and few are professionals comparing to Hong Kong as a 
whole. As a result, the median income of the residents of Kwai Tsing district is 
lower than Hong Kong. The median personal income is $1,428，and the median 
household income is $2,867, comparing to the respective median income of $1,516 
and $2,955 of the total Hong Kong figure. 
There is a a great difference of the Kwai Tsing district with the total Hong 
Kong figure and the Tsuen Wan district in the aspect of housing type. Most of the 
residents in Kwai Tsing district were living in the public housing estates, of which 
it is called a major public housing region (Table 2.3). 
. Kwai Tsing : Tsuen Hong 
Chung Yi Wan Kong 
Public Housing 79.2% 78,8% 19.7% 38.5% 
Home Ownership 0.3% - - 0.6% 
Scheme Hosuing 
Private Housing 13.9% 68.3% 51.4% 
Institutions 0.6% ： 0.5% 0.9% 
Temporary House 6.0% 14.5% 11.3% 8,6% 
Table 2.3 Hosuing Types 
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In addition to the above concentration in the public housing as the major 
dwelling units of the residents, the household size of the average Kwai Tsing 
residents are also greater than the Tsuen Wan region and Hong Kong as a whole 
(Table 2.4). 二 
Kwai Chung Tsing Yi Tsuen Wan Hong Kong 
1 person 7.8% 16.9% 152% 
2-3persons 24.7% 15.2% 36.6% 30.8% 
4-5persons 37.1% 51.1% 28.6% 31.5% 
>6 persons 30.4% 31.0% 17.9% 22.5% 
median 4.5 p 4.8 p 3.6 p 丨 3.9 p 
Table 2.4 Household size as at 1981 
From the above data of the 1981 Census, it can be seen that the residents at 
Kwai Tsing district are mainly living in public housings, which is very crowded 
comparing with the Tsuen Wan region and Hong Kong as a whole. Moreover, 
residents of Kwai Tsing are relatively earning a lower wage than Hong Kong total, 
and are mainly engaged in the manufactoring sector, as they are not so well educated. 
Besides, the population is younger, which means that the dependency ratio is greater 
than the average in Hong Kong. 
Combining the above demographic and geographic characteristics of the Kwai 
Tsing district, it is obvious that there are numerous community problems the residents 
are facing, such as housing problems (e.g. crowdedness and poor facilities and 
management of the public housing estates), transportation problems (especially the 
Tsing Yi island inhabitants), youth problems (as there are vast number of youths who 
lacks sufficient recreational facilities), and air pollution (as the residential areas are 
surrounded by factories which emitted smokes and odeous smells nearly all through 
the day). These community problems are influential to the political development of 
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the district, which will be thoroughly discussed in the subsequent sections. 
4. Political Development of the Community 
The political development of the Kwai Tsing new town could be traced back 
to the '70s. In 1974, the reorganized City and New Territory Administration 
Department (CNTA) had been formed. At each district, an office of the department 
was responsible for the liaison and coordination among local level government 
depratments. 
In 1976, the landmark for the political participation for Tsuen Wan residents 
had been made. Rural Committees of Tsuen Wan and some other advisory bodies 
had been reformed to a single advisory board, the Tsuen Wan New Town 
Recreation and Amenities (Advisory) Committee in March 1976. 
Later, this committe was transformed into the Tsuen Wan District Advisory 
Board in 1977, which was the 'ancestor' of the Tsuen Wan District Board, 
The Tsuen Wan District Advisory Board, which found in November 1977，was 
the first one in Hong Kong. The terms of reference of this board was : 
(a) to advise on matters affecting the well-being of people living in the district 
and those working there; 
(b) to advise on the provision and use of public facilities especially on: 
(i) priority of the public works; and 
(ii) the allocation of funds for small village projects; 
(c) to undertake: 
(i) minor environmental improvement works; and 
(ii) to provide cultural and recreational activities. 
It was obvious that the terms of reference of this board were actually the basis 
of the terms of reference of the later District Board. 
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With reference to this terms of reference, the board had set up six working 
groups: 
(a) cultural; 
(b) recreational and sports; 
(c) environmental improvement; 一 
(d) industry; • 一 
(e) social service; and 
(f) financial. 
All the members of the board were appointed by the government, with the 
chairman being the Town Manager (who was retitled to District Officer later). From 
1977 to 1981，the number of board members ranged from 27 to 33. Besides the 
official members from various government departments and unofficial members 
appointed by the government, there were also four ex-officio members, including the 
three Chairmen of Tsuen Wan, Tsang Yi and Ma Wan Rural Committees 
respectively, and the Chairman of the Yan Chai Hospital. 
Although the members of the above mentioned Tsuen Wan New Town 
Recreation and Amenities (Advisory) Committee and the then Tsuen Wan District 
Advisory Board were all appointed, and the works of these two boards had not 
attracted much attention from the public, they had a significant impact on the later 
development of the political market of Kwai Tsing, and thus the formation of political 
network within the district. 
5. Evolution of Political Market 
Although the Tsuen Wan District Board had not be found until 1981, the 
political market within the community began to take its start by as far as 1977，with 
the advent of the Tsuen Wan New Town Recreation and Amenities (Advisory) 
Committee in November 1977, Alongside with such development, political network 
of the notables within the community also began to form, no matter how embryonic 
it was at that time. 
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By the term ’ political market，丨，here it means the structure or mechanism in 
which there exist suppliers who supply for political benefits for the consumers who 
are eager for their political demands. The transactions involved in this political 
market are not necessarily be operated through monetary means, but through 
resources exchanged in the transactions. During a typical transaction in the political 
market, the supplier provides services or benefits to fulfill the political demands of 
the consumers. The consumers have the right of choice to take such offers or 
alternative offers, by giving support to the supplier. The most tangible form is to 
vote for the supplier in the election. Such political transactions take their way in a 
market, in that there is free competition in the supply side. Everyone eligible 
for the nomination under the laws governing an election can run for office, and 
compete in the political market (it should be noted that the focus of discussion in this 
paper is on the legitimated and formal channel of political participation in the 
establishment as stipulated in the relevant ordinances of elections in Hong Kong. In 
fact, it would be also meaningful to consider political participation outside the 
establishment. But due to the reasons mentioned in the first chapter, it is not included 
in this study). On the other hand, the consumers are in fact the registered voters in 
the community. But as consumers, they have the right to choose any offer by the 
suppliers, and to decide whether to support them or not. Basically, there are two 
ways to get involved into the political transactions. The first way is for the 
consumers to take the offers of the supplier into consideration. By considering the 
attributes of these offers, the consumers decide to take which offer, or not to 
take any at all. Thus, it takes the form of a derived demand by the suppliers, 
and have conscientized the voters. Another way is for the consumers to voice out 
their political demands, so that the suppliers are urged to provide appropriate 
'products' to respond to these political demands. Under free competition, the 
consumers then in turn can choose from different offers. 
In the above discussion of the concept of political market in understanding the 
operation of the political transactions, one thing has to bear in mind. Such political 
market differs from the economic market we have well involved in our daily live in 
one thing: the time frame. The consumers can actually exercise their right of 
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choice of products only periodically. That is, they can only vote for or against the 
suppliers only at the time of election every certain period. During the interval 
between these elections, the consumers do not have the right to vote down the 
supplier. In this aspect, it can be seen the political market is under imperfect 
operation when compared with the economic market. However, taking another 
perspective, the consumers can still make their choices and shift among competing 
suppliers during the intervals, by reinforcing them through supports continuously or 
by giving punishments through condemnations. Moreover, the consumer can even 
choose to withdraw from the political market, and not involve in any political 
transactions. Unless the suppliers plan not to run for the second term, they must take 
into consideration of such possible punishments of the voters. Thus, through the 
operation of these exchange transactions and by the 
exercise of reinforcements and punishments, a patron-client 
relation is likely t o establish between the politicians and 
the voters. The political market thus takes shape after 
such patterns of transaction being institutionalized, 
Although the Tsuen Wan New Town Recreation and Amenities (Advisory) 
Committee only took the advisory role and was out of the participation of the general 
public, it was in fact the embryonic form of the later district administration 
establishments. Of the six working groups of the committee, they had organized the 
following major activities during the years 1977 to 1981 (source: Annual Report of 
Tsuen Wan District Board 81-82): 
(a) assisting government departments to organize various cultural 
activities, including the Tsuen Wan Arts Festival since 1977; 
(b) funding the cultural activities organized by community groups; 
(c) organizing the Tsuen Wan Sports Festival since 1979; 
(d) funding the sport activities organized by community groups; 
(e) advising on the ’Keep Hong Kong Clean Campaign'; 
(f) conducting minor environmental improvement projects; 
(g) organizing 'Plant Tree Day'; 
(h) organizing 'Model Workers Award Scheme’； 
(i) organize career exhibitions; 
(j) conducting research on the livelihood of the aged; 
(k) assisting voluntary agencies in the community to run social services; 
and 




From the above major activities organized by the committee, it is clear that 
the major focus is on the provision of activities for the residents. But as mentioned 
in the section of the demographic characteristics of the community, it is obvious that 
the community problems the residents are facing have not been articulated in the 
committe and being handled. Nevertheless, the committe had also been consulted on 
some issues relating the community, such as the development of Tsuen Wan North, 
the management of the Tsuen Wan Town Hall, the construction of the MTR Tsuen 
Wan section, the constrcution of a camp for the VietNam refugees, the new policy 
on illegal immigrants, and the way to improve the recreation amenities provision in 
the community. These agenda items are in fact issues affecting the livelihood of the 
residents in the community. However, a political market had not been effectively 
formed yet during these years. 
Although this committee had been granted fundings in these years ( $L5m in 
78-79, $1.75m in 79-80, $2.03m in 80-81) (source: Annual Report of Tsuen Wan 
District Board 81-82), about 70-80% of these fundings was used in organizing 
cultural, recreational, and sports activities. Whereas the other fundings were used in 
conducting minor environmental improvement projects in the community, such as 
building small rest areas and pavements. Community problems mentioned in the 
previous sections such as housing problems, transportation problems, and air pollution 
problems had not been tackled in the committee. It was because either the resdients 
had not articulated their political demands clearly and effectively, or because the 
members in the committee had not articulated such concerns in respond to the 
political demand of the residents. No matter which way the reason was, it implied 
that the political demands of the residents could not be entertained (not necessarily 
fulfilling every demand) in the committee. The community is in fact an 
unexplored political market. This point would be discussed more 
thoroughly in Chapter III. 
Under this situation of the political development of this community, it is 
interesting and sgnificant to have an understanding on the evolution of the political 
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market within the community. How and why would the 'liberals' finally dominate 
the District Board? Why do the 'conservatives' being outcasted in the subsequent 
years of political development of the community? These are questions to be 
addressed in the following chapters, but they are not separated from the political 
situation during the years before 1985. 一 
6. Political Network before 1985 
As the Kwai Tsing District Board is previously included in the boundary of 
Tsuen Wan, it is significant to get an understanding on the political network 
formation of the Tsuen Wan District Board before 1985. As a result, it is important 
to consider the development of the Tsuen Wan Advisory Committee, which was the 
'ancestor' of the Tsuen Wan District Board. 
Although the Tsuen Wan Advisory Committee was only found in November 
1977，most of the members were in fact members of the previous Tsuen Wan New 
Town Recreation and Amenities (Advisory) Committee. The members had got 
acquaintance with each other through these years of service in the committee and in 
the advisory board. As this committee and this advisory board covered the boundary 
of both the Tsuen Wan district and the then Kwai Tsing district, members involved 
did come from both of the two districts. Analysized from the lists of the members 
in these years, it was observed that several of these members were those playing 
significant roles in the first term of Kwai Chung and Tsing Yi District Board since 
1985. How did the establishment of relationships among these members prior to the 
formation of the Kwai Chung and Tsing Yi District Board affected the configuration 
of the power structure of the District Board? How would the political network 
formation among these members contribute to the formation and changes of the 
political network of the Kwai Chung and Tsing Yi District Board after 1985? All 
these questions could be addressed to by starting from the analysis of the political 
network formation prior to 1985 in the following sections. 
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Before the District Board election taken place in 1982, all the members of the 
advisory board and the first term of Tusen Wan District Board were appointed. From 
1977 to 1981, the Tsuen Wan Advisory Board held regular meetings once every two 
months. There were three types of members, including the offical members, 
unofficial members, and ex-offido members^from the rural committees and the Yan 
Chai Hospital. All the members were serving on a one-year period, and thus 
required re-appointment every year. Such an operation had in fact helped the 
government to keep control on the board, and avoiding extreme conflicting opinions 
from the members. As the legitimation of the appointment came from the 
government solely, and the term for each appointment was only one year, the 
appointed members were inclined to support the government policies, without 
challenges which might pose embarassment to the government. In return for their 
support, the government gave rewards to these members by re-appointing them, by 
giving honours to them, and by helping them to occupy significant roles in 
community activities (especially through the funding of recreational, cultural, and 
sports activities organized by the board) which meant prestiges and status of the 
members. A patron-client exchange relationship thus was established. Thus, it could 
be seen that although the chairmanship was the Town Manager (later renamed District 
Officer), the number of members vary from year to year from 1977 to 1981. 
Moreover, not all the members serving in one term would be re-appointed in the 
subsequent term, which was an obvious representation of the above patron-client 
relationship between the government and the appointees. Table 2.5 lists out the 
relevant members (those later continue their political； involvement in the Kwai Chung 
and Tsing Yi District Board) being appointed during these years. 
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Name 77-78, 78-79 79-80 8 0 ^ 
CTS - - X 
HTC - Y Y 
LKM Y 二 Y Y 
LMW Y Y Y 
LYK Y Y I Y 
Table 2.5 
Occupation of Committee Chairmanships 1977-81 
The above members were those who were also being appointed to the Tsuen 
Wan District Board after 1982. Thus, they already had a long service history in the 
board, and had already got acquaintance with each other. In fact, they had involved 
in the community service for a long time, and hence had common membership in 
some community organizations and groups. Such a common afiliation had contributed 
to the formation of the political network among themselves, which had shown its 
effect in the subsequent term of the Kwai Chung and Tsing Yi District Board. 
CTS was an ex-officio member representing the Tsing Yi Rural Committee. 
He was also the President of Tsing Yi Sports Association, President of Tsuen Wan 
International Youth Association, Vice-chairman of Tsuen Wan Sports Festival, Vice-
chairman of Tsuen Wan Youth and Children Recreation Association, and member of 
Tsuen Wan Fight Crime Committee. 
HTC was the Chairman of Tsuen Wan Youth and Children Recreation 
Association, Chairman of Cultural Promotion Committee, Chairman of Tsuen Wan 
Girl Scouts Association, Honorable President of Tsuen Wan Scout Association, Vice-
president of South and North Kwai Chung Scout Association, Exco member of Tsuen 
Wan Sports and Recreation Confederation, Exco member of both the Tsuen Wan Arts 
Festival and Sports Festival, Exco member of Tsuen Wan District Keep Hong Kong 
Clean Campaign, member of the Management Committee of Tsuen Wan Town Hall, 
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and member of the Tsuen Wan Fight Crime Committee. 
LMW was the President of North Kwai Chung Scout Association, Honorable 
President of North Kwai Chung Sports Association, President of East Kwai Chung 
Keep Hong Kong Clean Campaign, Chairmaflrof the Model Workers' Award Scheme, 
Vice-President of North Kwai Chung School Sports Association, Vice-President of 
Tsuen Wan Youth and Children Recreation Association, and Chairman of a MAC. 
LKM had involved in community service as early as 1975 when he was 
appointed the member of the Tsuen Wan New Town Recreation and Amenities 
(Advisory) Committee. He was also the President of Yan Chai Hospital, President 
of Tsuen Wan Industrial Confederation, and President of the Model Workers' Award 
Scheme. 
LYK was the President of South Kwai Chung Scout Association, President of 
Tsuen Wan Chiu Chan Kai Fong Welfare Association, President of Kwai Chung Kai 
Fong Welfare Association, President of Tsuen Wan Walk for the Million Committee, 
Chairman of the West Kwai Chung Sports Association, Chairman of the 2nd Kwai 
Chung Festival, and President of Pok Oi Hospital. 
Although these members were different in their respective duration of 
community service, they had numerous common affiliations of their services (Table 
2.6). 
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TWAC MWAS FCC AF SF KHKC YCR SCOU 
CTS Y - Y 一 Y : Y -
HTC Y - Y Y Y Y Y Y 
LKM Y Y . - 二 - - _ - -
LMW Y Y - - Y Y Y Y 
LYK Y - | - 丨 _ 丨 _ 丨 - | y | 
Table 2.6 Common Affiliations 
* (TWAC: Tsuen Wan Advisory Board 
MWAS: Model Workers' Award Scheme 
FCC : Tsuen Wan District Fight Crime Committee 
AF : Tsuen Wan Arts Festival 
SF : Tsuen Wan Sports Festival 
KHKC: Keep Hong Kong Clean Campaign 
YCR : Tsuen Wan Youth and Children Recreation 
Association 
SCOU: Scout Association ) 
The above actor-by-affiliation matrix has described in detail the co-
memberships of the five actors, who we would see shortly their political influence in 
the Kwai Chung and Tsing Yi District Board. 
LKM was having the longest service history in the community. He started his 
community involvement when being appointed into the Tsuen Wan New Town 
Recreation and Amenities (Advisory) Committee in 1975, where he served for two 
years, and then continue his appointment for years. CTS was having the shortest 
community service history, who served only after 1980 in the Tsuen Wan Advisory 
Board. 
It was through these common affiliations that the actors began to form a 
political network among themselves. Co-membership did not automatically imply 
mutual support and close-knit network, but the affiliations they were in had in turn 
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provided numerous opportunities for their mutual understanding and communication. 
Even for possible conflicts occurred within the network, the communication ties 
between members had make it possible for c on f l i c t resolutions if they wanted (Boyle 
and Lawler, 1991). Morever, the Tsuen Wan District Advisory Board was the first 
one to be set up by the government throughout the whole territory. The appointment 
of membership represented the recognition of the status and prestige of those being 
appointed. In relation to other actors in the community, these appointed members 
were occupying structurally equivalent positions. They were the ones being 
consulted by the government on community issues and government policies. They 
were those being supported by the government to chair ceremonies and activities in 
the community. And they were being awarded honours. Such structurally equivalent 
positions had facilitated the formation of a communication network among themselves 
by which information and resources would flow and exchanges of resources were 
made possible within this network. 
Nevertheless, actors of this network were in fact occupying different roles, 
and were having ditYerent dyadic relations with each other. Some actors may be 
more closely-knitted, while others may be only loosely-knited within the network. 
Moreover, their power positions might also be different. 
The Tsuen Wan District Board was established on April 1, 1981, renamed 
from the above mentioned Tsuen Wan Advisory Board. Such a change was a result 
of the change in the territorial political scenario with regard to the district 
administrative scheme. 
In light of the New Territories experience in the development of district 
administration, a District Management Committee was set up in Kwun Tong on an 
experiemental basis in 1979. According to the review by the government, the 
Committee had been proved effective in co-ordinating and streamlining the overall 
administration of district affairs. 
Thus, the Green Paper "A Pattern of District Administration in Hong Kong" 
in June 1980 had proposed that the District Boards, as statutory bodies in the 
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districts, should have directly elected members to allow for a more direct channel of 
public participation and thereby increases its overall representativeness. The white 
paper "District Administration in Hong Kong" in 1981 endorsed and adopted the 
major recommendations contained in the Green Paper. And thus the Tsuen Wan 
District Board began to have its -elected mei^ers since 1982. 
Registration of voters took place from September to October 1981, whilst 
nominations of the candidates were processed between January and February. The 
elections of the New Territories District Boards and their counterparts in Hong Kong 
and Kowloon were on March and October respectively in 1982. 
Elections of the Tsuen Wan District Board were organized on a constituency 
basis. However, there were only 10 seats returning from ten constituencies in Tsuen 
Wan, among the total 40 members of the District Board, which consisted of 14 
officials, 3 ex-officios, 13 appointed and 10 elected unofficials. Thus, the elected 
members still represented a minority in the District Board. 
There were altogether 10 constituencies in Tsuen Wan, which returned one 
elected member from each of the 10 constituencies (Table 2.7). 
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Constituency No. of No. of Votes % 
Voters Casted 
(01) Kwai Chung Central 5,542 US56 33.49 
(02) Kwai Chung East . - 8,142 2,151 26A2 
(03) Kwai Chung North 8，689 3,218 37.04 
(04) Kwai Chung South 7,178 3,682 51.30 
(05) Kwai Chung West 9,719 2，310 23.77 
(06) Kwai Shing — 10,848 4,278 39.44 
(07) Tsing Yi 5,888 3,204 54.42 
(08) Tsuen Wan East 5,085 2,047 40.26 
(09) Tsuen Wan Rural * UQ33 
(10) Tsuen Wan West 8,551 3,561 41.64 
TOTAL 70,675 26,307 [ 37.22 
Table 2.7 Voter turnout rate in 1982 
(Source: Tsuen Wan District Board Annual Report, 1982-83) 
The voter turnout rate on March 4, 1982 the election day was only 37.22%, 
which was the lowest among the New Territory District Boards (Table 2.8). 
District Board Voter turnout Rate 
Tai Po ^ 
Island and North 
Yuen Long 62% 
Sai Kong ^ ‘ 
Tiien Mun ^ 
Shatin 43% 
Tsuen Wan 38% J 
Table 2.8 
Selected comparison on voter turnout rate in 1982 
(Source: Pai Shing Bi-Monthly, No.20) 
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The lower voter turnout rate was perhaps also due to the less competitive 
situation of the elections in Tusen Wan. There were 36 candidates stood for election, 
with one being uncontested. Thus the average competition rate was 3.89 per seat, 
lower than the 4.05 Hong Kong average (totally there were 299 candidates running 
for 56 seats, with 2 of them being uncontested). 
Of the 36 candidates running in Tsuen Wan constituencies, 6 were of 
indigenous background and 30 non-indigenous, with ages ranging from 24 to 65. As 
a result of the election, 10 candidates (9 non-indigenous and 1 indigenous) were 
successful for a tenure of office of three years with effect from April 1, 1982 (Table 
2.9). 
Constituency Candidate Age Occupation Votes 
Received % 
K.C. Central CWC 48 Supermarket 1,214 65.4 
Proprietor 
K.C. East SW 64 Merchant 1,591 74.0 
K.C. North HM 46 Foreman 1,893 58.8 
K.C. South CS 53 Manager 1,057 28.7 
K.C, West NYK 24 Teacher 32.4 
Kwai Shing LLY 51 Education 1,623 37.9 
Consultant 
Tsing Yi TL 37 Supermarket 1,026 32.0 
Proprietor 
T.W. East CSC 43 Dentist 1,206 58.9 
T.W. Rural FYH 55 Retired - ： 
T.W. West CKS 60 Headmaster 2,201 68.8 
Table 2.9 “ 
Elected Candidates of Tsuen Wan District Board, 1982 
(Source: Tsuen Wan District Board Annual Report, 1982-83) 
Comparing to the overal Hong Kong figure, the age distribution of these 
elected members were older (Table 2.10). 
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Age Tsuen Wan % Hong Kong % 
21-30 10 ^ 
31-40 10 21.4 
41-50 30 - 32.2 
51-60 40 ^ 
〉 二 6 1 10 ^ 
Table 2.10 
Age distribution of members of 
Tsuen Wan District Board and the Hong Kong total ‘ 
(Source: Tsuen Wan District Board Annual Report, 1982-83) 
From the above data，it was not surprising that the political network of the 
members of the Tsuen Wan District Board was greatly influenced by the network 
already formed before 1982. Nevertheless, the election of new members gave rise 
to new relations among the actors, and thus to the restructuring of the political 
network of the board. Although the incumbent members of the Advisory Board still 
occupied significant roles in the power structure, these newly elected members began 
to penetrate into it. The following table delineated the relative proximity to the 
power centre of the members during the first four years of the Tsuen Wan District 
Board (Table 2.11). 
81 -82 82 - 83 83 84 84 - 85 
I CI CE I CE TT I CE EI I _ 
CS - - - - - - - - Y -
HTC - Y Y - Y - Y - - _ 
L K M Y - - Y - - Y - - ^ 
L L Y - - - - - Y - I - I - I 
Table 2.11 — 
Committee Chairmanship Distribution of 
Selected Incumbent Members of 
Tsuen Wan District Board 1981-85 
(Source: Annual Reports of Tsuen Wan DB, 1982-85) 
( I 二 Industry Committee 
CI 二 Community Inofrmation Committee 
CE二 Cultural and Entertainment Committee 
TT二 Traffic and Transport Committee 
EI 二 Environmental Improvement Committee) 
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Table 2.11 listed out only the positions occupied by those members continue 
to present in the subsequent years in the Kwai Chung and Tsing Yi District Board. 
But, in fact, the other committee chairmanships were mainly occupied by those 
members later involved in the Tusen Wan EMstrict Board in subseqent years. It was 
obvious that HTC and LKM were the two most proximal to the power centre by 
being the chairman of a committee for the four consecutive years. They had already 
established their prestige in the board as significant figures. On the other hand, some 
of the newly elected members could get close to the power centre, but not all of 
them. CS and LLY are two of them, who had occupied the chairmanship respectively 
for one year. 
Although a primitive political network had been formed in these years, the 
actors had not helped to form a corresponding political market. As discussed earlier, 
the voters should be able to choose between political offers in the market out of their 
free will, and the suppliers were in a fair competitive basis when dealing with these 
transactions. However, the political demands of the residents, as observed from the 
demographic and geographic characteristics of the district, had not been entertained 
by these District Board members. Eventhough the residents had clearly articulated 
their political demands individually through the petition in the Meet-the-Public 
Scheme (MTP) of the board and collectively through actions advocated by local 
pressure groups and concern groups, such political demands had not been fulfilled 
effectively (Table 2.12). 
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82 - 83 83 - 84 84/85 
MTP Agenda MTP Agenda MTP 
1. tenancy & 85 - 55 2 152 
housing (36.3%) (55.0%) (22,2%) (35.9%) 
2. clearance 44 5 15 3 60 
&land (18.8%) (21.7%) (15.0%) (33.3%) (14.2%) 
3. environ'1 15 - 3 - 18 
improvem't ( 6.4%) ( 3.0%) ( 4.3%) 
4. traffic & 13 5 17 - 31 ‘ 
transport ( 5.6%) (21.7%) (17.0%) (7.3%) 
5. hawkers & 4 1 16 1 21 
markets ( 1.7%) (4.3%) (16.0%) (11.1%) (5.0%) 
6. industrial 1 6 - 1 1 - 27 
& |X)lliit，n ( 6,8%) (11.0%) ( 6.4%) 
7. social & 4 8 6 3 iO 
educat'l ( 1.7%) (34.8%) ( 6.0%) (33.3%) (2.4%) 
8. misc. 53 4 41 1 104 
(22.6%) (17.4%) (41.0%) (11.1%) (24.6%) 
Total Cases 234 23 100 9 | 423 
Table 2.12 
Nature of MTP cases and agenda of 
Tsuen Wan District Board 1982-85 
(Source: Annual Reports of Tsuen Wan District Board) 
*(MTP figures were the number of cases received by the board in the Meet-the-Public 
Scheme, whereas the Agenda figures were agenda items cited by the Annual Reports 




From the above table, it could be seen that the items of concern from the 
residents had not been well received by the District Board. The major agenda items 
did not reflect the major concerns of the residents. In the three years 1982-85, the 
most important concern of the residents was 'tenancy and housing problems'. This 
was reasonable because 80% of .the residents-were living in public housing estates in 
the district. However, the proportion of agenda items set by the District Board 
members had not reflect such a great concern. But on the other hand, the，social and 
educational issues' was the most frequently discussed agenda item in the board, which 
represented only 1.7% of the cases articulated by the residents through the Meet-the-
Public Scheme. - The District Board members were totally out-of-phase with the 
political demands of the residents. One reason for such trend was the passive role 
of the District Board members. Although the terms of reference of the District Board 
had made it clear that one of the functions of the board was to advise on matters 
affecting the well-being of people living in the district and those working there, the 
members were mainly taking the role of being consulted, but not to actively 
advocate for policy changes or for the betterment of the livelihood of the residents. 
Thus, most of the major agenda items mentioned in the annual reports were those 
consultation papers of the government. The members were thus acting in a 
responsive role in giving advices and opinions on government policies and operations, 
but not to reflect the interest of the voters. 
Moreover, the successful rate .of the cases seeking help by the voters through 
the Meet-the-Public Scheme was low. Only 32.5% of the total cases received in 
1982-83 were completed with positive response, while the figure for 1983-84 was 
only slightly improved to 37.2%. In addition to the inarticulation of voters' political 
demands, such low successful rate of the district board in solving the problems of the 
voters had made an negative impact on the evolution of the political market. The 
voters could not rely on the members to help meet their demands. On one hand their 
concerns were not reflected in the board, and on the other hand their concerns also 
would not be fulfilled through individual cases. 
A news report by the Tsuen Wan Star Post on July 16, 1984 had given 
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a typical case in such inarticulation of the political demands of the voters by the 
District Board. It was a news reporting the opinion of various concern groups and 
pressure groups within the district, including the opinion of the Tsuen Wan District 
Board, on the proposed ’Policy to tackle the Well-off public housing tenants" by the 
Housing Authority. As most of the residerks of Tsuen Wan were living in public 
housing estates, the proposal had attracted great concern in the district, and had 
mobilized heated debate on it. The proposals include (a) allocate public housing units 
to small families; (b)long-term planning for allocation of squatter areas and 
Temporary Housing Areas; (c)tackle the well-off tenants; (d)enlarge the Home-
Ownership Scheme; and (e)adclition of married children into the household list. 
Basically, the proposals in general had not attracted much discussion except (c)，the 
proposal on doubling the rents of the well-off tenants. And it was also on this item 
the District Board was obviously not articulating the opinions of the residents at large. 
Most of the residents and local concern groups objected to this proposal, but the 
District Board did not. 
The followings summarized the opinions of the various groups, including that 
of the Tusen Wan District Board: 
i) Tsuen Wan District Board:- as the definition of "well-off" was 
difficult to define, the board had not 
discussed on this item; 
ii) TWESSC (an voluntary agency):- should riot force the so-called "well-off" 
tenants to move out; 
iii) SKHMC (an voluntary agency):- the line drawn for "well-off" was too 
l o w ; 
iv) Tai Wo Hau Residents Assn:- should encourage them to move out but not by 
punishment of double rent; 
V) Kwai Shing Residents Assn:- objected to the fixed 10-year rent contract, and 
to the high rent there after; 
vi) Tsing Yi Concern Group:- public housing was a social service and 




In fact, various local concern groups and residents' organizations had 
organized petition actions to object to the proposal on "well-off tenants". For 
example, after the Lai King Residents' Association had conducted a survey jointly 
with the Tsing Yi Concern Group on the residents in May 1984, they had organized 
a mass rally to show their objection in Augirst. An Alliance on Anti-High-
Rent had then been set up among residents at Lai King Estate, Lai Yiu Estate, Tai 
Wo Hau Estate, Kwai Chung Estate, Cheung Tsing Estate, and Cheung Hong Estate. 
The objection from the voters were clear, but the District Board had failed to 
respond to it. 
Thus, the function of the District Board was challenged. Voters did not find 
that their political demands could be meet through this channel. A News report by 
the Tsuen Wan Star Post on October 1，1984 on the "Forum on whether the 
District Board could solve community problems" had reflected the 
frustrations of the voters: 
"many residents opined that the community facilities were very 
insufficient, and there were community problems such as 
insufficient bus service, traffic congestion of the Tsing Yi 
bridge, cultural and recreational activities, poor law and order 
situation, and insufficient medical service. 
Besides, some of the attendants reflected that the 
District Board and the District Board 
members were lacking initiative and not 
active in solving the above problems" 
(original in Chinese, italic characters emphasized) 
As the District Board members were mostly appointed, their were not getting 
legitimacy from the voters, but by the government. Even for the elected members, 
they did not recognized their role as political representative of the voters. The voters 
could not expect to meet their political demands through the District Board and the 
board members. The voters did not get benefits from the District Board members, 
which meant that they got no rewards if they chose to engage in the exchange 
transactions with these board members. Although the District Board had organized 
various recreational activities and entertainments for the residents, these were not 
resources valued greatly by the voters as their major concern was housing problems, 
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clearance and land matters, pollution problems, and traffic and transport problems. 
Thus, these activities provided by the District Board were not effective reinforcers for 
the voters to engage in exchange transaction with them. What was even worse was 
that the voters even perceived that the recreational activities were still insufficient (as 
mentioned in the above news report). In fact, as the members at the power centre of 
the District Board were mainly those appointed members, they did not care to involve 
in the exchange transactions with the voters. 
As the political demands of the voters were not articulated and being met 
through the District Board and board members, patron-client relationship between the 
board members and the voters were difficult to establish. The voters could not 
depend on the board members to act as political representatives and brokers for their 
political demands. On the other hand, the majority of the District Board members 
did not rely on the support of the voters to retain their positions and status in the 
political involvement in the district. They still could get proximal to the community 
power centre inspite of the lack of patron-client relationship with the voters, by 
cooperating with the government, their source of legitimacy. Thus, the resources 
provided by the District Board members were not valuable rewards for the exchange 
transactions with the voters; while on the other hand the support provided by the 
voters was not valued by the board members as precious rewards they could get by 
engaging in the exchange transactions. Such a lack of patron-client relationship 
implied that there was no Power-Dependence Relations (as proposed by 
Richard Emerson) between the board members as a collective actor and the voters as 
another collective actor. 
7. Conclusion 
Hence, although the political network among the board members themselves 
was observed to began to establish, the lack of patron-client relationship with the 
mass implied that these board members had not tried to facilitate the formation of a 
political market though there existed such chance. They did not act as suppliers for 
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political services, whereas the voters had no chance to engage in the political market 
place to fulfill their demands. Market mechanism was not established in these years. 
But this situation had in turn gave rise to the changing political scenario in the 
subsequent Kwai Chung and Tsing Yi District Board, and had given rise to the 
reshuffling of the power structure in the foHowing years. The unexplored political 
market had actually facilitated the evolution of a political market in later years. 
END NOTES 
1. Please refer to Stephen Tang's article for an 
elaboration of this concept (Stephen Tang, Political 
Markets, Competition, and the Return to Monopoly:Evolution 
amidst a Historical Tragedy, in Lau and Louie eds • Hong 
Kong Tried Democracy:The 1991 Elections in Hong Kong. The 




MARKET TEST OF THE LIBERALS 
1. Introduction 
1985 was a very significant year for the later changes and development of the 
Kwai Tsing District Board, and the developments of the libereals in the district. 
Although there were only seven liberals among the total of 25 District Board 
members, these seven liberals had formed a coalition to challenge the conservatives 
in the politics of committee. It was significant also not only because it represented 
a root for the later majority of the liberals in the Kwai Tsing District Board, it also 
gave a cue for the subsequent split within the liberal camp. 
In this chapter, affiliation and supportive matrices of the District Board 
members were constructed using the relational data collected from minutes of the 
board meetings. Correspondingly, affiliation and supportive network were identified 
for these board members. The affiliation network was used as a preliminary 
analytical tool to identify the structural constraints on the political behaviours of the 
board members during board meetings. However, as these relational data was 
collected through official documents, additional information on the dynamics among 
these members was collected through informant interviews, so that political exchanges 
behind the board meetings could also be identified. 
After the description on these structures, analyses would be made to study the 
process of formation of coalitions among the liberals and among the conservatives. 
By employing network analyses on partial-networks of the liberals and conservatives 
respectively, implications were made to the future development of the liberal camp 
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and the conservative camp in the later terms of the District Board. 
2. Changes in Political Scenario After the 1985 Election 
In 1985, a new District Board, the Kwai Chung and Tsing Yi District Board 
had been set up, and separated itself trom the previous boundary of the Tsuen Wan 
District. The Kwai Chung and Tsing Yi District runs from Kau Wah Keng on the 
• 1 
south. Rambler Channel on the west, Tai Wo Hau Estate and Shing Mun Reservoir ！ 
‘ j 
on the northern side. Tsing Yi was an island situated opposite Kwai Chung to the , 
I 
• I 
east and Tsuen Wan to the north. 
i 
I 
The district covered an area of about 2,000 hectares, of which about 600 ( i 
hectares are green belt. It was divided into the following eight constituencies (tabel : 
I 
3.1). 
Constituency Original Consituency No. of 
in Kwai Chung & in Tsuen Wan, 1982 Elected 
Tsing Yi, 1985 Seats 
82 85 
(Ol)Kwai Chung Central (01) Kwai Chung Central 1 2 
(Q2)Kwai Chung East (02) Kwai Chung East 1 2 
(Q3)Kwai Chung North (03) Kwai Chung North 1 2 
(Q4)Kwai Chung South (04) Kwai Chung South 1 2 
(Q5)Kwai Chung West (05) Kwai Chung West 1 2 
(06)Kwai Shing (06) Kwai Shing 1 2 
(07)Tsing Yi North (07) Tsing Yi I 2 
(08)Tsing Yi South (07) Tsing Yi - 1 
Total 7 15 
Table 3.1 
Changes in Constituency and Elected Seats, 82-85 
(Source: Tsuen Wan District Board Annual Report 84-85) 
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These constituencies were roughly the same as those stipulated in the 1982 
Tsuen Wan election consituencies, except the Tsing Yi constituency which was 
further divided into two constituencies. Moreover, the number of elected seats in 
Kwai Tsing District was increased to 15, as compared to 7 when in 1982. The new 
Kwai Chung and Tsing Yi District Board ^as thus comprised of 9 appointed, 15 
elected and 1 ex-officio members from the eight constituencies. The terms of 
reference of the board was: 
(a) to advise on matters affecting the well-being of people living in the 
district and those working there; 
(b) to. advise on the provision and use of public facilities and services 
within the district; 
(c) to advise on the adequacy and priorities of government programmes 
for the district; 
(d) to advise on the use of public funds allocated to the district for local 
public works and community activities; 
(e) to undertake, where funds are made available for the purpose, minor 
environmental improvements within the district; and 
(f) to undertake, where funds are made available for the purpose, the 
promotion of recreational and cultural activities within the district. 
(Tsuen Wan District Board Annual Report, 1984-85) 
These restructuring of the District Board had in fact provided opportunities for 
the penetration of the 'liberals' into the district, and gave rise to the significant 
changes of the political scenario of the community. But before analyzing the process 
and reasons for the changes in the community power structure, the changes in the 
national political development in the years, which had significant impact on such 
changes in the power structure of this community, had to be noted first. 
After the three years experience of the development of the District 
Administration Scheme in Hong Kong, there was a significant development that the 
link between community political scene with the national one being established. In 
1985，10 members of the Legislative Council of Hong Kong would come from the 
District Boards. That is, each of the 10 members would be elected among the 
District Board members themselves, which comprised only of about 60 members from 
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2 or 3 District Boards. Thus, the significance of each District Board members had 
increased, which meant that the resources they could get hold of to exchange with 
others became more valuable than three years ago. 
Another significant development of District Board was the changes in the 
legitimacy of the District Board Chairman. From this year onwards, the chairman 
would be elected among the District Board members themselves, instead of being 
occupied by the District Officer as in the term 1982-85. Corresponding to the above 
mentioned change in the significance of the Distrct Board members, it further 
increased the exchange resource of each individual District Board member. It was -；• 
commonly perceived that the chairman should be recognized or respected by the 
board members, and thus was having a greater chance to win for the indirect-election 
to become a Legislative Councillor. 
A third change began to take place in 1985. The representatives from local 
government departments would no longer be District Board members, but they would 
2still attend the meetings so as to keep a communication with the board. 
The changes in the national political situation also added weight to the above 
mentioned changes in the community political level. The Sino-British Joint 
Declaration had been officially announced in 1984, which had politically conscientize 
the Hong Kong people. The District Administration Scheme had also been reviewed 
in 1984, b r o u g h t to the above changes. The commitment of 'Hong Kong people 
ruling Hong Kong' was one of the reason for the penetration of the liberals. Just as 
one of the informants, LWT, said: 
after the British and Chinese government began to 
negotitate on the arrangements on the future returning back of 
Hong Kong to China, my friends and I had recognised the 
significance of the development of the District Administration 
Scheme. Though we were activists of pressure groups, we 
began to identify with the need to advocate for more effective 
change of the government policies by working within the 






Such a decision was, dramatically, making significant impacts on the political 
power structure of the community later on. 
3. Emerge of the New Generation 二 
As analyzed in Chapter one, the age of the board members were relatively 
older, and most of them were incumbent members serving the community for a long 
time since the era of the Tsuen Wan District Advisory Board, or even as far as at the 
Era of the Tsuen Wan New Town Recreation and Amenities (Advisory) Committee. 
But in the 1985 election, there were seven candidates who were obviously younger 
than most of the other candidates. Their age ranged from 24 to 32 only. All of them 
were community activists, either as members of residents' organizations or as 
members of concern groups'. They had organized numerous petition actions through 
the mobilization of residents to participate. They had tried to give pressure to the 
government outside the establishment. And, the most important thing was that, all 
of them had been elected with a large margin of votes over their competitors. They 
were later called，Kwai Tsing Sevens'.、 
What contributed to their landslide victory ？ And what impact had their being 
elected on the political network of the Kwai Chung and Tsing Yi District Board that 
had been formed in the era of the Tsuen Wan District Board before 1985 ? 
•.. . . . , 
It had to be traced back to the first election of the Tsuen Wan District Board 
in 1982. Although there were no representatives from the residents' organizations 
been elected, the failure of a candidate from a residents' organization had in turn shed 
light on the penetration of the 'Kwai Tsing Sevens' into the community in 1985. 
In the 1982 election, a candidate running in the Kwai Shing constituency had 
attracted vast attention, including the media. CLWC, a housewife representing the 






reported in a special feature by the Pal Sing Bi-Weekly Issue No.20,4 she 
decided to run because she: 
"...has some hope on the District Board. In the past years she 
had been working together with her husband for the betterment 
of the livelihood of the residents. By contacting the 
government officials, she felt that二if she could occupy a 
position in the bridging body establiawed by the government, 
it might help the service of them. So (she) decided to run in 
this election." 
(original in Chinese) 
In fact, she had paid much effort in acting for the residents to solve 
community problems such as rent rising, transportation, watering of the toilets, and 
the heat facing by the roof-top tenants. With the assitance of the organising by social 
workers of a voluntary agency in the community, the residents' association had 
developed steadily. Although she had been defeated at last, she had received 
unexpectedly great support from the voters. She had received 29% of the total votes 
casted, just being defeated by a slight margin of 8% by the winner, who was reported 
in the magazine as "two weeks before the voting day, (the school) had made 
appointments with parents of the pupils, giving each of them a gift, which includes 
sweets and biscuits, and a photograph of the candidate, reminding 
the parents to vote for him" (p.8，Pai Sing Bi-Weekly Issue No.20, italic 
emphasized). No matter such report was real or not, it had a significant implication 
to the political participation of the residents' organizations in the community. 
Candidate Background Votes received % 
LLY School consultant 1,623 37.9 
CLWC Resdients’ Assn 1，241 29.0 
KK MAC ^ 14.1 
CTC MAC 550 12.9 
CKS MAC ]95 4.6 
WKS MAC 64 1.5 
TOTAL 4,278 100,0 
Table 3.2 Result of the Kwai Shing Constituency, 1982 






Although she was defeated by a s l ight margin, she had a large advantage 
margin over all other candidates who came from the Mutual-Aid-Coinmittees (MAC). 
Her failure had in turn gave much stimulations for the 
community activists • One of the informant, LWT, had recalled such impact 
when he explained why he had not run in tfie 1982 election: 
"At that time most of the social activists still had reservation on 
the functions of the District Board. But there was still a 
representative from a local residents' association to run in that 
(1985) election. Though she was defeated, it had stimulated me 
that the residents did in fact wanted to find a political 
representative to reflect their political demands." 
(Interview conducted in Chinese) 
This failure had in fact acted as a market tester, though she had no intention 
to do so, which had helped to identify the political needs of the voters and to expose 
the weaknesses of the incumbent members and the strengths of the community 
activists. However, not all of the 'Kwai Tsing Sevens, decided to run due to the 
same single reason. As reported by another informant, LYC, the main reason for his 
running the office was the resources provided through such position: 
”I have concerned the benefits of the workers in this district for 
years. But my experience in organizing night schools for them 
had driven me to recognize the importance of resources. After 
deliberate consideration, I decided to run for the office because 
the allowances for District Board members could facilitate such 
duties." 
(interview conducted in Chinese) 
Whereas another informant, LKS, reported that his decision was made mainly 
due to the consideration of enhancing the functioning of the residents' association. 




group, revealed the idea of the War of Positions, which recognized the 
significance of each position occupied in the political establishments of the 
government in the promotion of democractic development of Hong Kong. 
With such different concerns wheii deciding to run for the offices, the 
platforms of their election campaign also reflected this condition. As reported on 
February 18’ 1985 by the South China Morning Post, the platforms of the sevens 
were: 
(a) LYC (Kwai Chung Central): 
- solving community problems, more labour rights and benefits, 
promotion of interest in political participation and democracy; 
(b) LOK (Kwai Chung East): 
- improvements in law and order, living environment and transport, 
more welfare funds for eldrely, labour education, pollution control, 
community facilities and improved multi-storey building management; 
(c) LWT (Kwai Chung East): 
- improvements in law and order, living environment, public housing 
management, more community facilities, transport, services for the 
elderly and promotion of civic education; 
(d) SCK (Kwai Chung West): 
- improvements to public housing and cominunity services; 
(e) LKS (Kwai Shing): 
- improvement of the living environment and community relations, 
working to solve district problems and reflecting public will; 
(f) WYC (Kwai Chung South): 
- improved housing management, living envirnoment, transport, law and 
order, reflecting public opinion on general policies; 
(g) LCF (Tsing Yi South): 
- improvements to residents' quality of life, promoting the further 
development of district administration and concern over policies related 
to the livelihood of the public. 
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At the 1985 election, these seven candidates had made landslide victory over 
the competitors. Nearly ail of them had won by a large margin, beating some 
incumbent members (Table 3.3). 
一 
Constituency Candidate Age Occupation Votes % 
K.C. Central LYC 31 Teacher 3,912 71.27 
K.C. East LWT 30 Teacher 3,749 88.11 ’ 
K.C. East LOK 24 Scoial Worker 3,512 76.22 | 
K.C. South — WYC 27 P/T 2,303 24.15 | 
K.C. West SCK 24 Prog. Analyst 3,833 85.17 | 
Kwai Shing LKS 30 Technician 2,971 48.85 ； 
T Y South LCF 27 Social Worker 2,862 374.6 j 
‘ ‘ I I I 
Table 3.3 Result of the "Kwai Tsing Sevens" , 
in District Board Election 1985 , 
I 
(* The % means the winning margin over the 2nd place if the 丨 
candidate gained most votes, or is the winning margin over the third ‘ 
place if the candidate is the 1st runners up.) 
What accounted for such great success of these new comers? The analysis in 
Chapter one had given the answer. The performance of the Tusen Wan District 
Board before 1985 was not recognized by the voters. The political demands of the 
voters had not been reflected in the district board and not be fulfilled. The informant 
LWT agreed on this, by adding that the incumbents and the candidates from 
traditional residents' organizations such as MACs had over-estimated their own 
capability. In fact, these local leaders had established their relationship with the 
residents through tangible benefits or activities such as outings and welfare benefits. 
But such a network was only a welfare-network between this local leaders and the 
residents. But the relations between any two actors was always multiplex, such 




was the political network that counted in elections. As these local leaders could not 
fulfill the political demands of the voters, no political brokerage could be formed 
between them. On the other hand, the community activists had tried to organize the 
residents to fight for their own benefits. Most of these seven candidates were either 
coming from local residents' associations with the assistance of the organzing work 
provided by social workers, or they themselves were active members of pressure 
groups which had ample experience in organizing the mass. 
For instance, LWT reported that he had gained the organzing skills (which the 
traditional local leaders were lacking of) through his participation in the students' 
union in the university, and through various social actions and his active role in a 
policy concern group. With such experience, he had established a concern group in 
Kwai Chung East a year before the election, and had organized several mass petitions 
on the crowdedness of the public housing tenants. The political demands of the 
residents had then been articulated, and were crystallized in collective actions. 
A Political brokerage relation with the mass began to form. He then gained his 
power base from the support of the followers, the residents who took him as a broker 
in the struggling of their political demands. With the institutionalization of this 
brokerage relationship and the legitimation of the concern group by the residents, the 
residents started to become dependent on the assistance of LWT. A patron-client 
relationship existed between him and the residents collectively. Such a relationship 
had been reflected in his landslide victory in the 1985 election. 
However, these seven new comers did not call themselves，Kwai Tsing 
Sevens' at the beginning. In fact, according to the various informants, they had not 
planned to run in the election by forming an alliance such as the，15-seed Alliance' 
in Central and Western District and the 'Campaigning Alliance, in Chai Wan. 
Actually, not all of them knew each other before the election. 
An informant, LYC, revealed frankly that he did not know some of these 
sevens such as LWT and LOK, although he had heard of them before. He was 
5 4 
acquaint with LKS, LCF, and WYC through cooperations on,community issues in an 
ad hoc basis. Examples were the Tsuen Wan Alliance on Anti-Fee-Increases' and 
the 'Joint Committee Against Rent Increase，. Moreover, according to him, they had 
not coordinated on the distribution of candidates among the constituencies, and had 
no cooperations in the operation of the dection campaigns except exchange of 
information on the progress during the election campaign period. Then how did the 
political network among these seven being formed? Would it be due to the 
similarities of their backgrounds or platforms that help established the political 
network of the 'Kwai Tsing Sevens'? 
4. Structure of the Political Network 
In answering the questions posed in the last section, techniques of Network 
Analysis were employed. An actor-by-affiliation matrix was constructured 
according to the groupings of each of the 25 Kwai Chung and Tsing Yi District Board 
members (Table 3.4), then a co-membership matrix (Table 3.5) was formulated using 
the above data. The data was then being analyzed by using the computer algorithm 
UCINET IV Student Version. 
5 5 
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1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 
H C C C L Y C C C L L L T L L S T W L L L L L S W 
T K W L H K T H M K Y P Y S K W O W Y C K C Y C W C S Y K H S C W M K C T S Y L T K T C F S K C 
1 8 2 - 8 5 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 . 1 O i l 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 C U L T U R E 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 S P O R T 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 R U R A L 1 1 0 0 0 , 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 S C O U T 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 M A C 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7 E L E C T E D 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
8 C A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9 L 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 P P 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
11 LABOUR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1 2 T C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1 3 H P 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Table 3.4 Affiliation Matrix 1985-88 
(Source: Annual Report of Kwai Chung and Tsing Yi District Board 
1985-86) 
82-85 : incumbent members of the term 8 2 - 8 5 . . 
CULTURE: office bearers of Tsuen Wan Cultural Association 
R U R A L : office bearers of Tsuen Wan Sports Association 
SCOUT : office bearers of branches of Scout Association 
MAC : office bearers of Mutual-Aid-Committees 
ELECTED: elected district board members 
CA : member of the Civic Association 
L ： office bearer of Tsuen Wan Residents, Recreation 
Association 
PP ： office bearers of Public Policy Viewers 
LABOUR : office bearer of Service Centre for Neighbours 
and Workers 
TC : office bearer of Tsing Yi ConQern Group • 
HP ： office..bearer of residents' organization assisted 






1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 
H C C C L Y C C C L L L I T L L S T W L L L L L S W 
T K W L H K T ' H M K Y P Y S K W O W Y C K C Y 
C W C S Y K H S C W M K C T S Y L T K T C F S K C 
1 H T C 5 3 3 3 1 0 . 0 2 0 3 3 4 2 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 C K W 3 3 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 2 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 C W C 3 2 4 4 1 0 0 1 0 3 3 3 2 0 1 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 C S 3 2 4 5 2 0 0 1 0 3 3 3 2 1 2 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
5 L L Y 1 0 1 2 2 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
6 Y H K 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7 C K H 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8 C T S 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 2 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9 C H C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 L M H 3 1 3 3 1 0 0 1 0 4 2 3 1 0 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 L K M 3 2 3 3 1 0 0 1 0 2 3 3 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 2 L Y K 4 2 3 3 1 0 0 1 0 3 3 4 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 3 T P C 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
14 LYT 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 5 L S S 1 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 1 4 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 6 S K Y 1 1 2 3 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 3 4 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 7 T L 1 1 1 2 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 2 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 8 W W T 0 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 9 L 〇 K 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 
2 0 L W T 0 0 0 1 1 〇 〇 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 
2 1 L Y C 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 
2 2 L C F 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 
2 3 L K S 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 
2 4 S C K 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 
2 5 W Y C 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 
Table 3 . 5 Comembe.rship Matrix 1985-88 
( S o u r c e : K w a i C h u n g a n d T s i n g Y i D i s t r i c t B o a r d A n n u a l R e p o r t 
1 9 8 5 - 8 6 ) 
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At a first glance, the so called 'Kwai Tsing Sevens, had indeed only minimal 
common affiliations in the community, but on the other hand, the so called 
conservatives seemed to have more commonality in their membership to various 
community organizations. Three aspects of analyses would be made in this section. 
One was to analyze the structure of the political network of all the members of the 
Kwai Chung and Tsing Yi District Board, including both the so called liberals and 
the conservatives, from these affiliation data. The second analysis to be made was 
focused on the specific characteristics of the 'Kwai Tsing Sevens', so as to try to 
identify particular patterns of networking among them. The third analysis would be 
done on the partial-network of the other board members, so as to identify any 
structural particularities among them and ti see if there were any differences from the 
partial-network of the ’Kwai Tsing Sevens,. 
(a) Structural characteristics of the Total Network 
First of all, the centralization of the total network was analyszed. 
Centralization refers to the overall cohesiveness or integration of the total network. 
Three related analyses would then be made. The first one was the degree of the 
network, which measured the local centrality of the actors. An actor was central if 
he had a high degree, which indicated that he was at the centre of a number of 
connections with other actors. A structural centre of the network was analogous to 
the centre of a star, which . was commonly used in sociometric analysis in 
ethnography. Another measure was the betweenness, which measured the extent 
to which a particular actor lies between various other actors in the network. In other 
words, those actors with a high betweenness might probably to have more information 
control to the others. He was likely to play the role as gatekeeper or broker for the 
others. The third measure was the closeness, which indicated the global centrality 
of the network. An actor was close to others if his distance from others was short. 
By these analyses, implications could be made on the relative positions and roles of 
each actor, the core and peripheral proximity to the power centre, and the structure 





In Table 3.6, actors CS, CWC, HTC, LYK, and SKY were having relatively 
high normalised degrees, which indicated that they were probably the centres of the 
network. It could be noted that none of the above mentioned actors were the 'Kwai 
Tsing Sevens'. This pattern was again reflected in Table 3.7. The 'Kwai Tsing 
Sevens' were all having very low between摩 measures when comparing to those of 
the other members. But unlike the measure of degree-based network centrality which 
was 103.99%, this betweenness measure of the network centrality recorded only 
6.68%. This indicated that the information flow among the members were not 
effective. One possible reason was that there were communication blockages among 
some members, so that very few or nearly no information (and thus resources) would 
be passed and exchanged. But who were the information blocks within the network 
7 From the individual normalized betweenness measures, it was obvious that the 
'Kwai Tsing Sevens' (except LYT, who was an elected member supported by the left-
wing organization Tsuen Wan Fong Chung Recreational Association) were probably 
those blockages. LCF, LKS, LOK, LWT, LYC, and SCK were only having a 
measure of betweenness of only 0.00. What it meant was that these actors had little 
information (and thus resources) exchange with other members in the network. But 
would it also meant that they had formed a clique among themselves and separated 






_ 一 一 _ _ 灣 — _ 一 一 一 一 — 一 •• — 一 _ 一 一 
1 HTC 27.00 112.50 
2 CKW 17.00 70.83 
3 CWC 27.00 212.50 
4 C S 40,00 166.67 
5 LLY 20.00 83.33 
6 YHK 0.00 0.00 
7 CKH .0.00 0.00 
8 CTS 10.00 41.67 
9 CHC 0.00 0.00 
10 LMW 23.00 95.83 
11 LKM 21.00 87.50 
12 LYK 24.00 100.00 
13 TPC 14.00 58.33 
14 LYT 13.00 54.17 
15 LSS 23.00 95.83 
16 SKY 27.00 112.50 
17 T L 22.00 91.67 
18 WWT 19.00 79.17 
19 LOK 15.00 62.50 
20 LWT 15.00 62.50 
21 LYC 13.00 54.17 
22 LCF 13.00 54.17 
23 LKS 14.00 58 .33 
24 SCK 15.00 62.50 




1 Mean 17.04 71.00 
2 Std Dev 8.9 6 37.33 
3 Sum 426.00 1775.00 
4 Variance . 80.28 1393.72 
5 Euc Norm 96.26 i 401.08 
6 Minimum 0.00 0.00 
7 Maximum 40.00 166.67 
Network Centralization 二 103.99% 
Table 3.6 
Freeman's Degree Centrality Measure of 





^m wm mm. — — — — • • 
1 HTC 1.51 0.55 
2 CKW 0.66 0.24 
3 CWC 2.67 0.97 
4 CS 20.93 7.581 
5 LLY 12.94 ‘ 4.69 
6 YHK 0.00 0.00 
7 CKH 0.00 0. 00 
8 CTS 0.35 0.13 
9 CHC 0.00 0.00 
10 LMW 2.67 0.97 
11 LKM 0.51 0.18 
12 LYK 1.10 0.40 
13 TPC . 0.00 0.00 
14 LYT 0.00 0.00 
15 LSS 6.69 2.42 
16 SKY 17.67 6.40 
17 TL 10.65 3.36 
18 WWT 2.67 0.97 
19 LOK 0.00 0.00 
20 LWT 0.00 0.00 
21 LYC 0.00 0.00 
2 2 LCF 0.00 0.00 
23 LKS 0.00 0.00 
24 SCK 0.00 0.00 
25 WYC 0.00 0.00 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR EACH MEASURE 
1 2 
Between nBetween 
一 一 一 一 — — 一 一 一 一 • " 一 — — — — — — — 
1 Mean 3.24 1.17 
2 Std Dev 5.79 2.10 
3 Sum 81,00 29.35 
4 Variance 33.57 4.41 
5 Euc Norm 33.19 12.03 
6 Minimum 0.00 0.00 
7 Maximum 20.93 7.58 
Network Centralization Index = 6.68% 
Table 3.7 Freeman Betweenness Centrality 




In addition, that the overall closeness centrality measure of the 
total network was 8.65% only, which indicated that the dependence of the actors 
within the network from the control by others was low. And thus the global 
centrality of the total network was not great. 
Combining the above three measures, it could be seen that the total network 
was actually not a very centralized one, with some relatively independent actors who 
had few information and resources exchange with the others. What it meant was that 
the District Board members were not very cohesive among themselves, perhaps there 
even existed some relational blocks among part of the members. This conception was 
further indicated by the measure of the density of the network, which 
measures the extent to which all possible relations are actually present. The non-
standardized value of this total network was 0.88 out of a maximum of 5 recorded in 
the network. Under the relatively low cohesion among the board members, it implied 
that there was probably a demarcation between those who were core to the power 
centre, and those who were peripherals. By the assistance of the analysis ofx-core 
of the total network, the relative positions as relative to the power centre could be 
seen. 
K-CORE P A R T I T I O N I N G 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 
1 2 3 4 5 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 8 0 1 2 3 6 7 9 
C C C C L L L L L S S T W W Y L L L L L C H L 
H K K C T S W Y Y Y C K T P W Y H C K L M O W T K 
DEGREE ^ S H W S S S T C K T K Y L C . T C K F S Y W K C C M 
———--—-"-— 
14 • * 
10 • • . xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
9 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx . • • . 
8 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx . . • 
Figure 3.1 K-core of the total network 85-88 
By their background and affiliations, the analysis shown that board members 
CS(#4), CWC(#6)，LCF(#8), LKS(#10), LLY(#11), L0K(#13), LSS(#14)， 
LWT(#15), LYC(#16), LYT(#18), SCK(#19), SKY(#20), TL(#21), WWT(#23), and 




CTS(#5), HTC(#7), LKM(#9), LMW(#12), LYK(#17), TPC(#22), and YHK(#25) 
were at the peripheral (Figure 3.1). It was very strange that the board members 
included in the core were including the 'Kwai Tsing Sevens', but on the other hand 
those incumbent members who had served for a long history since the Tsuen Wan 
Advisory Board were classified as the peripherals. But it seemed not to be the case. 
The 'Kwai Tsing Sevens' had not occupied any chairmanships of the District Board 
or committees during the three years term of the District Board from 1985 to 1988 
(Table 3.9). 
Ar^ -^ o-rc. a b c d e f g h _ 
CHS 1 
CKH 1 -
CKW 2 ？ 
CS 3 2 
CWC 3 2 




L S S -
LWT H 
SCK 
TL R N 2 
YHK I 3 . ; I • '1 I 11 
Table 6: Proximity to the Power Centre or the District 
Board . . ^  ^ , 
a = Chairman of District Board 
b = Chairman of committees . . 
c = Provisional Regional C o u n c i1lor/Regional 
Councillor elected among the board members . 
d = Member of District Committee of the Regional 
Council (elected among the members) 
e = unsuccessful nomination for the District Board 
chairmanship • 
f = unsuccessful nomination to the chairmanships of 
committees . 
g = unsuccessful nomination to Regional Councillor 
h = unsuccessful nomination to the District Committee 
of the Regional Council 
6 3 i 
t 
It could be seen from Table 3.9 that the board members who were actually at 
the core of the power centre were mainly those incumbent members of the Tusen 
Wan District Board, whereas the，Kwai Tsing Sevens' were only at the peripheral 
positions. Then what contributed to the distorted picture from the K-core analysis ？ 
One possible explanation could be got from the hint of the source of legitimacy of the 
members. It was interesting to note that the members being demarcated as the core 
to the power centre were all the elected members, whereas the others who were 
demarcated as peripherals were the appointed members. The source of legitimacy of 
these two kinds of members were totally different. The elected members were the 
political representatives of the voters, and their power legitimacy came from the 
support and choice of the voters. On the other hand, the legitimacy of the appointed 
members were based on the appointment by the government. They had not gained 
support from the mass. Although most of them were incumbent members of the 
Tsuen Wan District Board before 1985, they could not act as political representatives 
of the voters in articulating their political demands. Thus, from this point of view, 
it should be the elected members, especially the 'Kwai Tsing Sevens', who would 
occupy the core positions in the power structure of the board. But why was the real 
picture be totally the opposite way? The answer would be found by the analysis on 
the supportive network of these board members formed during the three years of the 
first term of the Kwai Chung and Tsing Yi District Board. 
(b) Supportive Network of the District Board 
To further analyze the shaping of the patterns of the political power 
configuration during the process of interaction in the three years, data was gathered 
with respect to the mutual supports among the board members in the meetings of the 
District Board.' It was assumed that the supportive behaviours shown in these 
meetings were a representation of the dyadic mutual-supportive relations between 
pairs of board members. Thus, through the content analysis of the minutes 
of the District Board meetings, relational data indicating the mutual supports 
between the board members was collected. It included the nomination of 
chairmanships and of delegates to the Regional Council, the process of agenda setting, 
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and the proposers and seconders of motions to be moved in the Board meetings. 
Hence, a valued directional supportive matrix was constructed by 
using this data. Subsequent analyses on the structure of the mutual support network 
were then possible. 
When comparing with the analyses using the affiliations matrix, the analyses 
based on the supportive newtork showed that there was an increase in the centrality 
of the network. The closeness centrality had increased from 8.65% to 64.59% ； 
whereas the betweenness centrality had increased from 6.68% to 21.80% . The 
measure of the density of the supportive network also reflected the same picture: its 
value increased from 0.88 to 1.10. From these figures, it could be seen that the total 
network was more centralized when time went by and actual political interactions had 
to be made within the domain of committee politics. But it was interesting to know 
whether such increases in the centrality was due to the increasing cohesiveness of the 
total network of the board, or clue to the increasing cohesiveness and mutual support 
within different blocks of the board. Thus in the later sections of this chapter, 
analysis would be made on two partial-networks, that of the 'Kwai Tsing Sevens' and 
of the others. 
K-CORE P A R T I T I O N I N G 
1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 4 0 1 5 8 3 5 6 9 0 4 9 7 8 2 3 
E C C C C H L L L S Y B L L L S L W L L L T W 
H K K C T W T L M S K T H C O W Y C K Y K Y Y P W 
DEGREE S H W S S C C Y W S Y L K F K T C K S C M K Y C T 
6 
5 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
4 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
3 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
2 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x • 
1 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Figure 3.2 
K'Core Analysis of the Supportive Network 1985-88 
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Returning to this supportive network first. The supportive behaviours in the 
board meetings reflected a totally different scene from the affiliation patterns analysed 
before. In the K-core analysis (Figure 3.2), the board members being identified to 
have occupied the core positions towards the power centre were CHS(#1)，CKH(#2), 
CHW(#3), CS(#4), CTS(#5), CWC(#6), HTe(#7), LLY(#11)，LMW(#12), LSS(#14)’ 
SKY(#20), TL(#21), and YHK(#25). Most of these members were incumbent Tsuen 
Wan District Board members. Referring back to the analysis of the proximity to the 
power centre in Table 3.9, most of them were those occupying the chairmanship of 
the District Board and of the committees. On the other hand, the 'Kwai Tsing 
Sevens' were only at the peripheral layer of the power structure. Among them, 
LKS(#10) AND WYC(#24) were even farther away from the power centre. But the 
farthest member from the power centre was WWT(#23). Perhaps this was not 
difficult to explain. WWT was an elected member of the Tsing Yi North 
constituency，running second to TL. WWT got only 792 votes in the election, losing 
by a margin of 24.87% to TL, who was supported by the Tsing Yi Rural Committee. 
As the chairman of this rural committee, CTS, had already build up a loosely-knitted 
network with the incumbent Tsuen Wan District Board members who had gained the 
core power of the Kwai Chung and Tsing Yi District Board, his relation with TL had 
helped the latter's entering into the power core. On the other hand, although WWT 
was not one of the，Kwai Tsing Sevens', he had also not been recruited by the others. 
Thus he was a detached member of the board, and thus farthest away from the power 
centre. 
By further analysing the supportive pattern using the "factions" analysis in 
UCINET, it was found that there existed roughly three factions among the board 
members (Table 3.10). One of the factions consisted of board members L0K(#13), 
LCF(#8), LWT(#15), LYC⑷6)，WYC(#24), SCK(#19), and LKS(#10). They were 
exactly the 'Kwai Tsing Sevens,. The other board members made up the other two 
factions. It should be noted that besides taking note on the demarcation of tactions 
and the intra-faction relations, it was also important to look at the 
inter-faction relations. Although the，Kwai Tsing Sevens' had high 
degree of relations among themselves, they had no exchange relations with other 
66 
factions, except HTC(#7), the chairman of the District Board. Unlike this scenario， 
there existed inter-faction relations between the other two factions. 
How did these factions be formed during the three years of committee politics 
7 Starting from the structural difference of their affiliations, what explained for the 
establishment of such factions ？ It was thrcnigh the political exchange relations that 
established in the process, and such patternized behaviours had facilitated the 
/ 
reinforcemnet and development of more cohesive factions among the board members. 
That is, exchange networks began to be formed. 
At the very beginning of the Kwai Chung and Tsing Yi District Board, the 
election of District Board Chairman had brought forth the process of formation of 
exchange partial-networks. On April I, 1985, the District Board had to elect the 
chairman among the board members themselves. The first time since the setting up 
of District Boards in 1981 that the chairman be coming from the election among the 
District Board members rather than by the District Officer from the government. The 
Chairman of the Kwai Chung and Tsing Yi District Board would be the first one to 
be elected among themselves in all of the 19 District Boards. Thus it was very 
significant for this election both symbolically and heuristically. As the number of 
appointed members out numbered the elected members by 3 to 2, it was expected that 
the chairmanship would be in the hands of these appointed members. But one of the 
'Kwai Tsing Sevens'，LWT, also run for the office. Although he was finally defeated 
by 7 to 18, the formation of factions began to take place. 
The first impact of such election was that the seven elected members who 
voted for LWT began to be identified as a group among themselves. In fact, 
although HTC was elected the chairman, he (and most of the appointed members) felt 
face-lost in this event. As analyzed by the informant LWT, as HTC could not be 
elected the chairman in an ipso facto way, the election was seen as a challenge 
to the prestiges of the appointed members. Thus, it had raised the consciousness of 
the appointed members of the strong challenge by the sevens in the future. 
Another impact of this election was the etYect in facilitating the cohesiveness 
of all the other board members except the 'Kwai Tsing Sevens'. Another informant 
SCK, analyzed that the sevens had presented an image of persistant challenge to the 
normal practice of the board, which usually made compromises rather than open 
67 
I 
confrontations. The other members began to realize that although they had dominate 
the District Board, they had to do something in response to such challenges. 
Becoming more cohesive was the first step to face with these challenges. Their tackle 
to these challenges was further motivated by the challenge by the sevens on April 11, 
1985. 二 
Grouped Adjacency Matrix 
2 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 1 4 0 4 3 5 6 8 9 8 7 9 2 3 2 5 
C C C C C C H S T L L L W L L L L S L L L T W L Y 
H K K S T W T K L L S K Y 0 W Y C C Y Y K P W M H 
S H W S C C K Y S S C K T C F K Y K M C T W K 
1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2 2 1 1 1 2 
3 2 1 1 1 1 1 
4 2 1 1 1 1 
5 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 
6 1 2 1 1 1 
7 1 1 2 
20 1 2 1 2 1 
21 1 2 2 
11 1 2 1 
14 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 
1 0 " “ 一 2 1 1 1 
24 2 1 1 1 
13 1 2 1 1 1 1 
15 2 2 1 
16 2 1 2 
8 1 1 1 1 2 
19 1 1 1 2 
18 1 1 2 
17 1 1 2 , 
9 1 1 2 
22 1 1 2 
23 1 2 
12 1 1 1 1 2 \ 
25 , 1 1 
Group Assignments: 
1： 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 11 14 20 2 1 
2 : 8 10 13 15 16 19 24 
3： 9 12 17 18 22 23 25 
Fit: 0.279 (larger values indicate better fit) 
Table 3•10 
Factions identified within the Supportive Network 85-88 
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Another elected member, LCF, had joined the battle to compete with YHK in 
the election of the Chairman of the Community Affairs Committee. Though LCF 
was defeated by a very slight margin of 12 to 13’ the perception of the other 
members on such challenge had been reinforced. 
Although these seven elected members were perceived as opponents to the 
interest of the other members, not all of the sevens agreed to take this strategy. One 
informant, LYC, revealed that not all of the sevens were so eager to challenge in the 
election of District Board Chairmanship. But due to their belief in democratization 
process within the board, they did not object to such idea when proposed by LWT. 
As recalled by LYC, LCF was not very motivated in doing so, after considering the 
future community relations in Tsing Yi, especially with the Rural Committee. 
But later on, the strategy was further reinforced, and no return was possible 
there after. On November 7, 1985, the Kwai Chung and Tsing Yi District Board 
held its 5th meeting. LOK put forward an agenda to discuss on the procedure 
for public policies consultation and powers of committee 
chairman. It was due to the September meeting of the Community Affairs 
Committee. In the meeting, the chairman, YHK, had refuted to vote on the 
"Consultative Green Paper on Subsidy Policy of Public Housing". Then LOK 
conde謹ed him of being、irresponsible and rude, which would have a negative effect 
on the political participation of the public. But on the above mentioned District 
Board meeting, another member, LLY, had put forward a procedural motion to 
postpone the agenda and to be discussed closed-door. The motion was supported by 
another member LSS. Then LOK made amendment to the above procedural motion 
to postpone the agenda for only 15 minutes and be discussed open-door. This 
amendment was seconded by LCF. After heated debate, the board had voted to 
postpone the agenda to another day. It was LOK who then filed a conde麵ation to 
the result immediately. LWT and LYC then followed suite. 
This incident had clearly reflected the operation of a network and the further 
development of the partial-exchange-networks. Within a network, the behaviour of 
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one actor would affect the behaviour of other actors in the network having dyadic 
relations to him, and in turn affected the behaviour of those having dyadic relations 
to those connected to the ego. Thus, in an ego-network, the behaviour of the ego 
would make influences to actors in his Ist-order zone, and then his 2nd-order zone 
(Mitchell, 1969) (i.e. those actors connected二to the actors in his Ist-order zone) and 
so on. In this incidence, LOK could be seen as the ego. His amendment had 
mobilized the support from the alters, and later his condemnation had also motivated 
the alters in his Ist-order zone to do the same. Thus in the subsequent votings, 
although they were defeated, they had consolidated themselves by voting 7 to 16. 
Such an action had reinforced the establishment of a partial network from the total 
network. In the same token, the members other than the 'Kwai Tsing Sevens' had 
also operated in the sense of a network. When YHK was being challenged, LLY had 
given his support by proposing to postpone the discussion. His supportive behaviour 
had in turn motivated the support from LSS. Then the support from the others took 
place in the subsequent votes. The confrontation by the 'Kwai Tsing Sevens' not only 
consolidated the faction of themselves, but also help to consolidate the faction of ail 
the other members. It was through this process that the two-partial networks be 
established. 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR EACH MEASURE 
1 2 
Between nBetween — 
1 Mean 1.43 4.76 
2 Std Dev 3.50 11.66 
3 sum 10.00 33.33 
4 Variance 12.24 136.05 
5 E h c Norm 10.00 33.33 
6 Minimum 0.00 0.00 
7 Maximum 10.00 33.33 
Network Centralization Index = 33.33% 
Table 3.11 Freeman Betweenness Centrality 
of partial network of the 






1 R8 LCF 0/00 一 0.00 
2 RIO LKS -8.00 -42.11 
3 R13 LOK 10.00 90.91 
4 R15 LWT 3.00 27.27 
5 R16 LYC 3.00 27.27 
6 R19 SCK 0.00 0.00 
7 R24 WYC 0.00 0.00 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR EACH MEASURE 
1 2 
FlowBet nFlowBet 
1 Mean 1.14 14.76 
2 Std Dev 4.97 37.79 
3 Sum 8.00 103.35 
4 Variance 24.69 1428.44 
5 Euc Norm 13.49 107.35 
6 Minimum -8.00 -42.11 
7 Maximum 10.00 90.91 
Network Centralization Index = 88,836% 
Table 3.12 Flow Betweenness Centrality of 
the partial network of the 
"Kwai Tsing Sevens" 85-88 
(c) Partial-Network of the Liberals 
The 'Kwai Tsing Sevens' were also being identified as the 'Liberals', due to 
their support to the further democratization of the political system of Hong Kong. 
In fact, by analysing this partial-network, it could be seen that they were more 
cohesive than the total network of the whole District Board. 
For example, the betweenness centrality of this partial-network was 33.33% 




only 21.80%. This meant that the sevens were more cohesive than their relations 
with all the other members as a whole. Similarly, the flow hetweenness 
centrality of this partial-network was also with a higher value of 88.836% 
(Table 3.12)，comparing to the 55.434% of the total network. This higher flow 
betweenness measure indicated that the information flow and resource exchange 
among these seven members were greater than with the other board members. The 
incidences cited in the last section had illustrated the operation of this partial-network. 
In the subsequent meetings of the District Board, these seven members continued to 
consolidate among themselves by supporting each other. For instance, on the 14th 
meeting held on May 7，1987’ LYC had put forward a motion to urge the government 
to delete the Public Order (Amendment) Ordinance 1987. Though the motion was 
rejected, the number of votes were again 7 to 16, reflecting the continual 
confrontation between the two factions. The Freeman-Granovetter measure 
also reflected that the dyadic relations between each pairs of them were strong ties 
(Table 3.13). 
Nevertheless, not all of them were equally active or having the same degree 
of closely-knit relations with each other. There were in fact three groupings within 
themselves (Table 3.14). The first one consisted of L0K(#13), LWT(#15), and 
SCK(#19). The second group consisted of LKS(#10) and WYC(#24). While the 
third group consisted of LCF(#8) and LYC(#16). These groupings could to some 
extent be traced back to their affiliations. LWT and SCK were the representatives 
of the Public Policy Viewers, whereas LOK was the partner of LWT in the Kwai 
Chung East constituency and had jointly run an office of District Board members. 
LKS and WYC were active members of local residents' organizations, and they had 
opportunities to cooperate in the past. LCF was a social worker and a core member 
of a concern group in Tsing Yi; whereas LYC had concentrated his service on labour 
welfare, but had also organized the residents in objection to rent increase, of which 
he had chances to cooperate with LCF. But these common or similar affiliations 
could only explain partially these three groupings. It explained for only 33.1% of the 
variances in the supportive behaviours of the sub-groupings (Table 3.15). Even so, 
the correlation between the commonality of affiliations and the supportive behaviours 
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was in fact insignificant statistically (as the proportion of random variation as large 
as the observed correlation was as large as 0.200, greater than the significance level 
of 0.05). 
The formation of these sub-groupings had to be contributed to the respective 
positions of each of them. It was found that there were roughly three 
structurally equivalent positions among the sevens (Table 3.16). LCF 
and LYC were occupying the equivalent positions in relation to the others, LOK and 
LWT another structural equivalent position, and LKS and WYC the third one. As 
mentioned before, LKS and WYC were not only members of local residents' 
Group 1: 
LCF LKS LOK LWT LYC SCK WYC 
Levels of Ties Among Actors 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
一 一 一 — — 一 — 
1 R8 LCF 2 2 2 2 ‘ 
2 RIO LKS 2 2 2 2 
3 R13 LOK 2 2 2 2 2 
4 R15 LWT 2 2 2 
5 R16 LYC 2 2 2 
6 R19 SCK 2 2 2 2 
7 R24 WYC 2 2 2 2 
Distribution of Ties 
1 2 
.-Freq Pet 
一 無 一 一 一 一 
1 Absent 0 0 
2 Weak 0 0 
3 Strong 20 100 
Table 3.13 Strength of ties among 
the "Kwai Tsing Sevens" 
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Fit: 0.892 (larger values indicate better fit) 
Group Assignments: 
1: R13 R15 R19 
2: RIO R24 
3: R8 R16 1 
Grouped Adjacency Matrix 
4 3 6 2 7 5 1 
4 R15 LWT 3 3 2 1 1 1 1 
3 R13 LOK 3 3 2 1 1 1 1 
6 R19 SCK 2 2 3 1 1 1 1 
2 RIO LCF 1 1 1 3 3 1 1 
7 R2 4 WYC 1 1 1 3 3 1 1 
5 R16 LYC 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 
1 R8 LKS 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 
Table 3.14 Factions identified within the 
"Kwai Tsing Sevens" 
CORRELATION MATCHES 
Observed value: 0.331 0.700 
Average: -0.021 0.740 
Standard deviation: 0.621 0.057 
Proportion as large: 0.200 0.902 
Proportion as small: 0.920 0.388 
Proportion as extreme: 0.200 0.902 
Table 3.15 Correlation between the Affiliation Network 
and Supportive Network of the "Kwai Tsing 
'一 Sevens" 
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organizations, they also behaved rather low-profile in the District Board. They had 
not proposed any agenda item in the board meetings from 1985 to 1987, and had 
never been nominated to run for chairmanships or delegates to the District Committee 
of the Regional Council. Nevertheless, they had no hesitation in supporting the 
agenda put forward by the other members:pf the ’Kwai Tsing Sevens'. LCF and 
LYC were occupying another structurally equivalent position in that they were 
respectively monopolized in their major areas of concern. As LCF was the chairman 
of the Tsing Yi Concern Group, the community problems of Tsing Yi such as the Oil 
Tanks and the traffic problem of the Tsing Yi bridge had made the group and LCF 
the legitimized supplier in meeting the political demands of the residents in Tsing Yi 
at large. Similarly, LYC was well known for his involvement in the labour affairs 
in the district. The organizing of residents to petition against the rent increase of 
public housing added weight to his popularity. In the Kwai Chung East constituency, 
LOK and LWT had became well received by the residents first through the issue of 
over-crowded families in public housing. 
Structural Equivalence Matrix 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
LCF LKS LOK LWT LYC SCK WYC 
1 R8 0. 00 2.83 3.16 3.16 0. 00 2.00 2.83 
2 RIO 2.83 0.00 4.24 4*24 2.83 3.46 0.00 
3 R13 3.16 4.24 0.00 0.00 3.16 1.41 4.24 
4 R15 3.16 4.24 0.00 0.00 3.16 1.41 4.24 
5 R16 0.00 2.83 3.16 3.16 0.00 2,00 2.83 
6 R19 2.00 3.46 1.41 1.41 2.00 0.00 3.46 
7 R2 4 2.83 0.00 4.24 4.24 2.83 3.46 0.00 
HIERARCHICAL CLUSTERING OF EQUIVALENCE MATRIX 
L L L L S L W 
C Y O W C K Y 
F C K T K S C 
Level 1 5 3 4 6 2 7 
一 — 一 一 一 一 一 — 
0.000 XXX XXX . XXX 
1.414 XXX XXXXX XXX 
2.465 XXXXXXXXX XXX 
3.505 XXXXXXXXXXXXX 
Table 3.16 Structural Equivalent Positions 
of the "Kwai Tsing Sevens" 
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One interesting point was noted in Table 3.16. The position of SCK was quite 
particular in that he had not occupied any structural equivalent positions with the 
other members of the ’Kwai Tsing Sevens'. In fact, he was playing a significant role 
in the communication with the other 'conservative' members。As analyzed earlier, 
there were continual confrontation between the sevens as a faction with all the other 
members as another faction. A polarized oppositional structure 
(Laumann and Marsden, 1979) existed between these two factions. The sevens had 
joined together to form a coalition of weak against the strong. Direct 
confrontation were frequently observed. However, as time went on, the 
'conservatives' began to realize that negotiations had to be made with the sevens. As 
recalled by the informant SCK, the reason was that the conservatives still wanted to 
save their faces. As they were more traditional in their values, they thought that they 
would be more prestigeous if there were less direct confrontation by the sevens. 
Although the conservatives would have no problem in defeating the sevens, they felt 
it face-losing if they had to exercise their coercive power every time. Moreover, the 
challenges by the sevens in the District Board had already attracted the media's 
attention. They began to demarcate the members of the District Board into either the 
liberal camp (the sevens) or the conservative camp. Nearly every victory of the 
conservatives was presented as a coercion towards the liberals by the press. Thus, 
in trying to maintain their images positive, the conservatives began to make dialogues 
with the sevens. A bargaining opposition structure then took place, 
with representatives of these two opposing coalitions in closer proximity acting 
as negotiating agents. Then, SCK took the brokerage role as representative in the 
bargaining process. Thus, although the two coalitions were still in opposition with 
each other, there began to have some exchanges between these two collective actors. 
The resources the conservatives had possessed were the funding and chairmanships 
of committees of the District Board; whereas the resources the liberals were in 
possession was their attraction to the press and their confrontational power in the 
board. What the conservatives perceived as valuable resources was the 'face-giving' 
by the liberals, whereas the resources perceived as valuable by the liberals was the 
resources in the board to meet their political demands. SCK recalled that one of the 




From the above analyses, among the liberals there also existed core and 
peripheral members. LKS and WYC, as detached members, were occupying the 
peripheral positions; whereas the five other jnembers were at the core. In fact, the 
structure of this coaltion was a tri-foci configuration, with LWT, LYC, and LCF 
as the three foci. As mentioned in the previous sections, each of them had gained 
vast support from the voters. Moreover, they were having resources that were 
valuable to other members in exchange transactions. LWT (together with SCK and 
LOK) had connections with other territorial-wide pressure groups, ties being set up 
as far as his involvement in the student union and in social issues such as the Boat-
house families and the Jubilee College issue. Moreover, he was later 
elected as a Regional Council in 1986. Such a position not only meant additional 
resources he could possess (such as information and connection with more senior 
government officials), but also a higher prestige as perceived even by the 
conservatives. LWT had frankly acknowledged this advantage as his additional asset: 
"the conservatives think that a Regional Councillor 
is at a higher status than a District Board member, 
so even they do not agree with my opinion, they 
respect me more than before." 
In addition, he was elected in the Consultative Committee on the Drafting of 
the Baisc Law, and was the Vice-Chairman of a central political group, the Hong 
Kong Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood. All these ties to the 
national political figures had helped him to possess valuable resources that could be 
exchanged. 
Similarly, LYC and LCF also had national political ties. As a long time 
activist in labour movement, LYC had established his ties with many national political 
figures. Moreover, he was well recognized for his concern of labour affairs in the 
district. This meant that he had also possessed resources that were valuable by others 




The case for LCF was quite similar. As mentioned earlier, his involvement in the 
community issues of Tsing Yi had gain him the monopoly in the political market 
in the community. In addition, he was also a member of a national political group, 
the Hong Kong Policy Observers. Hence, as LYC and LCF had possessed 
their own local political resources and also^ies with national political figures, they 
were relatively 'self-sufficient' in the exchange relations among the three foci. Thus, 
at the same time of involving in the mutual-supportive network in the District Board 
in the confrontation with the conservatives, these three focii still acted independently 
with respect to each other. Although they valued the support exchanged in the 
District Board, they did not need to depend on such sole relations. Either they could 
get resources by their own ties, or they could get the resources through their Ist-order 
alters or so. Power-dependence relations as proposed by Richard Emerson then were 
not established among these three. 
Although the 'Kwai Tsing Sevens' were forming a relatively closely-knitted 
coalition in the District Board in these three years, this tri-tbci configuration did have 
great impact on the subsequent development of the liberal camp in Kwai Tsing 
District Board. Chapters IV and V would made detail analysis on this point. 
(d) Partial-network of the Conservatives 
In facing the challenges by the liberals, the conservatives were drived to form 
coalition among themselves. The density of this partial-network had increased 
slightly to 1.11 than the total network of the whole board. Similarly, the closeness 
centrality of this partial-network increased to 79.36%, betweenness centrality to 
23.16%, and flow betweenness centrality to 57.672% . 
However, it should be noted that except the closeness measure, the values of 
the betweenness and flow betweenness measures were lower than those of the partial-
network of the liberals. This indicated that the conservatives were having a less 




not formed a closely-knitted network among themselves. It was very likely that the 
coalition formed in this first term of the Kwai Cluing and Tsing Yi District Board was 
due to the pressure from the seven liberals. Thus, they were not as cohesive as 
reflected in the several votings mentioned in previous sections in which they defeated 
the liberals usually by 16 to 7. 二 
K-CORE PARTITIONING 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 0 1 4 5 8 8 2 3 6 7 
C C C C C H L L L S Y L L L T W 
H K K C T W T L M S K T H K Y Y P W 
DEGREE S H W S S C C Y W S Y L K M K T C T 
6 
3 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
2 . xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx • 
1 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
Figure 3.3 K-core Analysis of the "Conservatives" 
There still existed core and peripheral members as relative to the power centre 
(Figure 3.3). The actors CHS(#1), CKH(#2), CKW(#3), CS(#4), CTS(#5)， 
CWC(#6), HTC(#7), LLY(#9), LMW(#10), LSS(#ll), SKY(#14)，TL(#15)，and 
YHK(#18) were at the core of the the power centre. On the-other hand, consistent 
with the analysis in previous sections, WWT(#17) was the farthest from the power 
centre. 
If analyzed further, there existed in fact four sub-groups among this 
conservative camp (Table 3.17). The first group consisted of CHS(#R1), CS(#R4)， 
CWC(#R6), HTC(#R7), LSS(#R14), and SKY(#R20). Except HTC and CHS, this 
group included mainly those coming from MACs of their repsective constituencies. 
The second group consisted of the actors LKM(#R9), LMW(#R12), and YHK(#R25). 
They were incumbent members of the Tusen Wan District Board in the last term. 
7 9 
\ 
The third group consisted of LYK(#R17), LYT(#R18), TPC(#R22), and 
WWT(#R23). This group included those who were relatively passive ones in the 
board meetings and, except LYK, rather far away from the power centre. The last 
group consisted of CKH(#R2), CKW(#R3), CTS(#R5), LLY(#R11) and TL(#R21). 
The members of this group had close relation；^ with the Rural Committee. These sub-
groups were roughly consistent with the impression of the informants, except the 
actor LYK. According to the informant SCK, LYK was actually a close allie with 
HTC, as he had established ties with HTC as early as in the era of the Tsuen Wan 
District Advisory Board. The classification of him into the third group with actors 
LYT, TPC and WWT was perhaps due to the fact that he was rather low-profiled in 
the board affairs, a commonality with the other three members in the sub-group. 
Although these conservatives did formed a coalition in the board, this was only 
solely due to their common background. Their common affiliations can only 
explained an insignificant proportion of variations in their mutual-supprtive network 
(Table 3.18). Thus, it was the pressure of the confrontation by the liberals that drive 
them together. It was a responsive measure taken by them, so as to consolidate their 
own interests. And thus, they support each other in exchange for the allocation of 
chairmanships and prestiges. In fact, there were conflicts of interests among 
themselves. For example, on the election of committee chairmen on March 17, 1986, 
CWC and TL had compete for the chairmanship of the Cultural and Recreational 
Committee. Again, on the 8th meeting held on May 1, 1986, CKH had competed but 
lost to TL and HJC in the election of delegates of the board 
to the District Committee of the Regional Council. LSS had also competed and 
defeated by TL, CWC, CS, and SKY in the election of delegates to the District 




Grouped Adjacency Matrix 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 7 4 4 6 8 8 0 2 3 6 7 5 2 3 5 9 _ — _ — — — — — — — 
C L H S C Y L L L L^T W C C C L 
H S T C K W H K M Y Y P W T K K T L 
S S C S Y C K M W K T C T S H W L Y 
I R l 2 1 1 1 1 . 1 1 1 
11 R14 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 
7 R7 2 1 1 
4 R4 1 1 2 1 1 
14 R2 0 1 1 2 2 1 
6 R6 1 1 2 1 1 
18 R25 1 2 1 
8 R9 1 2 1 
10 R12 1 1 2 2 1 1 
12 R17 1 2 1 
13 R18 1 2 1 
16 R22 1 2 1 
17 R23 1 2 
5 R5 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 
2 R2 1 2 1 1 2 
3 R 3 1 1 1 2 1 1 
15 R21 1 2 \ 
9 Rll 1 V 
Group Assignments: 
1： R1 R4 R6 R7 R14 R20 
2: R9 R12 R25 
3： R17 R18 R22 R23 
4: R2 R3 R5 Rll R21 
Fit: 0,367 (larger values indicate better fit) 






Observed value: 0.026 0.306 
Average: -0.041 0.316 
Standard deviation: 0.615 0-056 
Proportion as large: 二 0.378 0.632 
Proportion as small: 0.640 0.464 
Proportion as extreme: 0.378 0.464 
Table 3.18 Correlation between the affiliation and 
supportive matrices of the "Conservatives" 
The partial-network of the conservatives was not as cohesive as first thought. 
They always had conflicts of interest among themselves, and different positions were 
occupied by different members, with some to be more proximal to the power centre, 
while the others farther away from the power centre. 
5. Conclusion 
With the participation of the liberals into the District Board, new challenges 
were launched to the conservatives. These challenges include the query on the 
"normal practice" of the committees as chaired by the conservatives, open 
competition to chairmanships, and bringing different voices to agenda items. Such 
new politics of the committee have in turn sensitized丨 the conservatives in coping with 
such impact. They began to form a loose coalition so as to exercise coercive power 
over the liberals and to maintain the •’order'’ of the district board. However, as 
analysed in the past chapter, the coalition of the conservatives is only a reactive 
measure to the challenge of the liberals, and thus the common goal is mainly to 
preserve their interest usch as chairmanships. 
On the other hand, the seven liberals also began to consolidate into a more 
closely-knited coalition, in facing the coercion from the conservatives. The attention 
paid by the media also helped the cohesion of this coalition. Nevertheless, this 
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coalition of the liberals is in fact a tri-foci structure. Such a configuration has in turn 
significant implications to the later development of the liberal camp. 
Thus, both the conservatives and the liberals can identify "common enemy", 
so the district board members have divided themselves roughly into two cliques. The 
common affiliations and orientations of these two cliques have been expressed through 
their supportive beahviours in committee politics, which in turn reinforced such 
demarcation between the two cliques. 
END NOTES 
I.Here, residents' organization refer to the community 
groups formed by local residents aiming at identifying 
community problems and facilitating the solution, with a 
scope of concern mainly on their livelihood. Whereas for 
concern groups,工 refer to the community groups concerning 
for community betterment. Though the area of concern is 
also on the community, these concern groups are not 
necessarily consisted solely of local residents. To my 
experience, many of these concern groups are formed by 
external organizers such as social workers. Tsing Yi 
Concern Group is a good example. However, according to my 
experience, in Kwai Tsing District these two definitions 
sometimes do not differ much. Sometimes the membership 
will be overlap, or the goals of the residents' 
organizations will change. Thus, it is not uncommon that 







EMANCIPATION BY THE LIBERALS 
1. Introduction 二 
By consolidating the experience in the District Board in the previous three 
years, the seven liberals had tried to expand their market share by recruiting new 
members to run for the offices. This maneouvre was a successful, making the liberal 
camp the majority of the District Board. Kwai Tsing District Board was the first ever 
District Board that had been "emancipated" and being controlled by the liberals in 
Hong Kong after the launching of District Administrative Scheme. The focus of this 
chapter was not to find out the reasons for such success (although implications had 
already been sought in the last chapter concerning the failure of the conservatives to 
fulfill the political demands of the voters), but emphases would be made on the 
analysis of the power structure of the District Board thus formed. Two partial 
networks would be studied, namely the partial network of the conservatives and that 
of the liberals. Further analyses would be made in trying to identify factions, if any, 
within these two partial networks. EfYorts would be paid in trying to use these 
identified configurations to explain for the subsequent political behaviours of these 
two camps in the board； It would also be shown that the structure of the liberal 
partial network had a significant implication for the later split among themselves after 
1991. 
2. Market Penetration bv the Liberals 
In view of the market test in 1985, the seven liberals realized that they could 
enlarge the political market share by mobilizing more candidates to fill up the elected 
offices. As the seven liberals had openned District Board members' offices to render 
assistance to the voters' political demands, and to collect the opinion of them so that 
their political demands would be articulated and addressed to, they had gained trust 





informants, they had a great number of cases requesting assistance in the three years 
of 1985-88. For example, the number of cases requesting the assistance of LWT 
amounted more than 300 a year. 
In addition, these seven liberals kepi on organizing social actions and issue 
politics outside the board. The residents were continually mobilized in fighting for 
their benefits. In this process, the legitimacy of the sevens as political representatives 
of the voters was established. Moreover, the voters continued to depend on these 
sevens to proceed on benefit-fightings on behalf of them. It thus reinforced the 
power-dependence relationships between these seven liberals and the mass. 
In seeing such elite-mass relations as a reinforcement to their market position, 
market penetration could be done through the recruitment of new members to the 
political positions, and to make use of the brand loyalty of the voters to support 
these new comers. This was how the，partnership effect’ took place in the election 
in 1988 in Kwai Tsing District. 
Another development in the national political market had to be taken into 
consideration in understanding the development of the political market in the Kwai 
Tsing District in these three years from 1988 to 1991. Numerous national political 
groups had been formed in the years, and some of them were playing an active role 
in participation in elections. Just considering the liberal political groups first. In 
1988, 60 of the total elected members were coming from the three liberal political 
groups (Ming Po, March 12, 1988) (Table 4.1). 
Political Group No. of DB members 
Meeting Point 口 一 
Hong Kong Affairs Society 
Hong Kong Association for 27 
Democracy and People's Livelihood 
Total 60 
1 able 4.1 
Distribution of DB members of the liberal political groups 
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Although the effect of political groups on the district level elections in 1988 
was not recognized, it began to take shape in the development of the community 
politics. In Kwai Tsing (the district was renamed to Kwai Tsing District from 1988, 
and the District Board was accordingly renaned to Kwai Tsing District Board), 10 
of the 16 elected District Board members were members of political groups. 9 of 
them were members of the Hong Kong Association for Democracy and People's 
Livelihood, and the other one was a member of the Hong Kong Affairs Society. 
Unlike the political market in the national level, such political groups had in fact 
sginificant impact on the later development of the local political market, which 
contributed to the disintegration and realignment of the factions in the Kwai Tsing 
District Board. Details would be discussed in the next chapter. 
Returning to the penetration process of the liberals in 1988. As mentioned in 
the last chapter, the tri-focii configuration of the 'Kwai Tsing Sevens' power structure 
had further developed when they decided to occupy the greatest market share they 
were able to capture. As early as one year before the District Board election in 
March 1988，the 'Kwai Tsing Sevens' began to formulate the strategy to further 
develop the War of Positions in the district. Coordination meetings were held 
among them. The basic strategy was to recruit as many candidates as possible to 
occupy the then 16 elected seats in the election. However, the strategy was not 
receiving a strict compromise. The main difference was on the number of candidates 
they would put forward. As recalled by LWT, at that time LCF was rather reserved 
in filling candidates for all the 16 available seats. There was one more seat available 
in Tsing Yi compared with the term 1985-88; the Tsing Yi North constituency which 
returned two seats in 1985 was splited into two constituencies, Tsing Yi North and 
Tsing Yi South, which then returned one and two seats respectively, making the total 
elected seats of the District Board to increase to 16 from 15 as in 1985. In order to 
avoid adding more stress to the relation with the rural members, LCF did not plan 
to occupy all the four seats available. But in order to secure a majority in the District 
Board (there were 26 members in the District Board, including 16 elected, 9 
appointed, and 1 ex-officio; thus majority meant in control of at least 14 seats in the 
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board), LWT urged for filling up candidates for all the elected seats. Finally, they 
agreed to fill up only 15 candidates. 
In recruiting the candidates, it was mainly the incumbent ’Kwai Tsing Sevens' 
who took up the responsibility to recruit cancfidates for their respective constituencies. 
Except the constituencies Tsing Yi South and Tsing Yi North, the other 7 
constituencies would each reutrn two District Board members from the election in 
1988. Thus, partnership election campaign was possible for each of these 
constituencies. As the seven incumbent liberal District Board members were 
occpuying elected seats at ditYerent constituencies, each of them was possible to 
recruitment on more candidate to run as their partners. This was the strategy of 
'bringing up the new comer by the incumbent member'. It was 
planned that the transfer of patron-client relationship from the incumbent member 
with the voters to the new comers would result in the success of both of the partners. 
As mentioned in the last chapter, there was a tri-foci configuration of the 
political network among the ’Kwai Tsing Sevens'. Thus the recruitment process of 
new comers were also being conducted around these three foci (Table 4.2). 
Constituency Incumbent member New Candidates 
Kwai Chung Central J ^ SPL 
Kwai Chung East LWT ； ^ ^ 
Kwai Chung North : KNK & LKG 
Kwai Chung South WYC CYU 
Kwai Chung West - SCK C ^ 
Kwai Shing [：^ [KC 
Tsing Yi South LCF 
Tsing Yi North ^ 
Tsing Yi Central ；; 飞刊 
— Table 4.2 




There were three constituencies having no incumbent members from the liberal 
camp. Thus, the recruitment of new candidates had to be done by others. As Kwai 
Chung North was geographically adjacent to the constituency of Kwai Chung East, 
the two incumbent members LWT and LOK had already made some intervention to 
the community issues in the constituency. With LWT being elected as the Regional 
Councillor from the constituency of Kwai Chung East (which covered the District 
Board constituencies of Kwai Chung East, Kwai Chung North, Kwai Chung South, 
and Kwai Chung Central), he could intervene into the community issues and provided 
services to the voters as a broker in the position of a Regional Councillor representing 
the voters in these four District Board constituencies. But as the constituencies of 
Kwai Chung South and Kwai Chung Central were under the cover of two of the 
'Kwai Tsing Sevens'，LWT had mainly extended his intervention into the constituency 
Kwai Chung North in addition to his own District Board constituency. Thus, the 
vacant constituency of Kwai Chung North was eagerly filled up by the liberals, 
and it followed that the responsibility of recruiting new candidates was on the 
shoulder of LWT. It was assumed that if he could transfer the support from the 
voters on him in that constituency to the new comers, the two new candidates could 
win the election. As recalled by LWT, more than 200 cases seeking for assistance 
were received by him in the position of a Regional Councillor from 1986 to 1988. 
On the other hand, the two incumbent District Board members of the Kwai Chung 
North constituency, SKY and LSS, had not provided meeting-the-public service to the 
voters in the last term, so it was obvious that he was having a higher reputation 
comparing with these two board members. 
Similarly, as LCF, and the Tsing Yi Concern Group, were well received by 
the residents in Tsing Yi, the trustful relationship and the rolw of political 
representative between him and the voters had already been established. He was 
acting as a broker who was able to adress to the political demands of the voters on 
community issues. It followed that he was responsible to recruit for new candidates 
for the two new constituencies of Tsing Yi North and Tsing Yi Central. However, 




leaving one elected seat to be run by a representative from the Rural Committee. 
Although LWT urged to fill up all the available seats, LCF had the power to decide 
on the final number of candidates from the liberal camp to run in the Tsing Yi 
constituencies. Such a final decision had significant implication to the dynamics 
among the liberal camp, and thus on the structure of the political network of the 
liberals. More detail discussion on this point would be made in later sections. 
Referring to the third foci of the ’Kwai Tsing Sevens', LYC, it was thus 
natural that he was responsible to recruit his own partner. Recalled by LYC, the new 
candidate, SPL, was a member of the Service Centre for Neighbours and 
Workers run by LYC. 
The recruitment of the new candidate for the Kwai Chung West constituency 
was quite similar. The new candidate, CMF, was in fact a core member of the Kwai 
Shing Residents' Association. It was under the manoeuvre of LWT and SCK that he 
was deployed to run in the constituency of Kwai Chung West. Similarly, one of 
the new candidates of Kwai Chung North, LKG, was indeed a core member of the 
Kwai Chung South Residents' Organization. He was also deployed to run in the 
Kwai Chung North constituency. 
Notwithstanding of this recruiment responsibility by the respective incumbent 
board members, the recruitment process of new candidates for the constituencies 
Kwai Chung South and Kwai Shing were different. According to an informant, 
TKW，the new candidate of Kwai Shing, LKC, was a centre-in-charge of a voluntary 
agency in the community. As he had already planned to run for a District Board 
office in 1988，he had established working ties with the liberal camp. And thus when 
he revealed his intention to run for the office in Kwai Shing constituency, support was 
given by the liberal camp, mainly from LWT. It was one of the reasons why CMF 
was deployed to the Kwai Chung West constituency. One point should be noted here. 
LKC was not recruited by the respective incumbent board member LKS. This had 
significant implication to the subsequent development and changes to the partial 
political network of the liberal camp. 
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Recruitment of new candidate for the Kwai Chung South constituency was 
under similar situation. In fact, the new candidate, CYH, was from the Kwai Chung 
South Residents' Organization. On the other hand, the incumbent board member of 
that constituency WYC, though a previous core member of the organization, had 
splited from it since the 1985 election. THus he was at odds with CYH, and few 
cooperations were observed between them since 1985. Thus, the recruitment of CYH 
to run for the office was not by WYC, but out of his own initiative, with the support 
of LWT. 
From the recruitment process of new candidates in the liberal camp, it could 
be seen that the three focii were still in operation. But one of the foci, LWT, began 
to emerge as a very influential one. He was the architect of the market 
penetration efforts paid particularly at the constituencies Kwai Chung East, Kwai 
Chung North, Kwai Chung South, Kwai Chung West, Kwai Shing, and even Tsing 
Yi North where the new candidate KFS was a long time working partner of LWT. 
In fact, with the setting up of the Hong Kong Association for Democracy and 
people's Livelihood in 1986, 9 of these candidates (including the incumbent board 
members running for a subsequent term) were members of that political group, of 
which LWT was the Vice-Chairman, this situation had a very great impact on the 
development of the political network of the liberal camp in subsequent years. 
These fifteen candidates of the liberal camp finally won the election with a 
100% successful rate. Such a landslide victory resulted in the enlargement of the 
market share of the liberals, and thus domination over the Kwai Tsing District Board. 
3. Domination over the District Board hv the Liberals 
Following this landslide victory of the liberal camp, these fifteen board 




including the allocation of resources and prestigeous positions such as chairmanships. 
It was observed that the members of the liberal camp had occupied positions more 
proximal to the power centre, with the appointed District Board members at the 
peripheral with respect to the power centre (Figure 4.1). 
K-CORE PARTITIONING 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 
1 2 3 4 6 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 7 8 9 0 2 4 5 7 5 7 8 6 1 3 6 
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Figure 4.1 K一core Analysis of the Affiliation Total 
Network 1988-91 
Due to the difference in affiliations and background, the new term of the Kwai 
Tsing District Board had at the very beginning be divided into cliques (Figure 4.2). 
HIERARCHICAL CLUSTERING 
C C C K K L L L L L L L S S T W C C C C C C T S L Y T 
K M Y F N C K K K S W Y C P Y Y F H K K W T P H M H W 
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Figure 4.2 K-core Analysis of the Affiliation Total 
Network 1988-91 
A large clique consisted of the fifteen liberals, namely CMF(#6), CYH(#9), 




KFS(#10), KNK(#11), LCF(#12), LKC(#13), LKG(#14), LKS(#15), LSK(#17), 
LWT(#18), LYC(#19), SCK(#20), SPL(#22), TYW0;^24)’ and WYC(#25). This was 
the liberal camp. TWM(#27), was also a member of the liberal camp. But here it 
was clasified to be a relatively detached member just because he was not elected until 
1989，by which time LCF had resigned hi乞post of District Board member due to 
personal reason. TWM was a core member of the Tsing Yi Concern Group, and was 
thus mobilized by the group and LCF to succeed hi in. 
Another clique consisted of several of the appointed members. They were 
CTS(#7), LMW(#16), SHP(#21), TPC(#23), and YHK(#26). They were mainly 
appointed members of the last term of the Kwai Chung and Tsing Yi District Board, 
and thus had established ties with each other. This clique could be extended to 
include other appointed members CFN(#1), CHS(#2), CKG(#3), CKW(#5), 
CWC(#8)，and another elected member CKM(#4) who was the daughter of CTS. 
Thus, the conservatives had formed a loosely-knitecl clique in view of the domination 
by the liberals. 
Although under the domination of the liberals, the total network of the District 
Board was not a cohesive one. The density of the total network was only 0.80, the 
degree centrality of 55.08%, closeness centrality of 34.97%, and betweenness 
centrality just 13.34%. The low cohesiveness of the total network was due to the fact 
that there existed two factions right at the beginning of the term of the District Board 
nad communication between these two factions were, not very frequent and close. In 
fact, 47.58% of the ties in the total network were weak ties (Table 4.3). The high 
proportion of weak ties present in the total network could also be seen from the 
partition diagram, in which four sub-groupings could be observed (Figure 4.3). It 
should be noted that the 15 liberals could be classified into two sub-groupings, with 
those of the Tsing Yi Concern Group as one sub-group (LCF, TYW, TWM) and the 
other 13 as one sub-group. The other two sub-groups were found among the 
appointed members. 
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L e v e l s o f T i e s A m o n g A c t o r s 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
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Figure 4.3 Subgroupings identified within the District 
Board Affiliation Network 1988-91 
With the majority proportion of the liberal board members, they had also 
dominated on chairmanships and agenda of the District Board. For the period from 
September 7，1989 to March 26, 1991, the distribution of chairmanships and agenda 
items of the totally 15 board meetings were depicted in Table 4.4. 
In accordance to the K-core analysis mentioned earlier, it was obvious that the 
liberal camp was more proximal to the power centre. They had proposed totally 46 
agenda items out of the 47 in the 15 District Board meetings. They had also moved 
32 motions out of total number of 34，of which all of these motions proposed by the 
liberals were passed. On the other hand, the other 2 motions proposed by the 
conservatives were all defeated. Whereas on the chairmanships, LWT was elected 
the chairman of the District Board, making him the first and only one District Board 
member who came from the liberal camp。In addition, the liberals had occupied 14 
times of chairmanship of the committees out of a total of 16. It was obvious that the 
liberals were far more proximal to the power centre of the District Board. The 
election of SCK among the board members to be a delegate to the Regional 
Councillor, and the election ofTYW and CYH as Regional Councillors in 1989 added 
weight to this domination by the liberals. 





such strong coalition among themselves and the domination by them on board affairs. 
Data was collected from minutes of the District Board, meetings, and analyses were 
made with the assistance of tools of network analysis using the Ucinet IV software. 
I Member Committee Agenda Motion Motion . RC 
Chairman • moved passed District 
Committee 
C F N * 1 
CKW* 1 
CWC* 1 1 I 
CYH “ 1 5 3 1_ 
CMF 1 ^ 
K F S 2 5 5 5 
KNK “ 5 2 2 I 
LKC 1 5 2 2 1 
I LCF 1 
LKC 1 ~ 1 I 2 2 _1 
LKS 1 - — — 
LKG . 1 2 1 I 
LMW* 1 1 
LSK 1 1 1 i 
LWT ？ I 5 
SCK " 2 . 4 ^ ^ G ^ 
S P L 1 I _ J 1 
I TWM 4 2__丨 2 
TYW 2 3 _ _ _ 2 —— 
WYC 1 2 
YHK* 丨 1 丨 .丨 
Table 4.4 Proximity to the power centre of the District Boara 
(，*, 二 appointed members) 
The supportive network of the board was an even more cohesive one. The 
density of the supportive network of the board was 1.44. It was higher than the 
affiliation network which recorded a density measure of only 0.80 and a higher 
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standard deviation of 0.90. Similarly, the betweenness centrality measure (18.79%) 
of this supportive network was greater than that of the affiliation network. 
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Figure 4.4 K-core Analysis of the Supportive Total Network 
Unlike the affiliation network which classified all the fifteen liberal members 
as the core of the power centre, in actual behavioral terms, the supportive network 
turned out several layers to the power centre (Figure 4.4). The actual core of the 
power centre was consisted of seven liberal members. They were KFS(#10), 
LKC(#13), LYC(#19), SCK(#20), SPL(#22), TYW(#24), and TWM(#27). With the 
other liberal members at the second layer of the core. Here, it should be noted that 
LWT(#18) should actually be at the centre point of the power centre as he was the 
chairman of the District Board. Nevertheless, also due to his position, he sometimes 
had to play the role of mediator and could not always showing unreserved support to 
each liberal member. Thus, he was relatively less explicit in advocating the agenda 
items during board meetings' • 
Not surprisingly, the conservatives were at the peripheral of the power centre, 
with CHS(#2), CKM(#4), CKW(#5), and CTS(#7) farthest from the power centre. 
The commonality of these four members was that they were having close affiliation 




but they were totally outcasted by the members from the Tsing Yi Concern Group, 
so they were losing their influence both in Tsing Yi community issues and in the 
board. On the other hand, some of the conservatives were treated as able to negotiate 
and were not hardliners. As recalled by SCK, some of them such as SHP and CWC 
were not always having an absolute negative perception on the liberals. Moreover, 
they were more receptive to the domination of the liberals and had accepted it as an 
inavoidable fact. So that in exchange for their own benefits (e.g. being elected as 
chairman of committees or taken up special tasks such as the urging for a Cultural 
and Recreational Centre for Kwai Tsing by SHP), they in return chose to take a more 
moderate position in facing the dominance of the liberals. 
By analysing this supportive network of the total network, it could be seen that 
two factions were readily being demarcated (Table 4.5). The first faction consisted 
of the liberals, and one conservative, CFN. The other conservatives formed the other 
faction. But it should be noted that the measure of fitness of this demarcation was 
only 0.116，a rather low value for the identification of factions among the total 
network. As indicated by the measure of correlation between the affiliation network 
and the supportive network in Table 4.6 (observed value 二 0.173，p <0.01)，to 
certain extent the supportive behaviour recorded in the supportive network was in 
accordance with their commonalities in affiliations and background. Although the 
correlation was not a strong one, commonality in affiliation had helped the exercising 
of mutual supportive behaviours in the board meetings. But why was the demarcation 
of them into the 2 factions: the liberal camp and the conservative camp be scoring 
only a low value of goodness of fit? Did it implved that the demarcation was too 
simple，that is, the 26 board members should be classified into more than two 
factions, even within the liberal camp? Or it was because the conservative camp was 




Grouped Adjacency Matrix 
1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 
1 5 9 7 8 6 0 4 7 0 1 5 3 4 2 9 8 4 3 7 2 6 3 5 2 6 1 
C L C L L C S L T K K W L T S L C C C C C L T C L Y S 
1 5 2 1 -
15 5 2 - 2 
9 5 3 1 
17 5 1 1 2 1 
18 1 5 1 1 1 
6 5 1 3 
20 5 1 1 1 
14 2 1 5 1 3 
27 5 1 1 3 1 
10 1 2 2 5 4 1 
11 2 1 5 
25 1 1 1 5 
13 2 1 1 1 5 1 1 
24 1 3 5 1 5 1 1 
22 1 1 1 1 5 1 




5 , 5 
12 2 5 
2 6 1 C5 
L - J 
Group Assignments: 一 力^ m 1 6 9 10 11 13 14 15 17 18 19 20 22 24 25 27 
2! 2 3 4 5 7 8 12 16 21 23 26 
Fit: 0.116 (larger values indicate better fit) 
Table 4.5 Factions identified within the total network 
CORRELATION MATCHES 
Observed value: 0.173 0.365 
Average: 0.001 0.234 
Standard deviation: 0.356 ” 巧 
proportion as large: 0.000 
Proportion as small: 1.000 
Proportion as extreme: 0.000 0.984 ""“Table 4.6Correlation be^een the affiliation and 
supportive total network 1988-91 
98 
\ 
4. Structure of the Political Network of the Conservatives 
In view of the above question, it had to further analyze two partial networks: 
one of the conservatives and the other of tfie liberals to see any specific structures 
could be identified which contributed to the above mentioned questions. 
The density of the partial network of the conservatives was 1.11，higher than 
the density of the total network (which meant that this partial network was more 
cohesive than the total network), and the degree centrality measure was very high 
(84.44%). Moreover, the conservatives were less independent with each other when 
compared with the total network (closeness measure 二 36.62%). This was further 
illustrated by their betweenness measure which was 20.34%. However, 
notwithstanding their cohesiveness, the information flow and resources exchanged 
among themselves were low. The flow betweenness measure was only 9.586%. But 
what contributed to this phenomenon? 
In fact, this partial network of the conservatives was just a loosely-knited one. 
As analysed in the years before 1985 and 1985 to 1988 in the previous two chapters, 
the conservatives were not bounded together by ideology or commitment to certain 
beliefs, but-due to exchanges of resources (e.g. the allocation of prestigeous positions 
in the board before 1985, and the ad hoc coalition during 1985 to 1988 to respond to 
the challenges from the，Kwai Tsing Sevens’))-. The situation was even worse in this 
term because there left only 7 of them who were incumbent members in the past 
terms of either the Kwai Chung and Tsing Yi District Board or the Tsuen Wan 
District Board. The other conservatives were new members in this term. Thus, the 
mutual supportive network had to be established by taking some time. Hence, the ties 
among themselves were mainly weak ties (Table 4.7). 
Among themselves, two sub-groups could be identified (Figure 4.5). One sub-





the others formed another sub-group. As analysed by an informant, SCK, members 
of the first sub-group were either highly educated notables in the community (e.g. 
LMW was a medical doctor in the community who had operated for many years, and 
YHK was a headmaster of a secondary school in the community), or those who was 
willing to give sponsorships to community activities (such as TPC and SHP), or who 
had occupied a very prestigeous position in the community (such as CTS who was the 
chairman of the Tsing Yi Rural Committee and incumbent members of the Tsuen 
Wan District Board). On the other hand, members of another sub-group were mainly 
those coming from the MACs who were not well-off nor educated (such as CWC and 
CFN), or those businessman who were not willing to give great sponsors to 
community activities (such as CKW and CKG): 
"The CNTA appointed them not because they could 
balance the discussion with the liberals, but because 
they had money to sponsor community activities which 




Group Co-Membership Matrix 
1 1 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 
C C C C C C e L S T Y^ 
F H K K K T W M H P H 
N S G M W S C W P C K 
一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 — 一 一 
1 R1 2 1 1 0 1 2 0 2 2 2 2 
2 R2 1 2 2 0 0 2 1 2 2 2 2 
3 R3 1 2 2 0 0 2 1 2 2 2 2 
4 R4 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
5 R5 1 0 0 0 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 
6 R7 2 2 2 1 2 5 2 4 4 4 4 
7 R8 0 1 1 0 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 
8 R16 2 2 2 0 2 4 2 4 4 4 4 
9 R 2 1 2 2 2 0 2 4 2 4 4 4 4 
10 R23 2 2 2 0 2 4 2 4 4 4 4 
11 R26 2 2 2 0 2 4 2 4 4 4 4 
HIERARCHICAL CLUSTERING 
C C C C C C C L S T Y 
K F H K K W T M H P H 
M N S G W C S W P C K 
1 1 
Level 4 1 2 3 5 7 6 8 9 0 1 
— — — — — — — — — — 一 
4 XXXXXXXXX 
2 . xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
1 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
Figure 4.5 
Cliques identified among the Conservatives 
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Levels of Ties Among Actors 
1 1 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1一 
C C C C C C C L S T Y 
F H K K K T W M H P H 
N S G M W S C W P C K 
一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 
1 R 1 2 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 
2 R2 1 2 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
3 R3 1 1 2 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
4 R4 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
5 R5 1 0 0 0 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 
6 R7 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 
7 R8 0 1 1 0 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 
8 R16 1 1 1 0 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 
9 R 2 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 
10 R23 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 
11 R2 6 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 
Distribution of Ties 
1 2 
Freq Pet (%) 
1 Absent 12.00 21.82 
2 Weak 42.00 76.36 
3 Strong 1.00 1.82 







Such an analysis by SCK had pinpointed the main reason for the loose-knit 
network of the conservatives. Thus, due to their differences in background and 
orientation, they were just being driven together by the domination of the liberals. 
If anyone of the conservatives did not join into the network, he would be isolated 
both by the liberals and by the conservatives as well. So, in exchange for the 
minimization of the sense of alienation, each of them involved into the exchange 
network. As they did not identify themselves as liberals (and of course not being 
recognized by the liberals), they had to find an identity for themselves. Thus, non-
liberals became conservatives. Identity crisis could than be avoided by 
joining the group. 
5. Political Network of the Liberals 
The network of the conservatives was a loosely-knitecl one, but the political 
network of the liberal was a strong one. All of the ties among the liberals were 
strong ties (Table 4.8). 
The density of political partial network of the liberals (1.49) was high when 
compared with the partial network of the conservatives (1.11) and the total network 
(1.44). All the measures for centrality of this partial network had indicated that they 
were rather, cohesive. The closeness measure was 65.45%, and the betweenness 
measure was 33.24%. Moreover, the information flow among themselves were high 
(37.581%). 
Developed from the coalition of weak against strong in the last term, 
the liberals had formed strongholds among themselves as them dominated the board 
affairs so that they could try to urge for improvements in community issues more 
effectively as they had the power for allocation of resources and had used their joint 
force to exert greater pressure to the government. 





fulfill the political demands they were voicing out for their clients (the voters), they 
did not give up protest tactics outside the establishment. Moreover, they had 
consolidated their pressure by joining together in protest actions. This meant that the 
protest tactics each of them was using in articulating for improvement of the 
community problems in their respective constituencies before, could be reinforced by 
more effectively advocating for the changes by joining the pressure of 15 District 
Board together. Such a manoeuvre not only attracted the attention of the press, but 
indeed had exerted a great pressure to the government. As the District Board was a 
legitimate consultative channel for the government on community issues, the 
domination by the liberals on the Kwai Tsing District Board meant that they could 
pass any motion they wanted (which had already been discussed from the analysis in 
previous sections of this chapter). It was in turn a very great pressure to the 
government. Thus, by joining into the exchange network by each of them, each of 
them could get rewards that their respective community issues could be advocated 
with a power of 15 times more than did It by each of them alone! For example, 
during the period of June 1989 to November 1990, these 15 liberals had already 
jointly organized 67 press conferences, signiture campaigns, petitions, and protests. 
Moreover, motions were passed in the District Board, such as the motion against the 
construction of Container Terminal No.9 at Tsing Yi, agianst the importation of 
foreign labours, against the Double-rent policy on Public Housing, and against the 
selling of Mark-Six Lottery at CSL shops. 
One of the successful cases was the advocacy on the Air Pollution 
control (Fuel Restriction) Regulations 1990. As mentioned in 
Chapter 2, one of the community problem that had not been tackled and articulated 
by the conservatives in the past was the pollution problem in Kwai Tsing, where the 
industrial area was just nearby the residential area. Before this new term of the Kwai 
Tsing District Board, the two candidates at Kwai Chung North constituency had 
already mobilized the residents to articulate for the improvement in air pollution 
problems. After this new term of District Board, out of the initiative of these two 
board members, joint forces were consolidated among the 15 liberals to urge the 
government to improve the situation by passing an ordinance prohibiting the emittion 
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of polluting smoke from the factories. Throughout the, years, they organized 
numerous protest actions, being coordinated with m o t i o n s passed in the District 
Board, and in arranging lobbying efforts to the Environmental Protection Department 
and the Legislative Council responsible for passing the laws. Finally, the ordinance 
was passed, and the political demand of the:voters in the district was fulfilled. 
Levels of Ties Among Actors 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
C - C K K L L L L L L L S S T W T 
M Y F N C K K K S W Y C P Y Y W 
F H S K F C G S K T C K L W C M — — — — — — — — — — — — — — ~ ~ 
1 R6 2 2 2 
2 R9 2 2 2 
3 RIO 2 2 2 2 2 2 
4 Rll 2 2 2 
5 R12 2 2 
6 R13 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
7 R14 2 2 2 2 2 
8 R15 2 2 2 
9 R17 2 2 2 2 2 
10 R18 2 2 2 2 2 
11 R19 2 2 2 
12 R2 0 2 2 2 2 
13 R22 2 2 2 2 2 2 
14 R2 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
15 R2 5 2 2 2 2 
16 R27 2 2 2 2 2 
Distribution of Ties 
1 2 
Freq Pet 
一 一 一 一 一 一 
1 Absent 0 0 
2 Weak- 0 0 
3 Strong 55 100 
Table 4.8 
Strength of ties among the liberals 
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The operation of the political network was clearly observed during the above 
mentioned process. Although it was originally initiated by the two board members 
from the Kwai Chung North constituency, the liberal board members from the 
constituencies of Kwai Chung Central and Tsing Yi had also noticed it as a significant 
community problem, as there were also factories in their constituencies surrounding 
the residential area. As common concern was identified, they followed suite in the 
advocacy process. Thus, by commiting each of these members into the process, they 
got the reward of a more powerful adovacy, and thus a higher possibility of fulfilling 
the political demand of the voters in their respective constituencies. But how about 
the other liberal members whose constituency did not face such community problem? 
Why did they join the force? 
Again, it was the operation of an exchange network. By supporting the 
advocacy effort of other members within the network’ they could expect a future 
exchange from those they had supported in this issue. The reward was not 
necessarily an immediate one, but an anticipated reward would drive them to join in 
the exchange relations. By such delayed, anticipated, and not yet realized rewards, 
credibility had to be established between those being supported and the supporting 
members. No contract had been made during the exchange transactions. The 
exchange was just based on beliefs which might not be realized in the future. Thus, 
such a delayed reward meant also a prolonged exchange process, in which the party 
who had already delivered the resource in the transaction at the beginning of this 
prolonged exchange process would finally got the resources they valued at the end of 
this prolonged exchange process. Thus, such an exchange transaction without 
immediate or simultaneous exchange of resources could help the consolidation of 
group solidarity, because the one being supported was in debt of those supporting 
him. Hence, in the Kwai Tsing District Board, when the board members supported 
the motion by the members from Kwai Chung West on the extension of NLCDP 
service to that constituency, they were later inturn supported by the 
members from the Kwai Chung West constituency on this air pollution issue. 





liberals, they were not at a same plate when reference was took on the proximity to 
the power centre. In fact, there were some members who were at the core of the 
power centre, while some others were at a relatively more peripheral position. Those 
at the core of the power centre were KFS(#3), LKC(#13), LYC(#19), SCK(#12), 
SPL(#13), TYW(#14), and TWM(#16) (Figure 4.6). But among them, LWT, KFS, 
LKC, and LYC were occupying the most significant positions^ (Table 4.9). 
K - C O R E P A R T I T I O N I N G 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 2 3 6 1 2 3 4 6 4 7 9 0 5 8 5 
C C K L L S S T T K L L L W L L 
M Y F K Y C P Y W N K S W Y K C 
DEGREE F H S C C K L W M K G K T C S F 
— — — _ — 
5 
4 . . xxxxxxxxxxxxx 
3 • X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X . . 
2 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx . 
1 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
Figure 4.6 
K-core Analysis of the Liberals 88-91 
Actor Betweenness Closeness Flow Betweenness 
KFS 3 8 . 25 . 8 8 . 2 4 3 1 . 4 7 
LKC 1 6 . 6 3 6 2 . 5 0 2 0 . 5 7 
LWT 2 4 . 0 9 6 0 . 0 0 4 5 . 7 0 
LYC 5 . 3 4 6 2 . 5 0 4 . 1 
• “ Table 4.9 




It could be seen that these four actors were comparatively less dependent on 
others in the network, and had more resources flowing between them, or occupying 
a more significant position as bridges between other actors. It was interesting to note 
that these actors were roughly those of the tri-foci as identified in the era of 'Kwai 
Tsing Sevens' in 1985-88, with the additioaof LKC as the fourth significant actor. 
LWT was one of the significant actors here not just because he was the chairman of 
the District Board (one could recall the role of the chairman of the Kwai Chung and 
Tsing Yi District Board, HTC, in 1985-88 who was facing continuous challenges 
from the liberals), but also because of his resources available for exchange which 
were valued by the others involving in the exchange transactions. For example, in 
the above mentioned case of the air pollution ordinance, the success was not only due 
to the pressure from the 15 as a whole and the protest actions outside the board，but 
also significantly due to the success in lobbying the officials of the Enviro讓ental 
Protection Department, the members of the Environmental Problem Advisory 
Committee, and the Environment Panel of the Legislative CoiinciL As he had ties 
with the national political actors who were at these organizations, he was in 
possession of these resources in exchange and played the role of a broker. In turn, 
the other members had to depend on these ties to make the lobby successful. Thus, 
power-dependence relations had established (in this case), which meant that he was 
in a more prestigeous position comparing with the depending members. 
KFS was a significant actor not only because of his aggressive personal style, 
but also because of his involvement in the Tsing Yi Concern Group. As the founder 
of the group, LCF had resigned, he and TYW became the senior members of the 
group. As mentioned earlier, the Tsing Yi Concern Group was almost the 
monopolised supplier in the community with reference to the political demands of the 
voters. With his seniority and expertise in organizing (he was a social worker), he 
kept on possessing the resources not to be provided by other members. A 
monopoly of resources valued by others just meant a power 
advantage over others. 
Similarly, LYC was one of the three tbcii identified earlier in the，Kwai Tsing 
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Sevens' era. His comparatively lower value of flow betweenness here also meant that 
he did not depend much on others, which was reflected by the high value (62.50) of 
his closeness measure. Thus, he kept on his position in this term from the last term 
of the District Board. His independence was further reinforced by the expansion of 
his power by recruiting a partner. 二 
What different from the tri-foci phenomenon here was the role of LKC. 
Although he was not a member of the liberal camp before this term, he was very 
active in board affairs and in organizing protest actions for the voters. Moreover， 
with his expertise in cultural activities, he was also being elected as the chairman of 
the Arts and Cultural Affairs Committee in 1988-89, and later a delegate to the 
District Committe of the Regional Council. He was able to establish com應nications 
with the conservatives with his skillful social skill. Initiative meant influence. But 
being actively involved in board affairs, he was able to pass information and 
resources and thus relatively less dependent on others. 
But as KFS, LKC, and LWT were members of the Hong Kong Association 
for Democracy and People's Livelihood, there were no obvious discrepancies among 
them. Com麵nication links were stUl existing among them. Thus, although there 
were four significant members, the phenomenon was somewhat different from the tri-
focii structure in the years 1985-88. But these potential four focii did had significant 
implication for the subsequent split of the liberal camp after 1991, of which detail 
would be discussed in the next chapter. 
In fact, the 15 liberals in this term of the District Board could still be 
demarcated into two sub-groups in view of the strong coalition they had formed in 
these three years^  (Table 4.10). 
One of the two sub-groups consisted of actors CYH(#9), KNK(#11), 
LKG(#14), LSK(#17)，LWT(#18), and WYC(#25). This sub-group was actually 
centred around LWT, as the other members were mainly recruited by him. He had 




mobilization of national political notables (such as Mr. Martin Lee, Mr. Szeto Wah, 
and Mr. Lau Chin Shek) to support them, and the mobilization of other significant 
political groups (such as the Meeting Point and the Hong Kong Affairs Society) and 
pressure groups (such as the Hong Kong People's Council on Public Housing Policy) 
to nominate them. These were valuable resources that LWT could possess in helping 
the election of these members. Moreover, these members were recruited by LWT 
into the Hong Kong Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood, by which 
material supports, training sessions, and r e p u t a t i o n s of the organization were 




Fit: 0.210 (larger values indicate better fit) 
Group Assignments: 
1： R9 Rll R12 R14 R17 R18 R2 5 
2: R6 RIO R13 R15 R19 R2 0 R2 2 R24 R2 7 
Grouped Adjacency Matrix 一 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
9 2 7 4 5 0 5 8 1 6 3 2 3 4 1 6 
L C L K L L W L C L K S S T L T 
S Y K N C W Y K M K F C P Y Y W 
K H G K F T C S F C S K L W C M 
9 R17 5 2 1 1 1 
2 R9 5 3 1 
7 R14 2 5 3 1 1 
4 Rll 2 1 5 
5 R12 5 2 
10 R18 1 1 5 1 1 
15 R2 5 1 5 1 1 
8 R15 5 2 2 
1 R6 5 3 1 
6 R13 1 2 5 1 1 1 1 
3 RIO 1 2 5 4 1 2 
12 R2 0 1 5 1 1 
13 R22 1 1 5 1 1 1 
14 R24 1 5 1 1 5 1 3 
11 R19 , 1 2 5 -
16 R27 1 1 ” 5 
Table 4.10 
Factions identified among the liberals 88-91 
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But by giving the " g i f t " by LWT, no rewards were got from these members 
in return at the same time. The exchange with his associates was a generalized 
exchange . There was no direct and immediate reciprocity in the exchange 
transactions. But as no resources were exchanged by these associates in return, such 
exchange had to be based on credit mentality-among them. The increase of the level 
of trust among them would in turn help the building up of the cohesion of the sub-
group. Moreover, such a generalized exchange would help the transfer of loyalty on 
the individual LWT from the associates to the political group they belonged to. In 
other words, through such prolonged exchange transaction, a power-dependenct 
relationship was established between LWT and his associates. In fact, LWT had 
jointly operated a District Board members' office with KNK, LKG, and LSK. They 
were also members of the same residents’ association. CYH had also operated a 
Regional councillor's office at the office of LWT. 
‘ ^^ ^^  I 
LSK LKG 
L K S - — — . _ C Y H 
\\>CMF- SCK — — L W T - - ' 
I — 
‘ F i g u r e 4.7 Sociogram of the liberals 88-91 





between pairs of the 15 liberals. It was in fact the partial network of these liberals 
from the total network. As discussed in the process of recruitment of new candidates 
at the beginning of this chapter, the 15 members were roughly centred around the 
three foci identified in 1985-88. As the partners were recruited mainly by the 
incumbent members, they had a.closer tie with them. In general, three densely-tied 
portions of this partial network could be observed. One dense portion consisted of 
KNK, LKG, LSK and LWT. With LWT at the centre，this portion was connected 
to another portion consisting of the members of the Tsing Yi Concern Group. The 
portion of LYC and SPL was also connected to LWT. CYH was connected not only 
to LWT, but also to LKG directly because they were members of the South Kwai 
Chung Residents' Organization. WYC, LKC, and LKS were comparatively 
independent members. 
Thus, this partial network could be roughly divided into three sub-groups: 
a/ (LWT) with (KNK, LKG, LSK) 






b/ (LCF) with (TYW), (TWM) 
d (LYC) with (SPL) 
It could be seen that LWT was actually tliie cut point of the partial 
network, because he was the bridge linking various sub-groups in the partial network. 
However, unlike the generalized exchange relations between him and his associates, 
his relations with the other sub-groups (the members of the Tsing Yi Concern Group 
and the members from the Service Centre for Neighbours and Workers) were 
restricted exchange relations. As Tsing Yi Concern Group was a 
monopolized supplier in the fulfillment of political demands of the Tsing Yi voters, 
they were 'self-sufficient' during the election campaign and in the solving of 
community issues of Tsing Yi. No national political notables were necessary in their 
election campaigns. The name of Tsing Yi Concern Group was sufficient for them. 




Thus, the resources possessed by LWT which were valued by his associates were not 
valuable resources to them. Similarly, his relations with LYC and SPL were also of 
a restricted exchange type. With slightly difference from the relation with the 
members of Tsing Yi Concern Group, he had recruited SPL to be a member of the 
Hong Kong Association for Democracy ancLPeople's Livelihood. 
In relation to the Tsing Yi Concern Group and the Service Centre for 
Neighbours and Workers, the inter-group relations with the sub-group of the Hong 
Kong Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood were restricted exchange 
which based on direct reciprocity. For example, the support for the chairmanship for 
LWT was exchanged with the priority of agenda setting and allocation of committee 
chairmanships. As recalled by one of the informants, there were complains on LWT 
that he had allocated too much resources and gave too much prestige to the members 
from Tsing Yi, making the political market of Tsing Yi more and more monopolized 
by them. "It is just like an independent empire", described by the informant. These 
restricted exchange had not helped the consolidation between sub-groups, and thus the 
solidary of the coalition of the 15 liberals was not as tightly-knited as it seemed to be。 
On the other hand, the within-group solidarity of these groupings were very 
strong, and further reinforced through their loyalty to the group and mutual support 
during the three years. Thus, when there was crisis among this coalition, the above 
structure of the coalition would become threatened, and perhaps even became fragile. 
Approaching to the end of this term, such a crisis did unfortunately occured. 
6. Conclusion 
Following the analysis on the configuration of the total network and partial 
networks during the term 85-88, it was demonstrated in this chapter that such 
configurations had imposed structural constraints to the later formation of coalitions 
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and the further development and reinforcement of the partial networks. It was 
centered on the three foci identified in the earlier term of 85-88 that the new comers 
of the liberal camp evolved around for the expansion of the partial network of the 
liberals. However, it was also found that there were in fact two factions among the 
liberals, as a result of the tri-foci structure earlier and of the difference in the nature 
of exchange relations within and between these two factions. This phenomenon had 
given rise to the future split of the liberal camp, which would be analysed in the next 
chapter. 
END NOTES 
1.According to my own experience, it was LWT who was very 
influential in agenda setting and in strategies formation 
in committee politics. For instance, co-ordination 
luee七ings would be initiated and held by him for 七he liberal 
camp before each District Board meetings, so that consenses 
could be established among the liberals. Such an effort 
had enhance the consolidation of the liberal camp, and to 
ensure the agenda would be passed in board meetings. 
However, such a backdoor maneouvre had not been reflected 
by 七he newtork analysis, which in this study relied mainly 
on official minutes of 七he board meetings. Thus, backdoor 
manipulations would not be recorded in these papers. 
Although the employment of network analysis here had posed 
七 tiis limitation,, it could be minimized by conducting 
informant interviews and my personal experience. More 
detail discussion on the limitation of network analysis 
would be dealt with in the final chapter. 
2.As analysed in Chapters 工工 and 1工工，there were factions 
among the conservatives themselves. Moreover, the 
chairmanships were allocated to a few members only. Those 
familiarized with each other since the Tsuen Wan Advisory 
Board and in the term 1982-85 were more cohesive than other 
conservatives joining later. Although only occupying 
peripheral positions, joining the conservative camp would 
help the conservative new-comers more secured in 
encountering the challenges from the liberal camp. Thus, 
by qiving support, these members would got in return a 
sense of security and ”brotherhoodliness" among the 
conservatives. Although such exchange transactions were 
no七 in monetary terms, establishment of relational ties 
would still be possible through supportive behaviours in 







3.Again, according to my experience and the information 
from informants which were consistent with each other, 
these four actors were the most influential ones. But LWT 
was not shown in Figure 4.6 to be a significant actor, 
which due to the same reason of the limitation of network 








GREAT DIVIDE OF THE LIBERALS 
1. Introduction 
The Kwai Tsing District Board continued to be controlled by the majority of 
liberals after the 1991 election. However, with the incidence of the 1991 Legco 
Election, there was a split among the liberals, and some of them had realigned with 
the conservatives. Would such a split and realignment a result of solely the Direct 
Election of Legco in 1991，or due to personal clash? In this chpater, answers would 
be tried to find out by analysing the configuration of the liberal network before and 
after the Direct Election. The subsequent restructuring of the total network of the 
District Board would also be analysed, so as to identify the power structure of the 
board. 
2. Continual Domination hv the Liberals 
The new term of the Kwai Tsing District Board would be from 1991 to 1994. 
In this term, a significant change was made by the government on the boundaries of 
the election constituencies. In the past, the constituencies would generally return two 
elected seats each. But in this new term, the boundaries of the constituencies would 
be further divided into smaller ones, making the total number of constituencies to be 
15，returning 12 elected members from the Kwai Chung District and 6 from the Tsing 
Yi District (Table 5.1). 
1 1 7 I \ 
. I 
I Constituency Constituency No. of No. of 
in 1991 in 1988 Voters seats 
I (01)Kwai Chung Central Kwai Chung Central 12,392 2 
1 (02) Kwai Chung East Kwai Chung East 8,865 1 
(15) Shek Lei ‘ Kwai^Chung East 7,457 1 
I (03)Kwai Chung North Kwai Chung North 2_一 
I (04)Kwai Chung South Kwai Chung South 7,666 \ 
(14) Lei Cho Kwai Chung South 11,760 1 
(05) Kwai Chung West Kwai Chung West 8, 088 1 
(13) Tai Wo Hau Kwai Chung West 8,125 1 
(06)Kwai Shing Kwai Shing 16,508 2 
(07) Tsing Yi North Tsing Yi North 5,247 1 
(ll)Tsing Yi East Tsing Yi North 5,468 1 — — 
I (12) Tsing Yi Cheung On Tsing Yi North 1,173 1 
(08)Tsing Yi south Tsing Yi South 9,397 1 
(09)Tsing Yi Central Yi Central 12,288____1 
(10) Tsing Yi West Tsing Yi Central � 6 3 9 1 — — 
‘ “ Total 136095 18 | 
I �Table 5.1 — ‘ 
Changes of Constituencies and Elected Seats in 1991 
(Source: Annual Reports of Kwai Tsing District Board) 
As there were new constituencies and each of them had been splited into 
smaller ones than 1988, new candidates had to be recruited to fill 叩 these vacancies. 
• -
Moreover, 2 of the incumbent board members of the liberal camp in 1988 did not 
seek for another term, thus more new candidates were required. 
The manoeuvre of the recruitment process was similar to that of 1988, but the 
development of the national political market had given rise to some difference in this 
term. A new liberal political party, the United Democrats of Hong Kong had been 
established on April 16，1990. Most of the original members of the Hong Kong 





party, including those at the core of the power centre, such as LWT, KFS, and LKC. 
But at the time the election took place in March 1991, these members were allowed 
to have multiple memberships of the United Democrats of Hong Kong and the Hong 
Kong Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood. And they were not 
strictly required to bear the party label in the election. Thus, for the 6 elected seats 
in Tsing Yi, the candidates were recruited by the incumbent members of the Tsing 
Yi Concern Group; whereas the other liberal candidates to fill up the vacancies were 
mainly recruited through LWT, a core member of the UDHK. 
The liberals had filled up all the 18 available elected seats, and 8 of them were 
elected unopposed. They included LKG and LWW (a new candidate) of the Kwai 
Chung North constituency, WYC of Kwai Chung South, CYH of Lai Cho Area, SCK 
of Kwai Chung West, CMF of Tai Wo Hau, and LKC and LKS of Kwai Shing. 
Other liberals were also elected by a great winning margin over the opponents. The 
liberals had won all the 18 available seats, making them continue to be the majority 
in the Kwai Tsing District Board. The conservatives were absolutely out of cast in 
the election, and in the District Board. 
3. Political Structure of the District Board 
i 
I. 
The liberals had occupied 18 seats of the total 28 of the District Board (the 
other 9 were appointed, and 1 was ex-officio). With this greater proportion of 
number of board members, the liberals had occupied the core of the power centre of 
the Board, with the appointed members at the peripheral (Figure 5.1). This structure 
was a rather cohesive one, referring to the measures of the centrality of this network. 
This network was rather a globally centralized one (44.87%, Table 5.1), with much 
connections among the actors (47.17%, Table 5.2)，and the information flow among 
the members was higher than the previous total networks (17.511%, Table 5.3). In 
addition, the network was having a high local centrality (53.28%, Table 5.4), with 




KFS (normalized degree measure of 122.22), LKC (103.70), and LWT (92.59) as the 
actors being the central figures in the network. This was quite similar to the structure 
identified in the years 1988-91 with these three and LYC as intluenctial members. 
Thus, right at the beginning, two factions could be identified (Table 5.5). One 
faction consisted of the appointed conservative members, and the other consisted of 
the liberals. The goodness of fit of this model was very high (0.64), indicating that 
this demarcation of factions could to a large extent reflect the structure of the 
network. 
K-CORE PARTITIONING 
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Figure 5.1 






Closeness Centrality Measures 
1 2 
Farness Closeness 
1 43.00 . 62.791 ACW 
2 63.00 ‘ 4 2 . 8 6 CFN 
3 46.00 58.70 CHG 
4 45.00 60.00 CKW 
5 54.00 50.00 CMF 
6 34.00 79.41 CSM 
7 45.00 60.00 CTS 
8 63.00 42.86 CWC 
9 43.00 62.79 CWS 
10 � 43.00 62.79 CYH 
11 63.00 42.86 CYT 
12 43.00 62.79 KFS 
13 63.00 42.86 LCK 
14 43.00 62.79 LKC 
15 43.00 62,79 LKG 
16 43.00 62.79 LKS 
17 43.00 62.79 LWT 
18 43.00 62.79 LWW 
19 43.00 62.79 LYC 
20 43.00 62.79 SCK 
21 63.00 42.86 SHP 
22 43.00 62.79 SPL 
23 43.00 62.79 TKW 
24 43.00 62.79 TWM 
25 43.00 62.79 TYW 
26 64.00 42.19 WKC 
27 45.00 60.00 WKK 
28 43.00 62.79 WYC 
Statistics 
1 丨 2 
Farness Closeness 
— — ^ — — — — — — — 一 — — — 
1 Mean 47.71 58.19 
2 Std Dev 8.54 9.06 
3 Sum 1336.00 1629.23 
4 Variance 72.92 82.06 
5 Euc Norm 256.49 311.60 
6 Minimum 34.00 42.19 
7 Maximum 64.00 79.41 
Network Centralization = 44.87% 
Table 5-1 
Closeness Centrality Measure of Members 1991 




1 0.69 0.20 ACW 
2 0.13 0.04 CFN 
3 22.50 • 6.411 CHG 
4 28.63 8.16 CKW 
5 0.00 0.00 CMF 
6 170.00 48.43 CSM 
7 28.63 8.16 CTS 
8 0.13 0.04 CWC 
9 0.69 0.20 CWS 
10 0.69 0.20 CYH 
11 0.13 0.04 CYT 
12 0.69 0.20 KFS 
13 0.13 0.04 LCK 
14 0.69 0,20 LKC 
15 0.69 0.20 LKG 
16 0.69 0.20 LKS 
17 0. 69 0.20 LWT 
18 0.69 0.20 LWW 
19 0. 69 0.20 LYC 
20 0.69 0.20 SCK 
21 0.13 0.04 SHP 
22 0.69 0.20 SPL 
23 0.69 0.20 TKW 
24 0.69 0.20 TWM 
25 0.69 0.20 TYW 
26 0.00 0.00 WKC 
27 28.63 8.16 WKK 
28 0.69 0.20 WYC 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR EACH MEASURE 
1 2 
Between nBetween 
舞•一 —•一 — — 一一一— — — — — — — — — 
1 Mean 10.36 2.95 
2 Std Dev 32.11 9.15 
3 Sum 290.00 82.62 
4 Variance 1031.02 83.69 
5 Euc Norm 178.53 50.86 
6 Minimum 0.00 0.00 
7 Maximum 170.00 48.43 
Network Centralization Index = 47.17% 
Table 5.2 








1 168.00 4.11 ACW 
2 46.00 1,07 CFN 
3 204.00 • 4.751 CHG 
4 207.00 ‘ 4.82 CKW 
5 154.00 3.79 CMF 
6 861.00 21.08 CSM 
7 207.00 4.82 CTS 
8 56.00 1.31 CWC 
9 168.00 4.11 CWS 
10 164.00 4.05 CYH 
11 36.00 0.83 CYT 
12 -241.00 5.95 KFS 
13 36.00 0.83 LCK 
14 191.00 4.72 LKC 
15 136.00 3.28 LKG 
16 151.00 3.68 LKS 
17 164•00 4.05 LWT 
18 164.00 4.05 LWW 
19 150.00 3.63 LYC 
20 164.00 4.05 SCK 
21 45.00 1.05 SHP 
22 166.00 4.06 SPL 
23 164 . 00 4. 05 TKW 
24 181.00 4.44 TWM 
25 181.00 4.44 TYW 
26 50.00 1.16 WKC 
27 219.00 5.10 WKK 
28 164.00 4.05 WYC 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR EACH MEASURE 
1 2 
FlowBet nFlowBet 
德 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 — — — — — — ^ - ― ― ― 
1 Mean 172.79 4.19 
2 Std Dev 144.67 3.55 
3 Sum 4838.00 117.35 
4 Variance 20928.74 12.57 
5 Euc Norm. 1192.45 29.05 
6 Minimum 36.00 0.83 
7 Maximum 861.00 21.08 
Network Centralization Index = 17.511% 
Table 5.3 
Flow Betweenness Centrality Measure 1991 
, 1 2 3 
i 
\ 
Fit: 0.640 (larger values indicate better fit) 
Group Assignments: 
1: 1 5 6 9 10 12 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 22 23 24 25 28 
2: 2 3 4 7 8 11 13 21 26 27 一 
« 
Grouped Adjacency Matrix 
1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 
1 6 7 8 5 6 4 2 9 0 5 2 0 8 5 3 4 9 4 3 7 8 2 3 1 6 7 1 
A L L L C C L S C C T K S W L T T L C L C C C C C W W S 
1 3 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 
16 1 3 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 
17 1 1 3 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 
18 1 1 2 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 
5 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 
6 2 1 1 1 3 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 
14 1 2 2 2 2 1 - 3 2 1 2 1 3 2 2 1 2 1 1 
22 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 3 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 
9 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 3 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 
10 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 3 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 
25 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 3 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 
12 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 1 2 2 1 
20 1 L 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 3 2 1 2 1 1 
28 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 3 1 2 1 1 
15 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 
23 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 3 1 1 
24 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 3 1 
19 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 
力 ^ “ 3 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 
^ 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 、 2 1 3 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 
7 丄 1 1 1 3 2 2 1 3 2 1 
8 1 1 1 2 3 1 1 2 2 1 
2 1 2 1 2 2 1 3 1 2 2 
^ ； 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 
U 1 1 1 3 2 1 3 2 1 
2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 3 2 
2 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 3 
21 — I 
Table 5.5 
Factions Identified within the District Board 1991 
/ 
\ 
4. Supportive Network of the District Board 
The supportive network of the District Board (recording the supportive 
behaviours in the board meetings from April 1991 to March 1993) was having a 
density of 1.89，indicating that it was a rather cohesive one, mainly through the 
mutual support among the members. Nevertheless, it was a less centralized network 一 
than expected from their affiliations (Table 5.6). 
Affiliation Network Supportive Network 
Closeness 44.87% 10-52% 
Betweenness 47 • 17% 11,50^ 
Flow Betweenness 17 . 51% | 9 ,51^ 
— Table 5 .6 一 
Centrality Measures of the Affiliation and Supportive 
Networks 
There were great differences between the expected supportive behaviour 
(as implied from the structure — the affiliation network) and the observed 
supportive behaviour (as shown by the supportive network). Again, the 18 liberals 
were not at the same position in relation to the power centre. As shown in Figure 
5.1，the 18 liberals could actually be divided into two cores with respect to their 
proximity to the power centre. The most proximal members to the power centre were 
ACW(#1), CSM(#6), CYH(#10), KFS(#12), LKC(#14), LKS(#16), LYC(#19), 
SPL(#22), TYW(#25), and WYC(#28). The other liberals only occupy the second 
layer of the power core. The appointed members 丨were occupying different layers 
also. CKW(#4), CYT(#11), SHP(#21), and WKK(#27) were more proximal to the 
power centre by occupying the third layer. The other appointed members were 
further away from the power centre, with CTS(#7) farthest from the power centre. 
Here，LKG(#15) was originally an active member of the liberal camp in 1988-91，but 
here he was farthest from the power centre. Due to personal problems, he chose to 
detach from the camp and was also being alienated in the board. 
It should be noted that the liberals at the core of the power centre were those 
of the Tisng Yi Concern Group (ACW, CSM, KFS, and TYW), the Service Centre 




for Neighbours and Workers (LYC and SPL), and the Hong Kong Association for 
Democracy and People's Livelihood (LKC and LKS). Such an affiliation of these 
core members did in fact had significant implication for the great divide of the liberal 
camp to be mentioned shortly. 
F i t : 0.322 (larger values indicate better fit) 
Group Assignments: 
1： 2 4 1 1 1 3 2 1 2 7 
2 : 5 9 1 0 1 7 1 8 2 0 2 3 2 4 2 8 
3 : 1 6 1 2 14 1 6 1 9 2 2 2 5 
4： 3 7 8 1 5 2 6 
Grouped Adjacency Matrix 
1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 
4 2 3 1 1 7 7 5 9 0 8 8 3 4 0 2 1 4 9 2 6 5 6 5 8 6 3 7 
C C L S C W L C C C W L T T S K A L L S C T L L C W C C 
4 8 1 1 1 1 
2 8 1 
1 3 8 1 1 
21 1 8 1 1 ^ ^ 
11 1 1 8 1 1 1 1 1 
27 1 1 4 1 1 8 1 1 
17 8 4 1 3 4 3 4 2 3 
5 4 8 1 3 4 3 3 2 4 1 
9 1 1 8 1 1 3 1 
10 3 3 1 8 5 2 2 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2 8 4 4 1 4 8 3 3 1 3 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
18 3 4 2 3 8 3 . 3 1 2 
23 4 3 2 3 3 8 2 1 
24 1 1 2 1 2 8 1 
20 1 1 1 5 8 1 
12 R 1 1 1 I 8 3 4 4 2 4 4 2 
1 1 1 3 8 2 2 2 3 3 1 
. 1 1 4 2 8 2 2 3 3 1 
19 1 1 1 1 . 1 2 2 ( 2 8 4 2 2 1 1 1 
22 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 : 2 4 8 2 2 1 
1 1 1 1 4 3 3 2 2 8 3 1 
2 5 1 3 1 1 8 3 3 2 2 3 8 
1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 8 
- t " 8 o 
26 ] ； 3 
？ 1 1 
；— — ； 
Table 5-7 
Factions Identified through Analysis of Support in Meetings 




It was also interesting to note that CYH and WYC, who were members of the 
UDHK, were also at the core. 
Four factions could be identified among the District Board members according 
to their mutual supportive behaviours in the board meetings (Table 5.7), with a 
goodness of fit of 0.322. There were two factions observed within the original 18 
liberals. A faction consisted of CMF(#5), CWS(#9), CYH(#10), LWT(#17)， 
LWW(#18), SCK(#20), TKW(#23), TWM(#24) and WYC(#28). They were mainly 
members of UDHK and close associates of LWT, with the exception of TWM and 
CWS, who were originally members of the Tsing Yi Concern Group. Another 
faction included the other liberals from the Tsing Yi Concern Group, the Hong Kong 
Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood, and the Service Centre for 
Neighbours and Workers. 
Why were such discrepancies existed between expected and observed 
behaviour ？ The development of the national political market and the Direct Election 
of the Legislative Council in September 1991 were the key issues that differentiate 
these two factions. 
5. Split of the T.iheral Camp 
Before the election of the Legislative Council in September 1991，the 17 
liberals (excluding LKG due to the reason mentioned earlier) had frequent 
cooperations not just inside the District Board, but also in organizing protest actions 
outside the board. With a pattern similar to the manoeuvre in 1988-91, they joined 
together in signature campaigns, press conferences, and petitions. As reported by the 
Kwai Tsing Star Post in the three months from June to August, they cooperated in 
several incidences by joining force together (Table 5.8). 
1 2 7 
\ 
Date Incidence Involved Members 
June 91 Lobbying Transport Department LWT, TYW, KFS 
on bus service -
July 91 Statement objecting Surcharge ACW,CMF,CSM,CWS,CY 
of MTR 一 H,KFS,LKC,LKS,LWT, 
一 LWW,LYC,SCK,SPL,TK W,TWM,TYW 
Aug 91 Statement objecting the Speaker: TWM 
building of Container Terminal 
by Tsing Yi Concern Group 
Aua 91Statement concerning problems CMF,CSM,CWS,CYH,KF 
of bank operations S,LKC,LKS,LWT,LWW' LYC,SPL,TKW,TWM,TY 
W = = = 
“ Table 5.8 “ 
cooperation of the Liberal Camp before 91 Direct Election 
It could be observed that the cooperation were including members from the 
two factions identified earlier. Moreover, TWM was still representing the Tsing Yi 
Concern Group. But the Direct Election of Legislative Council in September 1991 
had sparkled the great divide between these two factions. 
Four candidates run in the election, including LWT, LYC, CWY (an 
incumbent Tsuen Wan District Board member and Regional Councillor), and a 
candidate from the conservative camp. LWT had gained in general the support from 
the liberal members of the Kwai Tsing District Board and the significant concern 
groups and residents' organizations within the district. However, there was a great 
discrepancy on the support to another candidate. 
Kwai Tsing District was included in the New Territory South constituency in 
the election, joined by the Tsuen Wan District and the Islands District. Two 
members would be returned from the election. LWT chose to run in partnership with 
CWY, the candidate from Tsuen Wan. However, many of the liberals in Kwai Tsing 
preferred to support another candidate from the Kwai Tsing District, LYC. One of 
the reason for LWT to choose CWY as partner rather than LYC was the exchange 




of votes anticipated, besides the differences in ideological orientation and the strength 
of ties between LWT--CWY and LWT--LYC. As mentioned earlier, LYC and LWT 
did not establish a very strong tie, as both of them were two of the foci identified in 
1985-88 and 1988-91. In addition to this structural constraints, the votes expected 
to receive by running partnership with CWY would be higher than with LYC. 
Another reason for this anticipation was that LWT and CWY were having a stong 
basis at two different districts (Tsuen Wan and Kwai Tsing). Thus, by presenting a 
balanced interest for the two districts, it was anticipated that the voters would 
more prone to vote for the pair coming from two different districts rather than 
coming from the same districts. 
Moreover, LWT and CWY were long time comrades in community activities. 
They were both the founding members of the Hong Kong Association for Democracy 
and People's Livelihood. They were also Regional Councillors since 1986. With the 
setting up of the United Democrats of Hong Kong, both of them were then became 
founding members and members of Central Committee of the political party. On the 
other hand, LYC was not, and was expected as would not in the future, a member， 
of the United Democrats of Hong Kong. Hence, in addition to the exchange of votes, 
strong political ties established for a long time and the possible benefits for the 
development of the political party also urge LWT to choose CWY rather than LYC. 
As recalled by an informant, those supporting LYC Included the members of 
Tsing Yi, LKC and LKS. In fact, not all the members of the UDHK supported 
CWY. But due to the party loyalty and the close association with LWT, they could 
not object such an arrangement. They could only choose to become passive and 
detached in the election campaign. Within the Tsing Yi Concern Group, the opinion 
of the six members were also not the same. However, due to the constraint by the 
group solidarity, they had to vote in a block vote manner. That is, once the 
group had made decision, all the members had to vote for the decision. But such 
incongruence within the group had later given rise to the split within themselves, with 
TWM and CWS withdrawn from the concern group and formed a new concern group 





The great divide among the liberal camp was then resulted. At the very 
beginning, LKC was elected the chairman of the District Board. It was in fact an 
exchange with LWT, the chairman of the District Board in last term. With his active 
personality in board affairs and as one of the four foci identified in the last term, 
LWT and the associates supported LKC to be the chairman, in anticipating an 
exchange later to gain his support to LWT in the election to Legislative Council. 
However, LWT expected the support of LKC and the others, not only to him but also 
to his partner. On the other hand, LKC and the members from Tsing Yi would 
expect LWT to run in partnership with LYC as an exchange to their support to him. 
According to the aggression/approval proposition by George 
Homans (Romans, 1974), aggression would result if the resources were not rewarded 
as expected in an exchange relation. Thus, both the two parties in the above 
exchange would feel that their expected reward was not fulfilled by the other party 
in the exchange. Hence, aggressive behaviour resulted. But LKC (also a member 
of the Hong Kong Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood) and KFS(a 
member of the Tsing Yi Concern Group and the Hong Kong Association for 
Democracy and People's Livelihood) were in fact also members of the UDHK，why 
did they not following the party line of UDHK to support both LWT as CWY ？ 
Recalled by TKW, it was perhaps due to the development of the national 
political market, which in turn would have great impact on the personal political 
development. LWT was a core member of the UDHK, which was perceived as a 
strong political party; whereas LKC was having a more promising development 
in the HKADPL. He was a member of the first term of the Monitoring Committee 
of the HKADPL, and the Vice-chairman of the committee in the second term. 
Later, he was elected the Vice-Chairman of the Hong Kong Association for 
Democracy and People's Livelihood. Thus, in his exchange relation with LWT, the 
resources possessed by LWT were not as valuable as before. LKC had established 
alternative ties in getting these resources. It meant that he could no longer be so 
dependent on the exchange transactions with LWT. The power-dependency relation 
had been deminishing between them. 
1 3 0 
\ 
In the same token, Tsing Yi Concern Group was rather monopolizing in Tsing 
Yi community affairs, LWT and thus UDHK had little to exchange for them. They 
did not value much on the resources UDHK and LWT was possessing. In addition, 
the Tsing Yi members could find alternatives even if they valued the resources 
offered by LWT and UDHK. They found HKADPL the viable alternative. Although 
HKADPL was not perceived as strong as UDHK in the national political market, it 
could provide opportunities for exposure on local issues through the system of 
spokesmanship. Although the Tsing Yi Concern Group was only a community-based 
concern group, they could gain bargaining power and thus increasing the successful 
rate in local issues through the channels provided by HKADPL. For example, 
through the established channels provided by HKADPL, ineinbers of the Tsing Yi 
Concern Group was able to make direct dialogues with top government officials on 
community issues such as the building of CT9 and the Route No.3. Thus, as 
alternatives were available, the exchange relation between the Tsing Yi members as 
a collective actor and LWT and associates as another collective actor was not as 
valuable as before. With the stimulation of such unfulfilled expectations, aggression 
resulted, and hence gave rise to the great divide among the liberal camp established 
previously. 
6. Aftermath of the Conflict 
1 
After the Legislative Council election in September 1991, the configuration 
of the total network was restructured. With the more active Involvement of the Kwai 
Tsing Branch of UDHK in community issues, the conflict between these two factions 
of the liberal camp not only took place in the board meetings, but also in protest 
actions. The District Board members of the UDHK would usually organize protest 
actions in the name of UDHK Kwai Tsing Branch, and the members from HKADPL, 
Tsing Yi Concern Group, and Service Centre for Neighbours and Workers always 
join together to organize community protest actions. 




For example, TWM had withdrawn from the Tsing Yi Concern Group after 
the election in September, and formed the Action Group in Protesting 
Against the Construction of Container Terminal No, 9 in October. 
It was the antecedent of the later Tsing Yi Action Group. In May 1992, 
ACW，CSM, KFS, LKC，LKS, LYC, SPL，TYW, Tsing Yi Concern Group, and the 
Service Centre for Neighbours and Workers had joined together in a questionnaire 
survey on the rent increase of public housing in the district, without involving the 
members of UDHK and the Tsing Yi Action Group. It was observed that the 
competition among the two factions became very heated later on. Particularly in 
community issues in Tsing Yi, whenever the Tsing Yi Action Group and LWT jointly 
organize a protest action, the Tsing Yi Concern Group would follow suite 
immediately, and vice versa. There was even an event of direct confrontation 
between the UDHK and the Tsing Yi Concern Group. In June 1992, the Tsing Yi 
Concern Group, led by TYW, went to the headquarter of UDHK to protest their 
support of the postponement of building of the New Airport Railway which passed 
through Tsing Yi and was perceived as a method to solve the traffic congestion 
problem of Tsing Yi. 
Right after the 1991 LC election, LKC and KFS had withdrawn their 
membership from UDHK, and TYW had joined the HKADPL as a member. LKC 
was later elected the Vice-Chairman of HKADPL, and the spokesman for the group 
on land and infrastructural affairs, and on political development. On the other hand, 
TWM had joined the UDHK after the conflict. • 
\ 
The cohesiveness of the supportive network of the whole board has then 
decreased after the 1991 LC election. Data of supportive behaviours in the board 
meetings was divided into before and after the Legislative Council election in 
September 1991 up to March 1993 (Table 5.9). 




Measures Before (4/91 - 9/91) After (11/91-3/93) 
Closeness 10.52% 8.08% 
Betweenness 11.50% 10.78% 
Flow Betweenness 9.51% 8.23% 
• Table “ 
Changes in the Centrality Measures of the Total Network 
All the three centrality measures showed that the total supportive network of 
the District Board was less cohesive than before the election. But referring to the 
affiliation network after September 1991, the network was a more centralized one, 
due to the more clearly classification of their respective affiliations (as they had 
already settled down in their changes of affiliations such as TWM joining the UDHK, 
KFS and LKC quitting the membership of UDHK, and TYW joining the HKADPL, 
making multiple membership less frequently occurred, and thus the demarcation of 
affiliations more clear). The closeness measure was 44,87%，and the degree measure 
was 24.79%. 
With this clearer demarcation, it could be seen from Figure 5.2 that the 
members of the UDHK were playing roughly structural equivalent positions in the 
District Board. For example, TWM, CMF，LWT, CYH, LWW, TKW, SCK, and 
WYC were at the structural equivalent postitions. On the other hand, TYW and 
KFS, and LKC and LKS were at structural equivalent positions respectively. 
1 3 3 
HIERARCHICAL CLUSTERING OF EQUIVALENCE MATRIX 
C L C C W C C C S W C C L L L L S A K T T C L C L T S W 
Y C F W K H T K H K S W K Y ^K K P C F Y W M W Y W K C Y 
T K N C C G S W P K ' . M S G CTS C L W S W M F T H W W K C 
1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 
L e v e l 1 3 2 8 6 3 7 4 1 7 6 9 5 9 6 4 2 1 2 5 4 5 7 0 8 3 0 8 
o T o o r XXX r「「「x"xx一 XXX XXXXXXXXXXX 
1 . 4 1 4 XXX . . . . XXXXX • • XXX . XXX • • XXX . xxxxxxxxxxxxx 
1 487 XXX . . . . XXXXX • . XXX . XXX • . XXX xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
1 609 XXX . . . . XXXXX . . XXXXX XXX . . XXX xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
2 • 000 XXX XXX • • XXXXX . . XXXXX XXXXX . XXX xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
2 ' 2 7 0 XXX XXX . XXXXXXX • • XXXXX XXXXX • XXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
2*552 XXX XXXXX XXXXXXX • . XXXXX XXXXX . XXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
2*576 XXX XXXXX XXXXXXX . • XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
2*646 XXX XXXXX XXXXXXX . . XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
2*774 XXX XXXXX XXXXXXXXX • XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
3*227 XXX XXXXX XXXXXXXXX • XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
3*569 XXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXX . XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
3*897 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX • XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
4*010 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
5*069 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
10 . 769 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
Figure 5.2 
structural Equivalent Positions of the Board Members 
By collecting the data of the chairmanships and influence in the board 







Committee Com. District Consul- Failure Failure 
Chairman V.P. Com. of tative in com. in V.P. 
RC com. of Chair electn 
HA electn of com. 
ACW* I — 
CHG+ 1 I I 
CMFe I 
CSM* 1 I 
CWC+ 1 
CYH@ 1 1 1 
CYT+ 1 -
K F S * 1 1 ^ — 
L C K + 1 1 I I 
L K S * 1 I 
Lwwe 1 
SCKQ I 
SHP+ l i 
TKW§ 1 
TYW* 1 1 
WKC+ 
WKK+ I 1 I 
Table 5.10 
Distribution of Important Posts in the District Board 1991-
93 
( * 二 members of Tsing Yi Concern Group or HKADPL 
+ = appointed member ‘ 
@ = member of UDHK ) 
It could be seen that the chairmanships and vice-chairmanships were mainly 
occupied by the board members from Tsing Yi Concern Group or the Hong Kong 
Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood. The board members of UDHK 
were in generally excluded from the chairmanships, except TKW and LWW, who had 
been elected as the chairman of a committee once. But it should be noted that TKW 







chairmanship, while the members from Tsing Yi Concern Group and HKADPL had 
not faced any failure. It was also important to note that the two failures 
Fit: 0.250 (larger values indicate better fit) 
Group Assignments: . 
5 9 10 17 18 20 23 .24 28 
2� 2 3 4 7 8 13 15 26 27 
3: 1 6 11 12 14 16 19 21 22 25 
Grouped Adjacency Matrix 
j i i l lMii i i i 
18 f s 3 3 3 3 2 r i 2 
9 8 1 1 1 1 1 3 
1 7 3 1 8 4 4 3 3 1 3 丄 丄 1 4 1 1 
2 8 3 1 4 8 4 3 4 1 3 
5 3 1 4 4 8 4 3 2 3 
20 8 1 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 0 2 1 3 5 3 3 8 1 2 丄 
24 2 1 2 1 1 8 
23 3 3 3 3 2 2 8 
2:小 1 1 8 、 8 1 … 
3 . 1 “ 8 1 
： “ ‘ i 8 2 2 1 3 3 3 2 
1 1 ^ . 1 1 1 2 8 1 4 1 1 2 2 2 2 
19 1 1 1 1 1 8 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 2 4 1 8 1 1 2 2 2 2 
22 1 1 1 2 1 1 8 1 2 1 1 
16 1 1 1 1 1 1 8 
21 -… 3 2 2 8 8 3 3 
25 1 1 3 3 4 1 2 2 4 8 4 4 
12 1 1 1 3 2 2 1 3 4 8 3 
6 1 1 2 2 2 1 3 4 3 8 
14 1 1 一 1 L ‘ 
" Table 5.11 
Factions Identified 1992 
… — — — 
1 3 6 
\ 
CORRELATION MATCHES 
Observed value: 0.594 0.358 
Average: -0.003 0.224 
Standard deviation: : 0.177 0.037 
proportion as large: 0.000 0,000 
Proportion as small: 1.000 1.000 
proportion as extreme: 0.000 1.000 
Table 5.12 
Correlation between the Affiliation and Supportive Network 
TKW had faced were beaten by the appointed members，which implied that the 
liberals other than the UDHK members had supported the respective appointed 
members instead of supporting the liberals from UDHK. This was in fact an 
indication of the formation of coalition between these liberals and the appointed 
members. 
The above mentioned observed coalition was further reinforced by the 
occupation of chiarmanships and vice-chairmanships by the appointed members. 
CYT，LCK，and CHG had been elected to chairmanships, while LCK, WKK, and 
CHG were also elected as vice-chairmen of committees. As the liberals had occupied 
a majority in the board, the appointed members should not have any chance to be 
elected. Thus, this situation just reflected the fact that they were supported by some 
liberals, those non-UDHKs. Then, it was the non-UDHK members who were most 
proximal to the power centre, with the UDHK members only at the peripheral. 
Although the members from the UDHK were the largest single group in the Distr 
Board, they became the minority in the board after the coalition among the r 
UDHKs. 
Hence, there were three factions to be identified by the observatior 






included the UDHK members. The second faction consisted the appointed members. 
The last faction consisted of the non-UDHK liberals, but included an appointed 
member, CYT^m). 
Why would the non-UDHK liberals forming coalition with the appointed 
members, but not with the UDHK members as before ？ As mentioned before, the 
91 Legislative Council election was the major catalyst of such realignment of the non-
UDHK liberals with the appointed members. It was found that the supportive 
behaviours in the board meetings were greatly correlated with their affiliations (Table 
5.12, 0.594，p < 0.01). That is, the non-UDHKs were forming coalition to act 
against the UDHK members. Thus, the development of the national political market 
did had a great impact on local politics. As analysed earlier, there existed 
competition between the liberal parties UDHK and HKADPL in the national level. 
Such competition was observed to have been extended to the Kwai Tsing District 
Board. Since the landslide victory of the UDHK in the three levels of elections in 
1991，it had attracted attention from others, and also posed a potential threat to others 
who participated in politics or had commited for personal political development. The 
UDHK became the political party having the largest number of board members (Table 
5.13). 
Political Party Legco UC/RC DB members members members 
UDHK ‘ 10 52 
Liberal Democratic 4 3 50 
Federation of Hong 
Kong — 
. „ . . ！ • -J 1 11 
Meeting Point f — 
“ n 2 14 
HKADPL 1 丨 j Table 5,13 





In facing such potential threat, the non-UDHK liberals and the appointed 
members then were able to construct a common enemy: the UDHK. Before such 
a coalition, the members from the Tsing Yi Concern Group was only having a small 
number of board members (6，later decreased to 4 as TWM and CWS had withdrawn) 
and was a minority compared to UDHK, Members of HKADPL, the Service Centre 
for Neighbours and Workers, and the independent liberals were also minorities 
comparing to the strong grouping of the UDHK members. Similarly, the appointed 
members were obviously the minority in the board. By constructing this common 
enemy, these weaks could than become strong by forming a coalition 
among themselves. 
But such a coalition was not based on commonality in ideology or beliefs. It 
was just formed to ensure the benefits of each of them. Thus, it was a coalition 
based on exchange relations among them. By engaging in the exchange network, 
resources could be exchanged. The distribution of chairmanships, vice-
chairmanships, and delegates to other consultative bodies could be made among 
themselves. The analysis on the proximity to power centre earlier had clearly 
reflected the operation of this exchange network. Besides, by engaging in this 
exchange network, the involved members could be ensured a strong hold on the board 
affairs, such as the allocation of funding available to the board and prestiges that 
followed. But allocating some chairmanships and vice-chairmanships to the appointed 
members，the non-UDHK liberals would in return getting the support from the 
appointed members in board affairs' ： 
The Tsing Yi Concern Group chose to form coalition with the HKADPL 
rather than UDHK not only because of the conflict in the 1991 Legco election, but 
also in the fact that the resources UDHK had possessed could be found in other 
alternatives. Ties to national political figures, insider information on matters 
concerning Tsing Yi, and the manpower and material support by the party could also 
be seeked from HKADPL. As an alternative was available, the 
resources exchanged by the UDHK members were not as 
valuable as before • Thus, combining with the consideration of the threat 
1 3 9 J 
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from the fast development of the UDHK, the Tsing Yi Concern Group had chosen 
the alternative exchange relations. 
As this coalition was based on merely exchange relations, it was not a tightly-
knited network. The density of this subgraph (Table 5.13) was 1.87, and it was not 
a h i g h l y c e n t r a l i z e d n e t w o r k . 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 9 1 2 5 6 7 
A C C C C C C C C K L L L L L S S T W W 
C F H K S T W W Y F C K K K Y H P Y K K 
W N G W M S C S T S K C G S C P L W C K ： 一 - - - - - - 一 
1 R 1 3 3 2 1 2 2 3 
2 R 2 1 1 
3 R3 1 1 1 1 
4 R 4 1 。 … ” 7 
6 R 6 3 4 3 1 2 2 3 
7 R 7 
8 R 8 
9 R 9 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 R l l 1 1 ^ , o A 2 4 
1 2 R 1 2 3 4 1 4 2 4 2 4 
1 3 R 1 3 . o 2 3 
1 4 R 1 4 2 3 4 1 2 2 3 
1 5 R 1 5 ^ ^ 9 1 1 
1 6 R 1 6 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 
1 9 R 1 9 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 4 2 1 
21 R21 1 t o 9 1 4 1 2 1 
2 2 R 2 2 2 1 2 1 ， ^ 1 4 1 2 
2 5 R 2 5 3 3 8 3 2 2 
R26 1 4 1 1 1 1 
2 7 R 2 7 1 1 ^ 
Table 5.13 
supportive Network of the non-UDHKs 1992 




It indicated that the members in this coalition were not so cohesive. The 
closeness measure was just 8.91%, the betweenness measure 11.55%, and the flow 
betweenness 16.55%. In view of this loosely-knited network, there were in fact 
differences in their relative proximity to the power centre (Figure 5.3). The core was 
mainly occupied by the active non-UDHK liberals rather than the appointed members. 
At the core were ACW(#1), CSM(#5), KFS(#10), LKC(#12), LKS(#14), LYC(#15)， 
SPL(#17), and TYW(#18). As observed earlier, they had already made frequent 
cooperations in organizing protest actions outside the board. Thus, it was not 
unexpected that they formed the core of the power centre of the District Board. Four 
appointed members occupied positions at the second power layer. They were 
CKW(#4)，CYT(#9)，SHP(#16) and WKK(#20). Except CKW and SHP were 
incumbent members of the last term of the District Board, CYT and WKK were new 
members/ 
Unlike the loose coaltion of the non-UDHKs, the UDHK members had formed 
a closely-knited partial-network among themselves. The density of this subgraph was 
2.80，much higher than the density of 1.87 of the loose coaltion of the non-UDHKs. 
Nevertheless, as TWM(#7) was a new comer of the UDHK, it was thus not 
unexpected that he was having a less cohesive relation with all the other seven 
incumbent UDHK members (Figure 5.4). In addition, after withdrawn from the 
Tsing Yi Concern Group, he found the alternative of getting resources previously 
provided by the Tsing Yi Concern Group. By engaging in the exchange relation with 
the UDHKs, he got resources valuable to him, especially when in persistent conflict 
of the previous group. Similarly, UDHK found the Tsing Yi Action Group as an 
alternative to Tsing Yi Concern Group in the involvement of co麵unity issues in 
Tsing Yi. Thus, in exchange the resources UDHK (and LWT) had supplied to 
TWM，they got back the chance of involvement in community issues of Tsing Yi 
through TWM, who had already established his own patron-client relationship with 
the voters. An exchange relation was then established. 
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K~CORE PARTITIONING 
DEGREE 1 2 3 4 5 6 8 7 
7 • • • • • • • • 
6 XXXXXXXXXXXXX . 
5 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
Figure 5.4 
K-core of the UDHKs 
By further analyze the individual flow betweenness measures, it was found that 
LWT(#R17) was still the most resourceful person among the members of UDHK in 
Kwai Tsing District Board (Table 57). It was easily understood. LWT was already 
the most resourceful member in the previous terms and was one of the foci from 
which other members were evolving around him. Thus, although he had lost his 
influence in the District Board in this term, he was still the member through which 
most resources were flowing, due to his ties with national political figures and 
political parties, and by his status as a Legislative Councillor. 
But in the board affairs, LWW and TKW were the only pair of UDHKs who 
could became a chairman of committee, and they occupied a struuctiiral equivalent 
position (Figure 5.5). It should be noticed that WYC’ CYH，and TWM were at no 
equivalent position with any other members. 
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structural Equivalence Matrix 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
CMF CYH LWT LWW SCK TKW TWM WYC 
1 R5 0.00 3.00 1.41 2.65 4 3 . 16 6.40 2.83 
2 RIO 3.00 0.00 2 . 6'5 2 . 65 5:20 2.83 6.86 3.32 
3 R17 1.41 2.65 0.00 2.45 4.69 2.65 5.83 2.45 
4 R18 2.65 2.65 2.45 0.00 2,00 1.00 4.47 4.12 
5 R2 0 4.00 5.20 4.69 2.00 0.00 1.73 4.00 5.57 
6 R23 3.16 2.83 2.65 1.00 1.73 0.00 4.47 4.24 
7 R24 6.40 6.86 5.83 4.47 4.00 4.47 0.00 7.62 
8 R28 2.83 3.32 2.45 4.12 5.57 4.24 7.62 0.00 
HIERARCHICAL CLUSTERING OF EQUIVALENCE MATRIX 
T S T L C C L W 
W C K W Y M W Y 
M K W W H F T C 
Level 7 5 6 4 2 1 3 8 — — — — — — — — 
1.000 . . XXX . • • • 
1,414 • • XXX • XXX . 
1.821 • XXXXX . XXX . 
2.57 6 . XXXXX . XXXXX 
3.096 . XXXXX XXXXXXX 
3.865 . XXXXXXXXXXXXX 
6.174 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
Figure 5.5 
Structural Equivalent Positions of the UDHKs 
As TWM was the only UDHK member in Tsing Yi, and being the chairman 
of the Tsing Yi Action Group, his particularity could readily be observed. But the 
situation of CYH and WYC worth further mention. 
Referring to Table 5.11 earlier, though there were three tactions being 
identified，there still existed communication ties between the faction of UDHKs and 
associates (18,9，17，28，5,20，10,24, and 23) and the faction of non-UDHKs 
(1,19,11,22,16,21,25,12,6,14). But the ties were mainly through two actors of the 
UDHK faction: #28 and #10. They were WYC and CYH respectively. As CYH had 
a personal kinship tie with a member of the Tsing Yi Concern Group, CSM, 
1 4 3 
and he was perceived by them as a more amenable UDHK member, he was more 
accepted by them than other UDHK members who were always perceived as too 
threatening. Moreover, he had chosen a rather low-profile image about his UDHK 
involvement in the district. Thus, he could act as a broker in communicating with 
the non-UDHK faction. Whereas WYC w ^ also taking a low-profile image in his 
UDHK label. Although he was a member of the 'Kwai Tsing Sevens' since 1985， 
and then a District Board member since then, he was rather detached from the board 
affairs and from the network of the liberals. He was perceived as even more low-
profile than CYH in his political orientation, and was not strict in his group identity. 
It could be understood that he was one of the few UDHKs that could be more 
accepted by the non-UDHKs. 
Thus，although the UDHKs as a collective actor was always at odds with the 
non-UDHK liberals, some of the UDHK members were still able to maintain a not 
so bad relationship with them. Then, would it be the case that a restructuring of the 
liberals be taken place in the near future, with some UDHKs rejoining the non-
XJDHKS, or vice versa ？ Only time would tell. 







1. Tmpact of Exchange Relations to Structure of Political Network 
The changes of the four generations of the Kwai Tsing District Board analysed 
in previous chapters had illustrated the impact of exchange relations to the exchange 
network configurations, and in return, the structural constraints of the exchange 
network on individual political behaviours. 
Unlike economic exchange relations, the political exchange relations of the 
board members were not based on monetary exchanges. Similarities in political 
orientation was one of the factors for the establishment of political networks. The 
liberals were more concern about the political representative and borkerage roles 
in the elite-mass relation with the voters in general. Unlike the conservatives, they 
identify with the need to be accountable to the voters. For example, in a survey by 
the Tsuen Wan Star Post on October 22, 1986, all the liberals reported that they 
would be accountable、to the voters through publication and distribution of 
performance reports, posters, and residents' meetings. On the other hand, the 
conservatives did not respond to the survey. Moreover, the liberals were having 
similar attitude towards the development of political systems in Hong Kong, asking 
for continual democratization. Their platforms as reflected during elections were also 
very similar. Thus, the political network was established partly based on such 
common political ideologies. Thus, ideological differences had to certain 
extent contributed to the differences in dyadic relations in the network. At the very 
beginning of the development of the District Board, such ideological differences had 
helped the demarcation of what was called the "conservatives" and the "liberals". 
Based on this demarcation, more detail analyses of the partial networks were then 
possible in the previous chapters. 
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In fact, the ideological difference between the "conservatives" and the 
"liberals" had not only helped to demarcate between the two right at the beginning, 
it was also useful in explaining some political behaviours of the District Board 
members subsequently. For example，although the liberals belonging to UDHK and 
non-UDHK had split among themselves into:fwo factions after the conflict during the 
1991 direct election of Legislative Council, these two factions had jointed force in 
promoting democratic development m Hong Kong. In June 1992，almost a year after 
the conflict, members from the UDHK (CMF, CYH, SCK, LWW, LWT, and TKW) 
and those liberals of non-UDHK (LKC, CSM, LKS, LYC and SPL) had jointly 
announced a statement requesting the total abolishment of the Appointed Member 
System. But this was the only incidence recorded after the conflict up to 1993 that 
the previous liberal camp had realigned together, and U was a one-shot action. No 
more cooperation could be observed shortly before and after the conflict m 1991. It 
was evidenced that no cooperation was observed concerning the livelihood matters 
or community issue. Cooperation was observed only in the above mentioned pohucal 
issue, which had reflected a clear pro-democratic ideology. Thus, ideology could be 
used to explain some of the political behaviours observed. 
However, why then was there splits and great divide among the liberal camp 
if the network was established on the basis of ideological commonality? In fact, the 
platforms of the later conflicting camps of liberals were of no great difference. The 
reason for such a split was that the poUucal network established among the liberals 
was not one depended solely on political ideology, but also on exchange relations. 
AS analysed m the previous chapters，the cohesiveness and duration of such an 
exchange network would be intluencd by the nature of exchange relations wUhin the 
network. As discussed b y Ekeh (1974), a g e n e r a l i z e d exchange would help 
to reinforce the group solidary in which the parties of the exchange t ransac t : 
belonged to, through the L a . o f Extended C r ed i t . As the engaged parties did 
not receive the benefits from the party to whom they have provided benehts， 
mentality of trust had to be established so that the benefits would be returned by 
someone else in the excahnge network. On the other hand, a r e s t r i c t e d 
exchange would not help to reinforce the group solidarity as the two parties would 





directly benefiting each other, but not receiving or giving benefits to any other parties 
within the exchange network. As mentioned in the previous chapters, the within 
group solidarity around the foci was then reinforced, while the inter-group solidarity 
was not. The nature of the exchange transaction thus contributed to the later split of 
within the liberal camp. f 
On the other hand, it could be seen from the previous chapters that the 
structure of the exchange network had in turn constraining the political behaviour of 
the individual actors. Those possessing more resources for exchange which were 
valued by the others could occupy a more prestigious position within the network. 
They became the foci by which others would evlove around them. This situation was 
in fact the sowing seeds for the alignment and disintegration of the liberal camp in 
the ten years under this study. Indices of the centrality of the actors had provided 
valuable information on the gathering and dividing of the liberals. That is, the 
respective positions of the actors in the network had given contraints to their future 
behaviours in exchange transactions. Hence, by identifying the characteristics of the 
position and role of the actors, their exchange behaviours and orientations towards 
coalition formations could be predicted (Lawler & Youngs，1975; Lawler, 1992). 
2. Impact of the Context: Application of Political Market Concept 
i ； 
Besides the above mentioned structural constraints of the exchange network 
on individual behaviours, the concepts of political market could also shed light on the 
explanation o f the changes in the network during the ten years (Tang, 1993). 
Borrowing the concepts from the discipline of Marketing Studies, it was 
found that it had made a vivid yet sensible explanation to the changes of the political 
exchange network. As in this case, the conservatives could not identify the potential 
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into the political market earlier than the liberals, they could not fulfill the political 
demands of the voters. That is, they could not act as competent suppliers to these 
political demands. But at that time before 1985, they had monopolysed the 
community political market. Thus it was natural that they gathered together to form 
a cartel (which is a combination of independent companies in order to limit 
competition and increase profit) when they faced the challenge by the liberals after 
1985. In other words, what the form of a cartel means was also an exchange network 
among themselves, in which they could exchange for each other for the protection of 
mutual political benefits such as the chairmanships in the District Board. 
However, at the introductory stage of the new political market, the 
conservatives failed to secure their market share. Thus, by targeting to a specific 
market segment and position themselves to a more visible position to the 
voters, the liberals could then penetrate into the political market by increasing 
market share by developing new products (themselves which had a product 
image of political representatives helping to articulate the political demands of the 
voters) to satisfy the existing needs of the voters not fulfilled by the conservatives. 
As they were at a similar market positioning, the liberals then form another cartel 
(i.e. coalition) to compete with the conservatives. In social network analysis terms, 
the liberals were occupying roughly structural equivalent positions in 
the political market with,respect to the conservatives. 
As the liberals had established patron-client relationships with the voters from 
1985, the residents in the district had been conseientized and be more ready to 
articulate their political demands, probably through the brokerage roles of the liberals. 
Thus, the political market had entered into the growth stage in 1988, and the 
liberals had enlarged their market share by the continual effort in market-segment 
concentration and market development. The exchange network between the liberals 
as a collective actor and the mass as another had been reinforced, which also means 
that the mass is more dependent on these political actors through the strengthening 
of the patron-client relationship between these two parties. 





After the market-share holding at the maturity stage of the political 
market in 1988-91, the development of the national political market had stimulated 
the need for repositioning of the liberals. A survey reported by Ming Po on 
January 31, 1994 had reflected that the satisfactory rating of the United Democrats 
of Hong Kong and the Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood was head-
to-head in the race. UDHK scored 61.74% in July 1993, while HKADPL scored 
61.5% at the same time. Following the keen competition in the national political 
market among political parties, the liberals in the community who belonged to these 
two national political parties had to find out a way to secure their own market share 
in their respective power bases. Thus, diversification was on the way so that 
the market would be expanded by developing new products to satisfy derived new 
political demands of the voters. Cliques were then detected among the liberals, and 
factions were observed as this repositioning process took place. The disintegration 
of this previous strong political network and the realignment with the conservatives 
was thus a result of the attempts of product modification so that the greatest political 
profit would be enjoyed by the political actors through exchanges within the then 
restructured exchange network. 
3. Methodological Tmplications 
As reflected in this study, a structural an^ysis on the community power 
system using the exchange network approach might be able to provide a promising 
methodological tool to identify the configurations of the community power structure. 
By using a mix of methods in collecting data, the measure of routinized 
community-affairs articulated and entertained in the District Board was a viable 
alternative to identify the operational characteristics of the exchange network in 
comparing with the reputational method. Retrospective biases by informant 
interviews could also be minimized by such a choice of research mix. Validity of the 
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data thus gathered was then ensured through the convergence of information through 
informant interviews, archival analysis, and participant observation. 
However, the network analysis had to be interpreted complimentarily with the 
other methods mentioned in the above research mix. As the models presented in the 
network analysis would be Impossible to return a perfect degree of fitness (that's what 
a model means), inaccuracy or blurs had to be cleared out by taking the 
informations from the informants and the archival records into consideration. 
Besides, the most important limitation of network analysis as observed in this study 
was that it could not identify the political process behind the scene. For example, the 
backdoor manipulation by LWT could not be identified through network analysis on 
the expressed behaviours. Thus, informant interviews and retrospection by key 
figures could be used as complimentary measures. 
Nevertheless, this method of network analysis using quantitative data (or the 
transformation of qualitative data through content analysis) had the advantage over 
traditional sociometric analysis in that it provided more concrete and comprehensive 
information on the characteristics of the exchange network, especially complex 
networks. Although in this study, the network consisted only of 25 to 28 actors，it 
would be terribly cumbersome to present the network in a sociogram, or to provide 
adequate information through such a method without losing the details. 
； 
4. Further AppHrations of Evrhange Network Approach 
Followed by the mission of Emerson, the aims of connecting the micro-level 
and macro-level social theory and the link between abstract concepts and empirical 
research, exchange network models could offer a powerful framework for describing 
social differentiation in terms of relational patterns among actors in the system. The 
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subgroups, or as interconnected types within a whole system (Burt, 1980). 
As mentioned in the Introduction, this study did not take into consideration of 
the political behaviours of other political groups within the community, such as the 
Mutual-Aid-Committees, the residents' orgajlizations, and the concern groups in the 
community, due to reasons already explained. Nevertheless, exchange network 
analysis could be employed to study the interorganizational linkages of 
the community political groups, so that a more comprehensive political scenario could 
be understood. Analyses could be made on the identification of elements of structure 
of the interorganization network, by focusing on the linkages or information and 
resources exchanged among these community groups (i.e. the nodes) and the 
modalities of network formation among these groups. Moreover, the processes of 
formation and regularization of these interorganization networks, the process leading 
to the mobilization of individual community groups or partial networks around 
specific social policies concern, and the transformative or combinatorial processes by 
which interorganizational action within networks affecting the policies concerning the 
community (e.g. the linkages of community groups in protesting against rent increases 
of public housing estates) could be analysed (Laumann, Galaskiewicz, & Marsden， 
1978). 
Exchange network analysis could also be employed in the study of macro-level 
social phenomenon, such as the development of social movements. There were 
numerous studies on the social conflicts in Hong Kong. For example, the study by 
Cheung and Louie (1991) had provided very rich information on the history and trend 
of social conflicts in Hong Kong from 1975 to 1986. By using these information, 
patterns of interlocking among political groups could be identified by using network 
analysis. The,same approach could be appplied to the study of social movements. 
The process of mobilization and crystalization of social movements could be analysed 
by employing network analysis, so that significant characteristics and structure of the 
movements could be identified. 







By using a similar approach as in this study, the analytical tools used in studying 
community level political groupings would also be useful in analysing the process of 
changes of the national political market. It might be a viable alternative to understand 
the national political development in complimentary to the focus on the decolonization 
process and the development of national political leaders and political parties (Lau, 
1990; Tsang, 1993; Lui & Wong, 1992). 
Although still underdeveloped, especially in the study of local political 
developments, exchange network approach provided a promising potential power in 
this area, though extra efforts had to be paid for the effective utilization of this 
approach in local studies. 
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